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Infectious diseases
Infectious diseases are caused by pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, 
parasites or fungi that can be transmitted directly or indirectly [1]. If the number 
of cases of a disease is above what is normally expected in that population, in that 
season, in that geographical area, it is defined as an outbreak [2]. Epidemics and 
pandemics are outbreaks that are spread over a large geographical area (epidemic) or 
over several continents (pandemic), usually affecting a large number of people [3]. 
The outbreak frequency and the diversity of pathogens have increased significantly 
in the past decades [4, 5]. Due to globalization, urbanization, the rapid growth and 
mobility of the world population and the speed of travel, emerging and reemerging 
diseases pose an increasing risk to the world [6, 7], see figure 1. An infectious disease 
can spread to any part of the world within 24 hours. Outbreaks of communicable 
diseases have devastating societal consequences, putting them on a prominent place 
on the political agenda [8, 9]. 
The consequences of an outbreak can be regarded in terms of morbidity, mortality, 
feelings of fear and anxiety, absence from work, costs (direct and indirect) and 
changes in the organization of healthcare [11-16]. As outbreaks challenge the entire 
healthcare system and even society as a whole, preparedness and response are essential 
at all levels, from the local healthcare provider level to the global policy level. 
Recent outbreaks
Outbreaks of communicable diseases have occurred since the early days of mankind. 
The first well-documented pandemic was the Plague of Justinian, which began in 541 
A.D. [17]. Since then, a large amount of outbreaks have occurred with sometimes 
devastating consequences [18]. 
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Figure 1: Emerging and reemerging viral diseases [10]
From Marston, H.D., et al., Emerging viral diseases: confronting threats with new technologies. Sci Transl Med, 
2014. 6(253): p. 253ps10. Reprinted with permission from AAAS. 
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 showed how 
rapidly a new disease spreads and how interconnected the world is. In February 2003, 
the first cases were reported from Asian countries, and over the next few months, 
the outbreak spread to over 20 countries in North America, South America, Europe, 
and Asia [19]. The outbreak resulted in almost 8000 probable cases with 662 deaths 
reported from 28 countries [20]. SARS underlined the need for a collective global 
defense and a shared responsibility of countries, which is the underlying principle of 
the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) [21]. The IHR requires countries 
to timely share information with the World Health Organization (WHO) related 
to events that may cross borders and threaten international public health. The IHR 
is a legal instrument that is binding on 196 countries across the globe [22]. The 
purpose of the IHR is to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public 
health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate 
with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference 
with international traffic and trade” [22]. 
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In 2009, the IHR was tested for the first time in a real-world situation during the 
H1N1 Influenza pandemic [23]. The H1N1 virus was first detected in Mexico, but 
soon spread around the globe. The WHO declared its first ‘public health emergency 
of international concern’ on 24 April 2009 [24]. H1N1 caused approximately 18500 
laboratory-confirmed deaths worldwide, but the true extent of deaths attributable 
to the pandemic virus could be significantly higher, since many people died without 
being tested [25]. An international committee that reviewed the experiences of the 
H1N1 pandemic including the function of the IHR concluded that “The world is 
ill prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly global, 
sustained and threatening public-health emergency” [26].
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), first reported in Saudi Arabia in 
2012, has spread to several other countries. The WHO reported 2040 laboratory-
confirmed cases and 693 deaths in 27 countries by July 2017 [27]. 
In December 2013, the largest outbreak of Ebola virus disease originated in West 
Africa. Between December 2013 and June 2015, a total of 28.616 Ebola cases have 
been reported in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, with 11,310 deaths [28]. In august 
2014, the WHO declared Ebola a ‘public health emergency of international concern’ 
[29]. The three West African countries and the international community were not 
prepared for an outbreak of this magnitude [30]. Ebola showed the devastating impact 
a single outbreak can have all over the world. Because the Ebola virus transfers easily 
from one person to another causing disease with a very high case fatality rate, healthcare 
organizations in countries outside West-Africa had to prepare for imported cases [31, 
32]. This required major time investments concerning training and simulation exercises, 
developing guidelines and public health campaigns to prevent social unrest. 
The large outbreaks in the past such as SARS, H1N1, MERS and Ebola show 
that outbreaks can have enormous impact. However, also regional outbreaks pose 
a threat to patients, healthcare and society. In the Netherlands, the 2013-2014 
Measles outbreak [33] and the 2007-2010 Q-fever outbreak [34] had a large impact 
on patients, healthcare and society. The Q-fever outbreak in the province of West-
Brabant triggered public anxiety all over the country [35]. This outbreak revealed 
the profound consequences of the intensive farming in the Netherlands, a crowded 
country with communities living in the direct vicinity of large animal farms. 
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The recent outbreaks forced international organizations such as the World Health 
Organisation [36, 37], the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control to take steps towards a more 
uniform global approach in preparing and responding to outbreaks. Due to the 
Q-fever outbreak in the Netherlands, a joint structure for surveillance, preparedness 
and response was set up between the veterinary and the human sectors, based on 
the One Health principle [38]. The concept of One Health is the unity of multiple 
practices that work together locally, nationally, and globally to help achieve optimal 
health for people, animals, and the environment.
Organizations involved in international and national preparedness and 
response
International level
The WHO supports countries to strengthen their national core capacities for 
emergency risk management and to recover from emergencies due to any hazard that 
pose a threat to human health security, including infectious disease outbreaks [39]. 
During large cross-border outbreaks, the WHO leads and coordinates the health 
response in support of the countries by e.g. identifying priorities, setting strategies 
and providing technical guidance. 
In 2016 the WHO published the Joint External Evaluation Tool, a national self-
assessment tool that can be used to assess a country’s capacity to prevent, detect, 
and rapidly respond to public health threats as part of the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) (2005) framework [40]. The tool is arranged according to the 
following core elements: preventing and reducing the likelihood of outbreaks and 
other public health hazards and events defined by IHR (2005) is essential, detecting 
threats early can save lives, responding rapidly and effectively, using multi-sectoral, 
national, and international coordination and communication. The tool combines self-
evaluation, peer review and voluntary external evaluations involving a combination 
of national and independent experts. The purpose of the external evaluation process 
is to measure country specific status and progress in achieving the targets [40]. 
At the EU level, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
aims to ensure that the European Union and its Member States are fully prepared to 
effectively respond to any communicable disease threat [41]. The ECDC supports the 
European Commission by developing tools and guidelines to assist Member States in 
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evaluating their level of preparedness, identifying gaps, and strengthening capacities. 
These activities take place in the context of the EU’s legal framework on serious 
cross-border threats to health as described in the Decision 1082 which was adopted 
in October 2013 [42, 43]. The decision 1082 helps EU Member States to prepare for 
and protect citizens against possible future pandemics and serious cross-border threats 
caused by communicable diseases, chemical, biological or environmental events 
[44]. Article 4 of the Decision addresses the planning of Public Health Emergency 
preparedness and response [44]. It focuses on strengthened coordination between the 
European Commission and Member States. This includes sharing best practices and 
experiences in preparedness and response planning.
National level
In the Netherlands, the Centre for Infectious Disease Control of the National 
Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) coordinates the control of 
infectious diseases, including effective prevention, close vigilance and quick response 
in the event of an outbreak, and contributes to reducing health problems related to 
infectious diseases [45]. 
Regional level
In the Netherlands, human infectious disease control is organized through 25 
municipal health services spread over the country. Each municipal health service 
is responsible for the public health in their region. Each healthcare organization 
within the region (for example hospitals, General Practitioners, municipal health 
services, emergency responders, ambulance services) has to be prepared to respond 
to an outbreak. These organizations, therefore, organize training and exercises for 
their employees, often in cooperation with other healthcare organizations within the 
region. During an outbreak, the municipal health service communicates with the 
public and organizes the response within their region. 
Preparedness and response activities
Outbreaks in the past underpin the need for a quick and uniform response to 
outbreaks. 
In the past, infectious disease control consisted mainly of providing clean drinking 
water, sanitation, washing hands, isolation, quarantine and vaccination [46]. 
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However, the enormous reduction in time to travel across the globe, the reemergence 
of pathogens and changing microorganisms require a different approach. Outbreaks 
can spread very quickly and cross boarders easily [47]. Stopping an outbreak prevents 
an epidemic or pandemic to emerge. Therefore, preparedness is necessary to prevent 
and keep outbreaks as limited as possible [48]. Nowadays, all countries, regions and 
first responders (directly or indirectly involved in providing healthcare during an 
outbreak) have to prepare themselves. However, there is little consistency in what 
constitutes preparedness or how it should be measured [49]. 
Evaluations show that preparedness is often suboptimal [50-52]. There is, however, 
little guidance for first responders in how to prepare for outbreaks. Countries have 
national laws and can use instruments from international organizations in preparing for 
outbreaks, but for first responders there are few instruments or measures available [49]. 
This makes preparedness for first responders a major challenge. During an outbreak, 
recommended control measures need to be timely and uniformly performed to curb 
the spread of pathogens and, ultimately, to reduce the number of persons becoming 
infected. Numerous documents -from various countries or regions addressing various 
types of outbreaks- describe such recommended response. This variety of documents 
and guidelines each developed for a specific outbreak can be confusing. 
Regional organizations need structure and guidance while preparing for and responding 
to outbreaks because, for individual regions, outbreaks are not that common so it is 
difficult to rely on their institutional experience. Lessons learned from outbreaks in the 
past provide valuable insights for preparing for and responding to future outbreaks. 
Unfortunately, these lessons are often disease specific. Implementing these disease 
specific lessons learned improves preparedness and response for that specific disease 
outbreak but not for preparedness and response in general. However, outbreaks are 
unpredictable events that are caused by sometimes even unknown pathogens, and 
first responders should be prepared for all types of outbreaks. Lessons learned from 
outbreaks in the past should be used to improve generic preparedness and response, 
so that preparedness and response for all types of outbreaks is brought to a higher 
level.
Until now, there is little evidence to inform guidance in what constitutes high quality 
preparedness and response for first responders [49, 53]. However, a significant body of 
evidence emerged throughout the past decades on how to define quality in healthcare 
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in general [54]. These principles can be used to define high quality preparedness for 
and response to outbreaks. 
 
Defining quality of care
To define quality of care we can use quality indicators. A quality indicator is defined 
as: ‘A measurable element of practice performance for which there is evidence or 
consensus that it can be used to assess the quality, and hence change in the quality, 
of care provided [55]’. Quality Indicators (QIs) are best developed by systematically 
conducting the following steps: selecting a topic and aim, developing a preliminary 
set of indicators, finding consensus among target users followed by a practice test and 
implementation [54, 56]. In the first step, the topic of interest is selected. Together 
with the topic, the aim of the QIs and target users should be determined. QIs can 
be developed for a range of different goals, for example for a pay-for-performance 
goal or for measuring patient satisfaction. Once the topic, target population and aim 
of the QIs is determined, potential QIs should be selected from relevant guidelines 
or literature. The stronger the evidence that specific care processes are linked to 
patient outcomes, the greater the potential for the indicators to reflect true changes 
in morbidity, mortality or health status [54]. Though, in many areas of healthcare 
the evidence is weak or not available. Final selection of QIs usually takes place using 
a consensus method with relevant experts from the field. Consensus methods can 
be used to create broad agreement for target users or in case the evidence level is 
weak or insufficient. Consensus techniques are iterative processes with feedback in 
which the ratings of experts are anonymous and the opinions of individual experts 
are synthesized and aggregated into a group judgement [57]. An example of such a 
technique, often used for QI development, is the RAND modified Delphi technique 
[58]. In this technique, an expert panel is asked to appraise the preselected QIs (i.e. 
systematically retrieved from literature and/or guidelines) in a digital questionnaire, 
which is followed by a face-to-face consultation [57]. After the selection of QIs is 
complete, the selected indicators are expressed in a numerator and denominator so 
that an indicator score can be calculated. A practice test is needed to ensure the 
selected QIs are valid, reliable and feasible [56]. In the final phase the QIs should 
be implemented into practice. For interpreting indicator scores the results can be 
compared to a benchmark, the scores of other organizations or scores from previous 
measures. 
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Quality indicators can be grouped based on typology (process, structure and 
outcome indicators) or grouped into, for example, the six domains of the Institute of 
Medicine that outlines six specific aims that a healthcare system must fulfill to deliver 
quality care [59]. Care should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient and 
equitable. 
Defining quality of care for outbreak preparedness and 
response
This thesis aims at defining high quality generic preparedness and response to 
outbreaks from a first responder’s perspective. A first step in defining high quality care 
for outbreaks would be to study the scientific evidence in this field. For outbreaks 
though, there is very little scientific evidence available regarding effective preparedness 
and response [49, 53]. A Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT), which is considered 
the ‘gold standard’ in scientific research and is ranked highest in the level of evidence 
hierarchy, cannot be practiced in outbreak studies. One of the conditions for a RCT 
is that there are two randomized groups, an intervention group and a control group. 
During outbreaks this randomization is not possible. Therefore outcome measures, 
such as the number of cases or deaths cannot be used to determine the effects of 
interventions because the effect without the intervention is unknown. In addition, 
the shared responsibility of various actors complicates measuring the impact of 
individual organizations [49, 53]. Although there is very little scientific evidence 
available in this field, literature can still provide valuable insights. Outbreak reports, 
papers describing lessons learned and guidance documents contain direct or indirect 
information on high quality care in this field. Therefore, when defining high quality 
preparedness and response, an overview of recommendations from the literature 
would be a first step. 
A second step for defining quality in healthcare when lacking higher levels of evidence 
(like from randomized control studies) is to rely on the opinion of experts in the field 
[56, 60]. Based on their knowledge and expertise with previous incidents or outbreaks, 
elements of high quality care can be selected. One of the methods that systematically 
aggregates the opinions of individual experts into group opinion is the Rand modified 
Delphi technique which is used in this thesis to collect opinions of experts and reach 
consensus among them on what is meant by ‘high quality’ preparedness and response 
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[61]. In this multi-step procedure experts score recommendations regarding high 
quality care in questionnaires and face-to-face consultations. 
A third step for defining quality is using the experiences of healthcare professionals. 
The thoughts, experiences and emotions of the people with practical experience in 
patient care can help to gain insight into what works and what does not.
In this thesis, we combined a literature review, the opinion of experts and the 
experiences of healthcare workers in the field with the aim to define high quality 
preparedness and response from a first responder perspective. 
Outline of the thesis
The main aim of this thesis is to define high quality generic preparedness and response 
to outbreaks from a first responder’s perspective.
To define high quality generic preparedness and response based on literature and 
expert opinion (chapter 2-4) we will answer the following research questions:
 - Which recommendations define optimal heath care system’s 
preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks according to literature?
 - What is the relevance of the recommendations as a criterion for high 
quality preparedness from the view of first responders and which 
recommendations have the highest urgency to be implemented?
 - Which key recommendations define high quality response for infectious 
disease outbreaks from a regional perspective?
To define high quality preparedness based on experiences (chapter 5 and 6) we will 
answer the following research questions:
 - How can healthcare organizations prepare for meeting the needs of 
their healthcare personnel?
 - What are the experiences of volunteers from the EU that worked in 
West Africa during the recent Ebola outbreak and what can we learn 
for the future emergency workforce teams?
In chapter 7 we discuss our findings and implications for practice and further research. 
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   17 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 1
18
References
1. World Health Organization. Health Topics: Infectious Diseases. 2017; Available from: http://www.who.
int/topics/infectious_diseases/en/.
2. World Health Organization. Health Topics: Disease Outbreaks. 18-08-2017]; Available from: http://
www.who.int/topics/disease_outbreaks/en/.
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice. An Introduction to Applied 
Epidemiology and Biostatistics. October 2006, updated May 2012.
4. Smith, K.F., et al., Global rise in human infectious disease outbreaks. J R Soc Interface, 2014. 11(101): p. 
20140950.
5. Jones, K.E., et al., Global trends in emerging infectious diseases. Nature, 2008. 451(7181): p. 990-3.
6. Semenza, J.C., et al., Determinants and Drivers of Infectious Disease Threat Events in Europe. Emerg 
Infect Dis, 2016. 22(4): p. 581-9.
7. Weiss, R.A. and A.J. McMichael, Social and environmental risk factors in the emergence of infectious 
diseases. Nat Med, 2004. 10(12 Suppl): p. S70-6.
8. Smith, R.D., Responding to global infectious disease outbreaks: lessons from SARS on the role of risk 
perception, communication and management. Soc Sci Med, 2006. 63(12): p. 3113-23.
9. Delamou, A., et al., Public health impact of the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa: seizing 
opportunities for the future. BMJ Glob Health, 2017. 2(2): p. e000202.
10. Marston, H.D., et al., Emerging viral diseases: confronting threats with new technologies. Sci Transl Med, 
2014. 6(253): p. 253ps10.
11. Murray, C.J., et al., Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for 291 diseases and injuries in 21 regions, 
1990-2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010. Lancet, 2012. 380(9859): 
p. 2197-223.
12. Lin, C.Y., et al., The psychological effect of severe acute respiratory syndrome on emergency department 
staff. Emerg Med J, 2007. 24(1): p. 12-7.
13. Gershon, R.R., et al., Factors associated with the ability and willingness of essential workers to report to 
duty during a pandemic. J Occup Environ Med, 2010. 52(10): p. 995-1003.
14. van Lier, A., et al., Disease Burden of 32 Infectious Diseases in the Netherlands, 2007-2011. PLoS One, 
2016. 11(4): p. e0153106.
15. Bults, M., et al., Perceived risk, anxiety, and behavioural responses of the general public during the early 
phase of the Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic in the Netherlands: results of three consecutive online surveys. 
BMC Public Health, 2011. 11: p. 2.
16. Rassy, D. and R.D. Smith, The economic impact of H1N1 on Mexico’s tourist and pork sectors. Health 
Econ, 2013. 22(7): p. 824-34.
17. Little, L.K., Plague and the end of antiquity: the pandemic of 541–750. 2007: Cambridge University 
Press.
18. World Health Organization. Disease outbreaks by year. 18 December 2017]; Available from: http://www.
who.int/csr/don/archive/year/en/.
19. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Fact Sheet: Basic Information about SARS, CDC, 
Editor. January 13, 2004.
20. World Health Organization. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)-multi-country outbreak - 
Update 60. 2003 20 May 2003 [cited 2017; Available from: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_05_20/
en/.
21. World Health Organization, International Health Regulations enter into force. 14 June 2017.
22. World Health Organization, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) - Third edition. 
2005.
23. Fineberg, H.V., Pandemic preparedness and response--lessons from the H1N1 influenza of 2009. N Engl 
J Med, 2014. 370(14): p. 1335-42.
24. World Health Organization, Pandemic Influenza H1N1 2009 - Report of Regional Consultation on 
Pandemic H1N1 2009 and Strengthening Country Capacity for Pandemic Preparedness Bangkok, 
Thailand, 9-11 July 2009. 2009, WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia.
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   18 04-05-18   16:55
1General introduction
19
25. World Health Organization, “Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International 
Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009” (PDF). 5 May 2011.
26. World Health Organization, Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005): Report of 
the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 2011.
27. World Health Organization. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) WHO MERS-
CoV Global Summary and Assessment of Risk. 2017 July 2017 [cited 2017 18-08-2017]; Available from: 
http://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/en/.
28. World Health Organization, Situation Report Ebola Virus Disease. 2016.
29. World Health Organization, Statement on the 1st meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 
2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. 2014.
30. Bell, B.P., et al., Overview, Control Strategies, and Lessons Learned in the CDC Response to the 2014-
2016 Ebola Epidemic. MMWR Suppl, 2016. 65(3): p. 4-11.
31. Haverkort, J.J., et al., Hospital Preparations for Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Patients and Experience Gained 
from Admission of an Ebola Patient. Emerg Infect Dis, 2016. 22(2): p. 184-91.
32. de Jong, M.D., et al., Preparedness for admission of patients with suspected Ebola virus disease in 
European hospitals: a survey, August-September 2014. Euro Surveill, 2014. 19(48): p. 20980.
33. Knol, M., et al., Large ongoing measles outbreak in a religious community in the Netherlands since May 
2013. Euro Surveill, 2013. 18(36): p. pii=20580.
34. Schimmer, B., et al., Large ongoing Q fever outbreak in the south of The Netherlands, 2008. Euro 
Surveill, 2008. 13(31).
35. Bults, M., et al., Q fever in the Netherlands: public perceptions and behavioral responses in three different 
epidemiological regions: a follow-up study. BMC Public Health, 2014. 14: p. 263.
36. World Health Organization, Reform of WHO’s work in health emergency management. WHO Health 
Emergencies Programme. 2016.
37. Brender, N., Global risk governance in health. 2014: Palgrave MacMillan.
38. RIVM. Zoönosestructuur. [cited 2017 21-08-2017]; Available from: http://onehealth.nl/Over_One_
Health/Zoönosenstructuur.
39. World Health Organization. What we do. [cited 2017 18-05-2017]; Available from: http://www.who.int/
about/what-we-do/en/.
40. World Health Organization, Joint External Evaluation Tool: International Health Regulations. 2016.
41. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. About us. [cited 2017 18-08-2017]; Available from: 
https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/about-us.
42. European Commission, Decision on serious cross-border threats to health [cited 2017 18-08-2017]; 
Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/policy/decision_en.
43. European Union World Health Organization, Legal Responses to Health Emergencies. 2015.
44. DECISION No 1082/2013/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 
22 October 2013 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision No 2119/98/EC. 2013.
45. RIVM. Centre for Infectious Disease Control. 2013 [cited 2017 18-08-2017]; Available from: http://
rivm.nl/en/About_RIVM/Organisation/Centres/Centre_for_Infectious_Disease_Control.
46. World Health Organization, Bugs, Drugs & Smoke, in Stories from Public Health. 2011: Geneva.
47. Butler, D. and L. Morello, Ebola by the numbers: The size, spread and cost of an outbreak. Nature, 2014. 
514(7522): p. 284-5.
48. Sands, P. and M. Chawla, Financing preparedness at a national level. Lancet, 2017. 389(10084): p. 2086-
2087.
49. Asch, S.M., et al., A review of instruments assessing public health preparedness. Public Health Rep, 2005. 
120(5): p. 532-42.
50. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Ebola emergency preparedness in EU Member 
States - Conclusions from peer-review visits to Belgium, Portugal and Romania, in TECHNICAL 
REPORT. 2015, ECDC.
51. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, The 2009 A(H1N1) pandemic in Europe, ECDC. 
2010.
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   19 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 1
20
52. Mounier-Jack, S. and R.J. Coker, How prepared is Europe for pandemic influenza? Analysis of national 
plans. Lancet, 2006. 367(9520): p. 1405-11.
53. Yeager, V.A., et al., The nature of the public health emergency preparedness literature 2000-2008: a 
quantitative analysis. J Public Health Manag Pract, 2010. 16(5): p. 441-9.
54. Grol, R., Wensing, M., Implementatie Effectieve verbetering van de patiëntenzorg. 2011, Amsterdam: 
Reed Business.
55. Lawrence, M. and F. Olesen, Indicators of Quality in Health Care. European Journal of General Practice, 
1997. 3(3): p. 103-108.
56. Kotter, T., E. Blozik, and M. Scherer, Methods for the guideline-based development of quality indicators-
-a systematic review. Implement Sci, 2012. 7: p. 21.
57. Normand, S.L., et al., Eliciting expert opinion using the Delphi technique: identifying performance 
indicators for cardiovascular disease. Int J Qual Health Care, 1998. 10(3): p. 247-60.
58. Boulkedid, R., et al., Using and reporting the Delphi method for selecting healthcare quality indicators: a 
systematic review. PLoS One, 2011. 6(6): p. e20476.
59. Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, Crossing the Quality 
Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century.2001.
60. Campbell, S.M., et al., Research methods used in developing and applying quality indicators in primary 
care. BMJ, 2003. 326(7393): p. 816-9.
61. Fitch, K.B., S.J.;Aguilar, M.D.;Burnand, B.;LaCalle, J.R.;Lazaro, P.;van het Loo, M.;McDonnell, J.;Vader, 
J.;Kahan, J.P., The RAND/UCLA Appropriateness Method User’s Manual. 2001.
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   20 04-05-18   16:55
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   21 04-05-18   16:55
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   22 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 2
Defining and improving healthcare 
facilities preparedness for infectious 
disease outbreaks: an integrative review 
identifying generic key recommendations 
and their connections to continuous 
quality improvement
Anita Huis
Evelien Belfroid
Janna Klein Breteler
Jim van Steenbergen
Marlies Hulscher
Submitted
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   23 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 2
24
Abstract
Currently, generic key elements for optimal health care system’s preparedness to 
infectious disease outbreaks are not well defined. The aim of this integrative review 
was to generate a series of key recommendations for optimal preparedness focused on 
healthcare facilities. Systematic searches of experimental, observational, qualitative, 
mathematical-modelling, and consensus procedure studies on preparedness were 
conducted from January 2002 to December 2013. Studies had to address preparedness 
of healthcare facilities and healthcare providers for infectious disease outbreaks. In 
addition, studies had to provide evidence-based or consensus-based recommendations 
for preparedness measures, or recommendations based on lessons learned or best 
practices for preparedness. We reviewed 63 studies of outbreak preparedness 
resulting in 295 unique recommendations for optimal preparedness among which 
we identified 80 key recommendations. We linked the recommendations to cyclical 
quality improvement practices such as the PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT cycle. The 
recommendations emphasize five main categories of preparedness: construction and 
maintenance of the preparedness plan; support for health professionals, patients, 
and families; surge capacity; communication with the public, patients, and families; 
and coordination and collaboration. 58 of the 80 key recommendations represent 
elements of a generic system of adequate preparedness. 26 recommendations provide 
guidance about how to use the preparedness system as a method for continuous 
quality improvement. These combined recommendations should significantly 
facilitate and improve preparedness for future outbreaks.
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Introduction
Preparedness is essential for strengthening the ability of healthcare system’s to cope 
with the challenges of large-scale infectious disease outbreaks [1-3]. Significant 
challenges such as limited resources and supplies [1, 4-6], high staff absenteeism [1, 4, 
5, 7], coordinated leadership, and clear and consistent communication strategies [4, 
5] are sometimes absent in the settings of hospitals [1, 4, 5, 8], general practitioners 
[7] laboratories [6], and home healthcare agencies [9]. During outbreaks, these 
challenges cause problems with delivering healthcare to epidemic and nonepidemic 
patients [1, 5]. Delayed outbreak detection and omissions in adequate healthcare 
delivery potentially increase disease transmission and adverse patient outcomes [3, 
6, 10].
Various initiatives have been taken to improve preparedness in the last decade [12-
15]. Well defined quality measures describing optimal preparedness are needed to 
achieve high-quality preparedness [16]. Preparedness measures should reflect both 
capacity and capabilities [18]. Such measures should be transformed into a valid set 
of quality indicators for assessing current practice and progress towards pre-defined 
goals [13, 15]. We need agreed-upon preparedness measures to ascertain whether 
current and past efforts have improved the outbreak response or created problems 
in ensuring accountability and prioritizing future investments [12, 17]. Therefore, 
preparedness should be embedded in a continuous quality improvement approach. 
PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT cycles provide a structure for testing changes iteratively 
on the basis of setting aims, defining performance, gathering performance data, 
changing processes, evaluating the effects of change, and using feedback to inform 
and set up the next measurement cycle. This systematic approach creates an ongoing 
improvement cycle [16]. 
Although numerous preparedness measures have been proposed and implemented 
[12], many are imprecise, inconsistent, and partially contradictory [16, 19]. Moreover, 
only limited evidence of their effectiveness has been identified [19-21].
This lack of clear and agreed-upon measures does not guide healthcare workers, 
health facilities, and health officials, who must work through a maze of requirements 
and ideas about what constitutes optimal preparedness. Preparedness research 
recommends identifying key preparedness capacities and capabilities that can be used 
to benchmark and improve preparedness [19-21]. Although previous reviews have 
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attempted to overview the preparedness literature and to identify evidence 1 of the 
effectiveness of preparedness [22-23] they have not defined generic key elements for 
good practice. Our objective was to systematically review preparedness literature to 
generate a series of key recommendations for optimal health care system’s preparedness 
for infectious disease outbreaks. We linked these recommendations to cyclical quality 
improvement practices such as the PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT cycle.
Materials and methods
Search strategy and search databases
We searched Medline.Ovid, Embase.Ovid, and Wiley/Cochrane Library using a 
search strategy that combined thesaurus terms and keywords describing ‘Preparedness’ 
and ‘Outbreaks’ and terms related to local healthcare systems such as ‘Health 
Facilities,’ and ‘Health Care System’ (S1 Appendix 1). The search was limited to 
studies published in English between 1 January 2002 and 18 December 2013, as the 
research field of public health preparedness is relatively young, with most literature 
published after the anthrax attacks in the USA in 2001 [12, 22].
Eligibility criteria and study selection
The review team developed the eligibility criteria (S2 Appendix 2) in consensus 
and used studies found in a preliminary search to extensively test these criteria. 
Two reviewers (JB and AH) assessed the eligibility independently in an unblinded, 
standardized manner. Titles and abstracts were screened against eligibility criteria 
(Figure 1). Discrepancies were discussed and resolved in consensus. Studies had to 
address preparedness of healthcare facilities and healthcare providers for infectious 
disease outbreaks. Studies addressing preparedness for emergencies other than 
natural infectious disease outbreaks were excluded because preparedness depends on 
the emergency type [4, 24]. In public health, relying on the standard hierarchy of 
evidence, with randomized controlled trials (RCTs) at the top end, is hardly possible. 
Sometimes, an RCT would be unethical; observational studies are often needed 
to enhance the external validity of RCTs [25]. Adhering to the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) public health guidance [25], we included 
experimental, observational, qualitative, mathematical modelling, and consensus 
procedure study designs. 
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Two reviewers (AH and JB) assessed the eligibility of full texts. If the eligibility of a 
text was unclear, the review team discussed it until consensus was reached. Studies 
had to provide at least one evidence-based or consensus-based recommendation, or at 
least one recommendation based on lessons learned or best practices for preparedness. 
If the study assessed the effectiveness of preparedness measures, it had to describe 
which preparedness intervention was applied; whether a control group was used; and 
which outcomes were measured (S1 Appendix 2, Figure 1). 
Data extraction
The review team developed two Excel data extraction sheets focusing on study 
characteristics and recommendations for generic preparedness measures. The 
extraction sheets were pilot-tested on three randomly-selected, included, full-text 
studies and were refined accordingly.
Two reviewers (JB and AH) independently collected data about general study 
characteristics: primary research objective, study year, study design, country, type 
of outbreak, healthcare setting, participants and response rate, and methods. To rate 
recommendations for preparedness measures, all reviewers were instructed via a data 
extraction manual to identify and copy all preparedness recommendations that were 
based on expert consensus, lessons learned from outbreak-evaluation studies, or best 
practices for preparedness. Review team pairs (JB, AH, JS, and MH) extracted data. 
Disagreements were resolved by discussion.
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Figure 1: Flow diagram of study selection and eligibility criteria
Data analysis
In our two-step analysis of the included studies, the first step identified and 
categorized generic key recommendations for optimal preparedness. We identified 
preliminary themes on the basis of the first 100 extracted unique recommendations. 
These themes were extensively pilot-tested, compared with the WHO guidelines and 
checklists [1, 2], discussed by the review team, and adapted and grouped into five 
main categories. Then, unique recommendations selected for inclusion were grouped 
and generic key recommendations were formulated. The review team discussed these 
recommendations until consensus was reached. AH, EB, JS, and MH assigned the 
key recommendations to the main categories. Then they defined 23 subcategories to 
which the key recommendations were further assigned. The second step examined 
the recommendations from the viewpoint of continuous quality improvement. 
Where possible, the key recommendations were mapped to a corresponding phase 
of the PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT improvement cycle that serves as a framework for 
iterative testing of changes [16].
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Results
Study characteristics
Our search yielded 2243 records. After removing duplicates, we screened 1353 titles 
and abstracts. Seventy-three studies met the inclusion criteria (Figure 1). We assessed 
the full texts of 63 studies (the full texts of ten studies could not be retrieved). Forty-
one studies were excluded of which 19 did not describe specific outbreak preparedness 
recommendations or interventions. Seven studies did not address preparedness of 
health care facilities or –providers. Eight studies were related to one overarching 
article, and seven studies did not meet the eligibility criteria for study design. Finally, 
22 articles were eligible for data extraction and analysis. Sixteen studies addressed 
preparedness in a hospital setting (Table 1), including the settings of the emergency 
department [26-29], acute care [30-32], intensive care [33], and pediatric care [34-
37], and other hospital settings [38-41]. The remaining eight studies focused on 16 
settings of long-term care [42, 43], home care [9], general practitioners [44], and 
other [45, 46]. 
Twelve studies addressed preparedness for pandemic influenza (Table 1). Other 
studies focused on preparedness for severe acute respiratory syndrome [35, 37, 39, 
41], pandemics or infectious disease outbreaks in general [9, 27, 38, 45], respiratory 
outbreaks [42], and measles [44]. Eleven studies had a cross-sectional survey design 
(Table 1); one study was a Delphi consensus procedure [33], four studies had 
qualitative study designs [34, 35, 37, 46], two studies assessed correlations [30, 31], 
one was a cohort study [44], and three studies combined differing study designs [27, 
42, 45].
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Table 1. Study characteristics
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Hospital setting          
Sugerman et al. 
(2011)
2009 / 
United States
Survey 26 ED managers Pandemic 
influenza
12
Fitzgerald et al. 
(2012)
2009 / 
Australia
Survey 12 ED directors and 618 
emergency care professionals
Pandemic 
influenza
16
Schneider et al. 
(2010)
2007 / 
United States
Survey 13 emergency preparedness 
coordinators (one per hospital)
Pandemic 
influenza
5
Fusco et al. (2012) 2009 / 
Europe
Survey / 
Delphi 
consensus
35 ED and 6 medical admission 
departments
Highly 
infectious 
diseases
24
Adini et al. (2009) Not reported 
/ Israel
Correlation 24 acute care hospitals Pandemic 
influenza
11
Adini et al. (2011) Not reported 
/ Israel
Correlation 24 acute care hospitals and 589 
ED physicians and nurses
Pandemic 
influenza
16
Zoutman et al. 
(2010)
2007 / 
Canada
Survey 95 acute care hospital staff 
responsible for developing 
hospital pandemic influenza plan 
(one per hospital)
Pandemic 
influenza
10
Sprung et al. (2010) 2007-2009 
/ Various 
countries*
Delphi 
consensus
Society representatives from 
intensive care
Pandemic 
influenza
63
Giacomet et al. 
(2007)
2005 / Italy Survey 123 heads of hospital pediatric 
units 
Pandemic 
influenza
11
Gearing et al. (2007) 2004 / 
Canada
Qualitative 19 clinical social workers of a 
pediatric hospital 
SARS 9
Filice et al. (2013) 2010 / 
United States
Qualitative 20 pediatric emergency 
physicians of academic pediatric 
emergency medicine institutions 
(one at each institution)
Pandemic 
influenza
5
Nicholas et al. (2008) 2003 / 
Canada
Qualitative 5 pediatric patients admitted 
to hospital , 10 parents, and 8 
physicians and nurses 
SARS 16
Imai et al. (2006) 2003 / Japan Survey 7463 health care workers at seven 
tertiary-level hospitals 
SARS 4
Srinivasan et al. 
(2004)
2003 / 
United States
Survey 456 infectious disease consultant 
at hospital and medical centers
SARS 8
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
2009 / 
United States 
and Canada
Survey 323 hospital epidemiologist and 
preparedness professionals 
Pandemic 
influenza
9
Aiello et al. (2011) Not reported 
/ Canada
Survey 1020 staff from 22 departments 
within one hospital
Pandemic 9
Other settings        
Rebmann et al. 
(2011)
2010 / 
United States
Survey 526 home health professionals of 
home health agencies 
Pandemic 17
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Table 1. Study characteristics - continued
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Smith et al. (2009) 2007 / 
United States
Survey 137 assisted living facilities and 
long term care facilities
Pandemic 
influenza
13
Eastwood et al. 
(2008)
2005-2006 / 
Australia
Before-after 
study / 
survey
111 and 108 infection control 
managers of residential aged care 
facilities (in first respectively 
second survey)
Gastro-
enteritis and 
respiratory 
outbreaks
17
Rosewell et al. (2010) 2006 / 
Australia
Cohort 304 general practitioners (one 
per general medical practice)
Measles 1
Hashim et al. (2012) 2010 / 
Europe
Qualitative 30 ministries of health, 27 
ministries of civil emergency 
response or equivalent, 
40 national public health 
authorities, 31 subnational 
government tiers, and 28 
primary and 21 secondary 
healthcare workers. 
Pandemic 
influenza
17
Gershon et al. (2009) Not reported 
/ United 
States
Before-after 
study / 
survey
129 emergency medical service 
personnel and paramedics 
Pandemic 2
ED: Emergency Department. SARS: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. 
Key recommendations for a generic system of preparedness for infectious 
disease outbreaks
We extracted 295 unique recommendations for optimal preparedness from 22 
studies, which resulted in 80 key recommendations (S3-S4 Appendixes 3 and 4). 
The five main categories (including 22 subcategories) emerged during data analysis: 
(1) construction and maintenance of the preparedness plan; (2) support for health 
professionals, patients, and families; (3) surge capacity; (4) communication to the 
public, patients, and families; and (5) coordination and collaboration.
Construction and maintenance of the preparedness plan
Recommendations in this category describe the planning cycle and focus on how 
preparedness plans should ideally be developed, updated or reviewed, distributed, 
and/or implemented. We identified 36 unique recommendations from 11 studies [9, 
26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 43, 46], bundled into ten key recommendations and 
classified in five subcategories (S3-S4 Appendixes 3 and 4). Two recommendations 
refer to the availability of a comprehensive, current, activated, and distributed plan for 
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infectious disease outbreak preparedness. Three recommendations focus on specifically 
developing and updating the preparedness plan. Two recommendations refer to a 
multidisciplinary approach for dedicated team collaboration and coordination for 
developing a plan. One recommendation highlights the availability of resources for 
developing and testing the preparedness plan, and two recommendations discuss 
developing creative strategies to disseminate the plan.
Recommendations for supporting health professionals, patients, and families
Nineteen studies [9, 26-31, 33, 35-43, 45, 46] provide recommendations for 
this main category. We retrieved 94 unique recommendations corresponding to 
six subcategories and summarized them into 25 key recommendations. Eleven 
recommendations relate to organization, key personnel, content of training, drills, 
and education. Six recommendations concentrate on infection control procedures 
and containment. The subcategory ‘psychosocial assistance for patients, families, and 
healthcare workers’ include five key recommendations about preparing for staff needs 
during a crisis (e.g. childcare), addressing mistrust and fear, and the role of social 
workers in effectively supporting patients and families. Three recommendations focus 
on specific measures to protect patients, families, and healthcare workers, such as staff 
protection levels and vaccination programmes.
Recommendations regarding surge capacity
These recommendations offer plans for surge capacity and design of health 
facilities that consider managing various levels of surge. We identified 109 unique 
recommendations from 16 studies [9, 26-31, 33, 36-38, 40-43, 46] and bundled them 
into 26 key recommendations. These recommendations represent six subcategories, 
starting with one recommendation referring to the availability of an institutional 
surge capacity plan. Seven recommendations about infrastructure include plans 
to expand capacity in case of an outbreak, the availability of isolation rooms and 
alternative care sites, a list of procedures not to use during an outbreak, and measures 
to reduce clerical burden. The third subcategory describes four preparedness measures 
for managing adequate manpower, including coordination of labour resources for 
expanded care and definitions of roles and responsibilities of key individuals. Three 
recommendations describe necessary equipment, pharmaceuticals, and supplies such 
as an access plan for stockpiling and distribution, diagnostic materials, antiviral drugs, 
and hygiene equipment. The seven recommendations of the subcategory ‘Triage’ 
include protocols, trained staff, and an ethical framework for managing competing 
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priorities. Lastly, the subcategory ‘Monitoring’ consists of four key recommendations 
focusing mainly on surveillance of suspected cases and monitoring the burden of 
disease in relation to the capacity of healthcare.
Communication with the public, patients, and families
The one recommendation of this category compiles 13 unique recommendations retrieved 
from seven studies [26, 27, 33, 35, 37, 43, 46]. Healthcare organizations should have 
communication strategies for patients and their families that inform them adequately, 
unambiguously, and empathically about the disease and treatments; different target 
groups and their levels of understanding should be taken into account. Communication 
should focus on the local healthcare provisions and aim at avoiding panic.
Coordination and collaboration
Thirteen studies [27, 32-38, 40, 42-44, 46] provided 43 unique recommendations for 
coordination and collaboration, bundled into 18 key recommendations and classified 
in five subcategories. The first subcategory contains one key recommendation 
requiring that healthcare organizations should have a tested plan for coordination 
and collaboration; implemented when the crisis occurs, updating as the crisis 
evolves, and evaluation and improvement in the post-crisis phase. The second 
subcategory ‘coordination and collaboration within health facilities’ includes four 
recommendations: preparing a communication, coordination, and collaboration 
system between key departments, installing a multidisciplinary, organizational 
preparedness committee, appointing an outbreak coordinator, and assuring the 
presence of an outbreak control group to coordinate adequate response. The third 
subcategory ‘coordination and collaboration between health facilities’ includes six 
recommendations: the availability of a communication and coordination system 
between relevant healthcare and regional 1 facilities, the topics that need coordination 
and collaboration (e.g. coordinated approach for patient transfers and resources), 
a regional outbreak control group, a medical officer as the public health leader, 
and an implementation group. Three recommendations focus on the subcategory 
‘communication strategies’ for communication with public health planners and the 
availability of an internal information channel to ensure that information is up to 
date, factual, accurate, and reliable while preventing information overload. Four 
recommendations focus specifically on the subcategory ‘leadership’ by developing 
strategies to ensure effective and responsive leadership, especially at the level of senior 
management.
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Optimal healthcare preparedness: PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT cycles to 
drive improvement
Figure 2 displays the key recommendations for optimal preparedness related to the 
ongoing process of quality improvement. The figure centre shows the elements of 
a generic optimal preparedness system to respond to infectious disease outbreaks 
and is based on 206 unique recommendations and 58 key recommendations. The 
various stages of the continuous improvement cycle move around this centre. We 
identified ten key recommendations derived from 31 unique recommendations that 
relate to the PLAN phase and concentrate mainly on constructing the preparedness 
plan. Training, drills, and exercises are part of the DO phase and include 52 unique 
recommendations, bundled in 11 key recommendations. The STUDY phase evaluates 
and assesses current preparedness. Recommendations for the content and methods 
of assessment are scarce. We identified six unique recommendations bundled in three 
key recommendations, which say that knowledge should be re-evaluated frequently, 
the preparedness plan should be evaluated and improved in the post-crisis phase, and 
national standards should be used to evaluate the level of preparedness of healthcare 
facilities. The ACT phase integrates the learning generated from previous phases, 
which can be used to adjust preparedness measures. Nine unique recommendations 
hint at the ACT phase. They are summarized in two key recommendations that 
say the preparedness plan should be improved in the post-crisis phase and regularly 
updated by experts; lessons learned from previous outbreaks should be included.
Discussion
Healthcare organizations understand the threats and challenges of sudden outbreaks. 
Since preparing for all possibilities is impracticable, healthcare organizations aim at 
an acceptable level of preparedness. Adequate and sustainable preparedness requires 
a cycle of continuous improvement [16]. Exercises and responses to recent infectious 
disease outbreaks must be extensively evaluated in the PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT 
cycle, so that policies and practice can be adjusted appropriately. There are serious 
gaps in the international literature regarding this continuous improvement cycle. 
Recently, teams from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control visited 
three Member States who were focusing on preparedness and response activities 
related to the Ebola health threat [47]. They recommend a comprehensive evaluation 
plan so that the lessons learned can be used to improve protocols and guidance. This 
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   35 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 2
36
review adds to the current knowledge of how to provide a solid system of adequate 
preparedness in various key domains. Our review shows many opportunities that local 
healthcare facilities can use in their preparedness systems. Our review reveals a wealth 
of recommendations that should significantly facilitate and improve preparedness for 
future outbreaks.
Although thoroughly improving a preparedness system would require systematically 
addressing all the recommendations, we focus on recommendations that – in our 
opinion – need specific attention. First, the institutional preparedness plan for 
infectious disease outbreaks should be based on clear and consistent guidelines, 
but still be flexible enough to accommodate changes derived from new scientific 
insights and experiences of crises. It should also adapt to the local situation [26, 
46]. Concomitantly, communication strategies must be clear and timely in 
communicating policy changes and supporting for implementation for front-line 
healthcare professionals [27, 32, 34-37, 43, 44, 46]. Second, the recommendations 
stress the importance of proper staffing infrastructure with clear rules for command, 
coordination, and collaboration, and strong leadership equipped to take decisions 
under pressure and allocate resources in an ethical and transparent manner [33-
38, 40, 42, 43, 46]. Third, many recommendations aim at practical and technical 
preparedness measures. We identified recommendations that address psychosocial 
assistance for patients, families, and healthcare workers. These measures are important 
in minimizing the psychosocial impact of an infectious disease outbreak on patients, 
families and health care workers, as well as in creating the right conditions to ensure 
that healthcare workers can continue their work [33, 35, 37, 38]. Fourth, education 
and training for achieving optimal protection of healthcare workers, patients, and 
families is well represented in most studies. 1 We identified various strategies, such as 
traditional educational programmes, table-top exercises, and drills [9, 26, 27, 29-33, 
36-40, 42, 43, 45]. Given the prominent role of education and training balanced 
against time investment and costs of organizing extensive drills, more research into 
the effectiveness of different educational strategies is needed to balance the efforts and 
benefits. Fifth, 58 of the 80 key recommendations represent elements of a generic 
adequate preparedness system to respond to infectious disease outbreaks. Twenty-
six of the 80 recommendations provide guidance for using the preparedness system 
to continuously improve the quality. Ten of these recommendations relate to the 
PLAN phase and 11 to the DO phase. Only three recommendations relate to the 
STUDY phase and two lessons learned relate to the ACT phase, leaving serious gaps 
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   36 04-05-18   16:55
Defining healthcare facilities preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks
37
2
in the continuous improvement cycle. The STUDY and ACT phases need additional 
key recommendations to create a learning approach as an effective method to drive 
improvement. The challenge is to achieve consensus for a minimal set of essential 
key quality indicators for generic preparedness measures across the whole spectrum 
of local healthcare organizations. These quality indicators can be used to measure 
the level of preparedness of the organizations and provide insight into the elements 
needing improvement.
Five studies that assess the effects of preparedness measures [30, 31, 42, 44, 45] differ in 
study design, type of participants, preparedness interventions, and outcome measures. 
Interventions for improving preparedness capacities used information resources, 
equipment and infrastructure [30, 42, 44], and preparedness training programmes 
[31, 45]. One study assessed the effectiveness of the intervention using a historical 
cohort design [44]. Two studies described the association between preparedness 
interventions and outcome measures [30, 31], and two studies examined the results 
of preparedness interventions using a before-after design [42, 45]. None of these 
studies included a control group. Most outcome measures were self-reported [42, 
44, 45], although in two studies, two independent evaluators assessed the outcome 
measure with checklist items [30, 31]. Given the heterogeneity of these studies and 
the methodological weaknesses of the study design and evaluations methods, we did 
not analyze the effectiveness. Methodologically robust research, including assessments 
of general effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and implementation fidelity, is required 
to evaluate the effectiveness interventions intended to improve the preparedness for 
infectious disease outbreaks.
Certain limitations should be considered in interpreting the results of this review. 
First, our literature review was comprehensive, but not exhaustive. We might have 
missed some relevant studies. We were unable to retrieve ten full-text articles, which 
may have contained relevant information. Second, we did not systematically search 
for grey literature, which may have caused publication bias. Previous research states 
that excluding grey literature can lead to overestimates of intervention effectiveness 
[48, 49]. The purpose of our review was to identify key recommendations for defining 
preparedness measures rather than to examine their effectiveness. Nevertheless, 
we used grey literature to construct categories and subcategories [1, 2] and build 
our PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT cycle. Third, two-thirds of the studies addressed 
preparedness in hospital settings and one-third were conducted in other healthcare 
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settings. However, the set of key recommendations in this study was developed to 
be generic, so many key recommendations are also applicable to other settings such 
as primary care, long-term care, and home health agencies. Fourth, little primary 
research has been done in this area and the current literature consists mainly of case 
studies and cross-sectional needs assessments. Only five studies in our review used 
a quasi-experimental study design, but serious flaws make their validity doubtful. 
Therefore, we have not reported the effectiveness. 
Despite these limitations, this review presents valuable key recommendations for a 
solid plan of adequate preparedness in various key domains and for effectively using 
this system to drive improvement. An adequate system of generic preparedness 
for local healthcare facilities is important because infectious diseases outbreaks are 
unpredictable but recurring events that influence human health and economic well-
being worldwide.
Conclusion
Delayed outbreak detection and omissions in adequate healthcare delivery potentially 
increase disease transmission and adverse patient outcomes. Therefore, optimal 
preparedness is essential for strengthening the ability of healthcare system’s to cope 
with the challenges of infectious disease outbreaks. However, generic key elements 
for optimal health care system’s preparedness to infectious disease outbreaks are not 
well defined. This review contributes to the current knowledge about providing 
a solid basis for adequate preparedness in various key domains. The identified 
recommendations could significantly facilitate and improve preparedness for future 
outbreaks. Moreover, by linking these key recommendations to the PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT improvement cycle we provide a framework for driving continuous 
improvement in preparedness. 
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   38 04-05-18   16:55
Defining healthcare facilities preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks
39
2
References
1.  WHO-EURO. Hospital preparedness checklist for pandemic influenza: focus on pandemic (H1N1) 
2009: focus on pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 17 December 2013 2009.
2.  WHO. Pandemic Influenza Risk Management WHO Interim Guidance. 17 December 2013 2013.
3.  Scarfone RJ, Coffin S, Fieldston ES, Falkowski G, Cooney MG, Grenfell S. Hospital-based pandemic 
influenza preparedness and response: strategies to increase surge capacity. Pediatric emergency care2011; 
27(6): 565-72.
4.  Hawryluck L, Lapinsky SE, Stewart TE. Clinical review: SARS - lessons in disaster management. Critical 
care 2005; 9(4): 384-9.
5.  Booth CM, Stewart TE. Severe acute respiratory syndrome and critical care medicine: the Toronto 
experience. Critical care medicine 2005; 33(1 Suppl): S53-60.
6.  van Asten L, van der Lubben M, van den Wijngaard C, et al. Strengthening the diagnostic capacity to 
detect Bio Safety Level 3 organisms in unusual respiratory viral outbreaks. Journal of clinical virology: the 
official publication of the Pan American Society for Clinical Virology 2009; 45(3): 185-90.
7.  Nori A, Williams MA. Pandemic preparedness - Risk management and infection control for all respiratory 
infection outbreaks. Australian family physician 2009; 38(11): 891-5.
8.  Shaw K. The 2003 SARS outbreak and its impact on infection control practices. Public health 2006;120(1): 
8-14.
9.  Rebmann T, Citarella B, Subramaniam DS, Subramaniam DP. A home health agency’s pandemic 
preparedness and experience with the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. American journal of infection control 2011; 
39(9): 725-31.
10.  Goodman RA, Posid JM, Popovic T. Investigations of selected historically important syndromic outbreaks: 
impact and lessons learned for public health preparedness and response. American journal of public health 
2012; 102(6): 1079-90.
11.  Werber D, Krause G, Frank C, et al. Outbreaks of virulent diarrheagenic Escherichia coli--are we in 
control? BMC medicine 2012; 10: 11.
12.  Nelson C, Lurie N, Wasserman J, Zakowski S. Conceptualizing and defining public health emergency 
preparedness. American journal of public health 2007; 97 Suppl 1: S9-11.
13.  Lotstein D, Seid M, Ricci K, et al. Using quality improvement methods to improve public health 
emergency preparedness: PREPARE for Pandemic Influenza. Health affairs 2008; 27(5): w328-39.
14.  Curran ET, Bunyan D. Using a PDSA cycle of improvement to increase 1 preparedness for, and 
management of, norovirus in NHS Scotland. The Journal of hospital infection 2012; 82(2): 108-13.
15.  Harrison LM, Shook ED, Harris G, Lea CS, Cornett A, Randolph GD. Applying the model for 
improvement in a local health department: quality improvement as an effective approach in navigating 
the changing landscape of public health practice in Buncombe County, North Carolina. Journal of public 
health management and practice : JPHMP 2012; 18(1): 19-26.
16.  Seid M. LD, Williams V.L., Nelson C., Lurie N., Ricci K., Diamant A., Wasserman J., Stern S. . Quality 
Improvement: Implications for Public Health Preparedness 2006. (accessed 18 December 2013).
17.  Acosta J. NC, Beckjord E.B., Shelton S.R., Murphy E., Leuschner K.L., Wasserman J. A National Agenda 
for Public Health Systems Research on Emergency Preparedness2009. (accessed 18 December 2013).
18.  Nelson C, Lurie, N., Wasserman, J., Zakowski, S. Leuschner, K.J. Conceptualizing and defining public 
health emergency preparedness: RAND Health, 2008.
19.  Asch SM, Stoto M, Mendes M, et al. A review of instruments assessing public health preparedness. Public 
health reports 2005; 120(5): 532-42.
20.  B.A. J. The Problem of Measuring Emergency Preparedness: The Need for Assessing “Response Reliability” 
as Part of Homeland Security Planning2008. (accessed 18 December 2013).
21.  Nelson CD, Beckjord EB, Dausey DJ, Chan E, Lotstein D, Lurie N. How can we strengthen the evidence 
base in public health preparedness? Disaster medicine and public health preparedness 2008; 2(4):247-50.
22.  Savoia E, Massin-Short SB, Rodday AM, Aaron LA, Higdon MA, Stoto MA. Public health systems 
research in emergency preparedness: a review of the literature. American journal of preventive medicine 
2009; 37(2): 150-6.
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   39 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 2
40
23.  Yeager VA, Menachemi N, McCormick LC, Ginter PM. The nature of the public health emergency 
preparedness literature 2000-2008: a quantitative analysis. Journal of public health management and 
practice : JPHMP 2010; 16(5): 441-9.
24.  Lovelace K, Bibeau D, Gansneder B, Hernandez E, Cline JS. All-hazards preparedness in an era of 
bioterrorism funding. Journal of public health management and practice : JPHMP 2007; 13(5): 465-8.
25.  NICE. Methods for the development of NICE public health guidance 2009. (accessed 19 December 
2013).
26.  Fitzgerald G, Aitken P, Shaban RZ, et al. Pandemic (H1N1 influenza 2009 and 1 Australian emergency 
departments: implications for policy, practice and pandemic preparedness. Emergency medicine 
Australasia : EMA 2012; 24(2): 159-65.
27.  Fusco FM, Schilling S, De Iaco G, et al. Infection control management of patients with suspected highly 
infectious diseases in emergency departments: data from a survey in 41 facilities in 14 European countries. 
BMC infectious diseases 2012; 12: 27.
28.  Schneider RB, Benitez JG, D’Angelo A, Tyo K. Pandemic influenza: antiviral preparedness and health care 
workers. Disaster medicine and public health preparedness 2010; 4(1): 55-61.
29.  Sugerman D, Nadeau KH, Lafond K, et al. A survey of emergency department 2009 pandemic influenza 
A (H1N1) surge preparedness--Atlanta, Georgia, July-October 2009. Clinical infectious diseases : an 
official publication of the Infectious Diseases Society of America 2011; 52 Suppl 1: S177-82.
30.  Adini B, Goldberg A, Cohen R, Bar-Dayan Y. Relationship between equipment and infrastructure 
for pandemic influenza and performance in an avian flu drill. Emergency medicine journal : EMJ 
2009;26(11): 786-90.
31.  Adini B, Goldberg A, Cohen R, Bar-Dayan Y. Impact of pandemic flu training on ability of medical 
personnel to recognize an index case of avian influenza. European journal of public health 2012;22(2): 
169-73.
32.  Zoutman DE, Ford BD, Melinyshyn M, Schwartz B. The pandemic influenza planning process in Ontario 
acute care hospitals. American journal of infection control 2010; 38(1): 3-8.
33.  Sprung CL, Zimmerman JL, Christian MD, et al. Recommendations for intensive care unit and hospital 
preparations for an influenza epidemic or mass disaster: summary report of the European Society of 
Intensive Care Medicine’s Task Force for intensive care unit triage during an influenza epidemic or mass 
disaster. Intensive care medicine 2010; 36(3): 428-43.
34.  Filice CE, Vaca FE, Curry L, Platis S, Lurie N, Bogucki S. Pandemic planning and response in academic 
pediatric emergency departments during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Academic emergency 
medicine : official journal of the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine 2013; 20(1): 54-62.
35.  Gearing RE, Saini M, McNeill T. Experiences and implications of social workers practicing in a pediatric 
hospital environment affected by SARS. Health & social work 2007; 32(1): 17-27.
36.  Giacomet V, Tarallo L, De Marco G, Giannattasio A, Barbarino A, Guarino A. Preparing 1 for an influenza 
pandemic in Italy: resources and procedures in paediatric hospital units. Euro surveillance : bulletin 
Europeen sur les maladies transmissibles = European communicable disease bulletin 2007; 12(7): E7-8.
37. Nicholas DB, Gearing RE, Koller D, Salter R, Selkirk EK. Pediatric epidemic crisis: Lessons for policy and 
practice development. Health policy 2008; 88(2-3): 200-8.
38.  Aiello A, Khayeri MY, Raja S, et al. Resilience training for hospital workers in anticipation of an influenza 
pandemic. The Journal of continuing education in the health professions 2011; 31(1): 15-20.
39.  Imai T, Takahashi K, Hoshuyama T, Hasegawa N, Chia SE, Koh D. Substantial differences in preparedness 
for emergency infection control measures among major hospitals in Japan: lessons from SARS. Journal of 
infection and chemotherapy : official journal of the Japan Society of Chemotherapy 2006; 12(3): 124-31.
40.  Lautenbach E, Saint S, Henderson DK, Harris AD. Initial response of health care institutions to emergence 
of H1N1 influenza: experiences, obstacles, and perceived future needs. Clinical infectious diseases : an 
official publication of the Infectious Diseases Society of America 2010; 50(4): 523-7.
41.  Srinivasan A, Jernign DB, Liedtke L, Strausbaugh L. Hospital preparedness for severe acute respiratory 
syndrome in the United States: views from a national survey of infectious diseases consultants. Clinical 
infectious diseases : an official publication of the Infectious Diseases Society of America 2004; 39(2): 272-4.
42.  Eastwood K, Osbourn M, Francis L, et al. Improving communicable disease outbreak preparedness in 
residential aged care facilities using an interventional interview strategy. Australasian journal on ageing 
2008; 27(3): 143-9.
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   40 04-05-18   16:55
Defining healthcare facilities preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks
41
2
43.  Smith PW, Smith AW, Meza JL. Influenza preparedness in Nebraska assisted living facilities. Biosecurity 
and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science 2009; 7(4): 429-32.
44.  Rosewell A, Patel M, Viney K, Marich A, Lawrence GL. Impact of faxed health alerts on the preparedness 
of general practitioners during communicable disease outbreaks. Communicable diseases intelligence 
quarterly report 2010; 34(1): 23-8.
45.  Gershon RR, Vandelinde N, Magda LA, Pearson JM, Werner A, Prezant 1 D. Evaluation of a pandemic 
preparedness training intervention of emergency medical services personnel. Prehospital and disaster 
medicine 2009; 24(6): 508-11.
46.  Hashim A, Jean-Gilles L, Hegermann-Lindencrone M, Shaw I, Brown C, Nguyen-Van-Tam J. Did 
pandemic preparedness aid the response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009? A qualitative analysis in seven 
countries within the WHO European Region. Journal of infection and public health 2012; 5(4): 286-96.
47.  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Ebola emergency preparedness in EU Member 
States – Conclusions from peer-review visits to Belgium, Portugal and Romania. Stockholm: ECDC; 
2015.
48.  McAuley L, Pham Ba’, Tugwell P, Moher D. Does the inclusion of grey literature influence estimates of 
intervention effectiveness reported in metaanalyses? Lancet 2000;356:1228–31.
49.  Hopewell S, McDonald S, Clarke M, Egger M. Grey literature in meta-analyses of randomized trials of 
health care interventions. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 2007; 2. MR000010. 
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   41 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 2
42
Appendix 1 
Search strategy
Final search strategies for search databases Medline, EMBASE and Cochrane (search performed at 18 December 
2012). #In the Cochrane search interface only time period search restrictions can be applied; it does not support 
language and publication type search restrictions. 
Search 
database
Search strategies Results
Medline [1] Preparedness keywords
(Preparedness.ti,ab.) OR ((Preparations adj10 (pandemic? or influenza 
or H1N1 or SARS or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or outbreak? or 
epidemic? or disease? or threat? or early)).ti,ab.)
7802
[2] Outbreak thesaurus terms and keywords
(exp Disease Outbreaks/ or exp Communicable Diseases/ or exp Disease 
Transmission, Infectious/ or Infection Control/mt [Methods]) OR ((epidemic? 
or pandemic? or outbreak? or infectious disease? or communicable disease? or 
influenza or h1n1 or sars or severe acute respiratory syndrome).ti,ab.)
270300
[3] Local health care system thesaurus terms and keywords
(exp Emergency Medicine/ or exp Disaster Medicine/ or exp Emergency 
Medical Services/) OR (exp Health Personnel/ or exp Laboratory Personnel/ 
or exp General Practice/) OR (exp Patient Care/ or exp Patient Care 
Management/ or exp Nursing Services/ or exp Nursing care/) OR (exp Health 
Facilities/) OR (exp Health Systems Agencies/ or exp Local Government/ or 
exp State Government/) OR ((hospital? or doctor? or clinician? or nurse? or 
nursing or practitioner? or physician?).ti,ab.) OR (((professional? or worker? 
or official? or personnel or staff or sector or service? or facility or facilities) adj3 
(health or care or healthcare or health-care or medical or clinical)).ti,ab.) OR 
((laboratory or laboratories or microbiologist?).ti,ab.) OR ((care adj3 (medical 
or patient or clinical or health or primary or setting)).ti,ab.) OR ((health-care 
or healthcare or health system? or health protection).ti,ab.) OR (((agency or 
agencies or department? or authority or authorities or organi?ation?) adj3 
(local or state or regional or county or province or medical or clinical or health 
or emergency or admission)).ti,ab.) 
2859690
[4] [1] AND [2] 1856
[5] [3] AND [4] 1002
[6] [5] limit to english language 945
[7] [6] limit to yr=”2002 -Current” 869
[8] [7] not (comment or congresses or letter).pt. 840
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Search 
database
Search strategies Results
EMBASE [1] Preparedness keywords
(Preparedness.ti,ab.) OR ((Preparations adj10 (pandemic? or influenza 
or H1N1 or SARS or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or outbreak? or 
epidemic? or disease? or threat? or early)).ti,ab.) 
9507
[2] Outbreak thesaurus terms and keywords
(exp Epidemic/ or exp Communicable Disease/ or exp Disease transmission, 
Infectious/ or exp influenza,human/ or exp severe acute respiratory syndrome/ 
or infection control/) OR ((epidemic? or pandemic? or outbreak? or infectious 
disease? or communicable disease? or influenza or h1n1 or sars or severe acute 
respiratory syndrome).ti,ab.)
470830
[3] Local health care system thesaurus terms and keywords
(exp Emergency Medicine/ or exp disaster medicine/ or exp emergency health 
service/) OR (exp health care personnel/ or exp laboratory personnel/ or exp 
general practice/) OR (exp patient care/ or exp nursing/) OR (exp health care 
facility/) OR (exp local government/ or exp municipal government/ or exp state 
government/ or exp healthcare agency/) OR ((hospital? or doctor? or clinician? 
or nurse? or nursing or practitioner? or physician?).ti,ab.) OR (((professional? 
or worker? or official? or personnel or staff or sector or service? or facility 
or facilities) adj3 (health or care or healthcare or health-care or medical or 
clinical)).ti,ab.) OR ((laboratory or laboratories or microbiologist?).ti,ab.) OR 
((care adj3 (medical or patient or clinical or health or primary or setting)).
ti,ab.) OR ((health-care or healthcare or health system? or health protection).
ti,ab.) OR (((agency or agencies or department? or authority or authorities or 
organi?ation?) adj3 (local or state or regional or county or province or medical 
or clinical or health or emergency or admission)).ti,ab.) 
5079300
[4] [1] AND [2] 2381
[5] [3] AND [4] 1489
[6] [5] limit to english language 1401
[7] [6] limit to yr=”2002 -Current” 1310
[8] [7] not (comment or congresses or letter).pt. 1296
Appendix 1 continued
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   43 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 2
44
Search 
database
Search strategies Results
Cochrane# [1] Preparedness keywords
(preparedness:ti,ab,kw) OR (preparations:ti,ab,kw)  
18707
[2] Outbreak thesaurus terms and keywords
(MeSH descriptor: [Disease Outbreaks] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: 
[Communicable Diseases] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: [Disease 
Transmission, Infectious] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: [Infection 
Control] explode all trees and with qualifiers: [Methods – MT]) OR (MeSH 
descriptor: [Influenza, Human] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: [Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome] explode all trees) OR ((epidemic? or pandemic? 
or outbreak? or infectious disease? or communicable disease? or influenza or 
h1n1 or sars or severe acute respiratory syndrome):ti,ab,kw)
5139
[3] Local health care system thesaurus terms and keywords
(MeSH descriptor: [Emergency Medicine] explode all trees) OR (MeSH 
descriptor: [Emergency Medical Services] explode all trees) OR (MeSH 
descriptor: [Disaster Medicine] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: 
[Laboratory Personnel] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: [Health 
Personnel] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: [General Practice] explode 
all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: [Patient Care] explode all trees) OR (MeSH 
descriptor: [Patient Care Management] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: 
[Nursing Services] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: [Nursing Care] 
explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: [Health Facilities] explode all trees) 
OR (MeSH descriptor: [Health Systems Agencies] explode all trees) OR (MeSH 
descriptor: [Local Government] explode all trees) OR (MeSH descriptor: 
[State Government] explode all trees) OR ((laboratory or laboratories or 
microbiologist?):ti,ab,kw) OR ((hospital? or doctor? or clinician? or nurse? or 
nursing or practitioner? or physician?):ti,ab,kw) OR ((health-care or healthcare 
or health system? or health protection):ti,ab,kw) OR ((medical care or patient 
care or clinical care or health care or primary care or care setting):ti,ab,kw) OR 
((professional? or worker? or official? or personnel or staff or sector or service? 
or facility or facilities):ti,ab,kw) OR ((agency or agencies or department? or 
authority or authorities or organi?ation?):ti,ab,kw) 
122576
[4] [1] AND [2] 204
[5] [3] AND [4] 65
[6] [5] limit to from 2002 to 2012 43
Appendix 1 continued
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Appendix 2 
Eligibility criteria for screening both titles and abstracts and full text articles
Titles and abstracts Inclusion criteria
• The study addresses preparedness of healthcare facilities and healthcare 
providers to infectious disease outbreaks, which are directly involved in 
providing healthcare during an infectious disease outbreak (including primary-, 
secondary-, tertiary- and home and community care providers); or indirectly 
involved in providing healthcare services during an outbreak (including local 
health departments, and clinical diagnostic laboratories). 
• The study has one of the following study designs: experimental quantitative 
study designs (before-and-after studies, non-randomised controlled trials, and 
randomised controlled trials); observational quantitative study designs (before-
and-after studies, case–control studies, cohort studies, correlation studies, cross-
sectional studies or quantitative surveys, and interrupted time series); qualitative 
study designs (including document analysis, interview studies, focus group 
studies, observation, and qualitative surveys); mathematical modeling studies; 
and expert consensus procedures.
Exclusion criteria 
• The study addresses preparedness to emergencies other than natural infectious 
disease outbreaks.
• The study describes one of the following settings: low and middle income 
country settings; disaster-settings (e.g. infectious disease outbreaks which occur 
after flooding); historical settings (outbreaks which occurred more than 15 years 
ago); and mass gathering settings. 
• The study addresses preparedness of other organizations or institutes not 
involved in providing health care services during the outbreak (e.g. businesses, 
schools, armed forces, prisons), or preparedness of the general public. Also 
exclusion if the setting was not reported in the abstract. 
• The study design is different from the study designs as described in “titles and 
abstracts inclusion criteria” (see above), or was not clear from the abstract.
Full text articles Inclusion criteria
• The study provides at least one evidence-based or consensus-based 
recommendation, or at least one recommendation based on lessons learned or 
best practices for preparedness. 
• If the study assessed the effectiveness of preparedness measures, it needs to 
describe which preparedness intervention was applied; whether a control group 
was used; and which outcomes were measured.
Exclusion criteria
• The study provides neither evidence-based or consensus-based recommendations, 
nor recommendations based on lessons learned or best practices for preparedness.
• The study claims to assess effectiveness of preparedness measures, but does not 
describe which preparedness intervention was applied; whether a control group 
was used; or which outcomes were measured.
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Appendix 3
Tables including key recommendations and relation to PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT cycle
Table 1 Recommendations for construction and maintenance of the preparedness plan
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
Availability of a preparedness plan for infectious disease outbreaks
1. Every healthcare organization should have a preparedness 
plan for infectious disease outbreaks that is comprehensive, 
current, activated, and distributed 
9 (9, 26, 27, 29, 32, 37, 43) PLAN 
PHASE
2. The staff members of small healthcare organizations who 
are responsible for preparedness planning should have 
access to education and training in outbreak planning
1 (32) PLAN 
PHASE
Development and updating of the preparedness plan
3. The institutional preparedness plan should be updated 
by experts on a regular basis; the updating should include 
lessons learned from previous outbreaks 
7 (9, 26, 29, 34, 37) ACT PHASE
4. The preparedness plan should be flexible and adaptable 
to the actual and local situation 
2 (26, 46) PLAN 
PHASE
5. The preparedness plan for vulnerable groups of patients 
should be considered specifically 
3 (36) PLAN 
PHASE
Planning collaboration and coordination
6. Healthcare institutions should develop their institutional 
preparedness plans in a multidisciplinary internal-and-
external committee, which should consist of dedicated 
expert groups that promote capacity building 
4 (32, 46) PLAN 
PHASE
7. The presence of a dedicated staff position for pandemic 
or disaster preparedness is important. This position 
should preferably be filled by a medical officer 
3 (31, 43) PLAN 
PHASE
Resources 
8. Resources for developing, testing, and updating a 
preparedness plan should be made available
3 (32, 46) PLAN 
PHASE
Distribution and implementation
9. Creative dissemination strategies should be developed 
and tailored to clinical providers. They should be 
distributed via medical directors, and they should 
encourage the routine use of the preventive procedures 
3 (34, 36) PLAN 
PHASE
10. Healthcare workers should have access to the institution’s 
preparedness plan (for example, on the intranet) 
1 (32) PLAN 
PHASE
Number of key recommendations: 10 ; number of unique recommendations: 36; number of studies: 11
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Table 2 Recommendations for the support of health professionals, patients, and families
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
Protection of patients, families, and healthcare workers
1. In the presence of uncertainty, staff protection 
should start at the highest level and then be gradually 
reduced 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
2. Each healthcare organization should have a plan 
for prioritising the staff and residents for receiving 
vaccine and antiviral drugs 
1 (43) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
3. The designated employees should be encouraged 
through creative strategies or mandated to receive the 
appropriate vaccine and/or antiviral prophylaxis 
6 (9, 28, 31, 40, 42) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Education and training: organization 
4. Healthcare workers should be educated and trained 
(with table-top exercises, operational exercises, drills, 
and continuous infection prevention education). 
Various scenarios and other methods are needed to 
ensure they have the necessary knowledge and skills 
15 (9, 26, 29, 31-33, 36, 
37, 40, 43, 46)
DO PHASE
5. Drills and exercises should be multidisciplinary 
and conducted externally to assess how the plans of 
various healthcare facilities interact and to provide 
a better understanding of overall community 
preparedness 
1 (9) DO PHASE
6. The course material should be standardised. It should 
encourage central development of training tools and 
benchmarks, and national standards should be used 
for evaluating the level of emergency preparedness of 
medical facilities for pandemics 
2 (31, 45) DO AND STUDY 
PHASES
7. The training programme should be implemented 1 (31) DO PHASE
8. Healthcare institutions should provide ongoing 
education programmes about infection prevention 
for employees, and they should organise regular 
disaster drills and exercises 
3 (9, 38) DO PHASE
9. Knowledge should be re-evaluated frequently 1 (33) STUDY PHASE
10. Training materials should be available for: infection 
control measures, presenting principles for personal 
protection in pandemic influenza and avian flu, and 
for contagious infectious diseases such as severe acute 
respiratory syndrome and pandemic influenza
1 (30) DO PHASE
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Table 2 Recommendations for the support of health professionals, patients, and families - continued
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
Education and training: content
11. The staff should be educated and trained in:
- The disease, medical management, alert lists, and 
training non-ICU staff for pre-determined tasks
- Infection control measures including, laboratory 
specimens, visitor restrictions, and appropriate 
personal protective  equipment (PPE) use
- Triage: rapid recognition of suspected patients with 
highly infectious diseases
- Hospital organization and its command structure
- Social issues such as ethical issues, dealing with 
the deceased and the family of dying patients, and 
community education
- Resilience in family–work balance, education 
and preparation of employees’ families and the 
community, ethical concerns and fairness, types 
of stress, conflict management, and antiviral 
treatment 
18 (9, 27, 31, 33, 36, 38, 
39, 42, 45)
DO PHASE
Education and training: key personnel 
12. Senior management should identify the staff 
members to participate in training programmes 
(healthcare workers and members of the hospital 
command structure), allocate the staff to the defined 
roles, verify that they have participated, and evaluate 
their knowledge annually 
6 (31, 33, 36) DO PHASE
13. All designated professionals should be trained 1 (31) DO PHASE
14. Instructors providing training should be trained 
as instructors (for example, in personal protection 
techniques and reduction of environmental 
contamination). Infection control staff should 
preferably do the teaching 
2 (31, 33) DO PHASE
Psychosocial assistance for patients, families, and healthcare workers
15. Healthcare organizations should have contingency 
plans for supporting patients and their families, and 
respecting and advocating their rights 
1 (35) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
16. Social workers should be prepared to take a leading 
role in providing effective interventions concerning 
patients and families 
3 (35) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
17. Healthcare organizations should anticipate 
addressing mistrust, fear, and moral maintenance 
of healthcare workers in order to guarantee human 
resource sustainability 
4 (33, 37, 38) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
18. Mental health and faith-based services should be 
available for professionals 
1 (43) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
19. Healthcare organizations should prepare for staff 
needs such as housing, food, family support, and 
childcare 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   48 04-05-18   16:55
Defining healthcare facilities preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks
49
2
Table 2 Recommendations for the support of health professionals, patients, and families - continued
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
Infection control procedures and containment 
20. An infectious disease preparedness plan should 
include items supporting infection control (including 
measures to prevent contamination) for all phases of 
the outbreak, such as: 
- Contamination at the bedside 
- Visitor restrictions 
- Admissions 
- Masking of cases 
- Enhanced cleaning 
- Cohorting of sick residents 
- Safe respiratory therapy practices 
- Safety of the environment and equipment in areas 
used for elective procedures should be assessed to 
prevent exposure of uninfected patients 
- Measures for respiratory hygiene and cough 
etiquette 
- Procedures for handling family, visitors, consultants 
- Use of airborne and contact precautions 
- Appropriate protective measures such as the use of 
vaccinations, protective equipment, and antiviral 
drugs 
15 (27, 33, 39, 41, 42) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
21. All employees concerned should be fit-tested for PPE 
use. The organization should appoint someone to be 
available for questions from the staff about PPE use 
4 (9, 39, 41) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
22. Compliance of healthcare workers with transmission-
based precautions should be enforced via diverse 
strategies 
1 (27) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
23. Healthcare organizations should plan to put 
healthcare workers exposed to a highly infectious 
disease on leave for the maximum incubation period 
to monitor their health for the maximum incubation 
period 
3 (41) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
24. Healthcare organizations should plan to screen 
patients with symptoms of the infectious disease 
1 (41) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
25. Specific protocols for high-risk procedures 
should be available, addressing the following 
issues: appropriateness of high-risk procedures, 
qualifications of clinicians performing high-risk 
procedures, required use of PPE and following a high-
risk procedure, optimal site for performing high-risk 
procedures, essential personnel and exposure time 
during high-risk procedures, room entrance and 
exiting during procedures and safe disposal of or 
adequate sterilization of utilized equipment. 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Number of key recommendations: 25; number of unique recommendations: 94; number of studies: 19
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Table 3 Recommendations regarding surge capacity 
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
Surge capacity plan
1. The institutional plan should account for the 
provision of care across the surge capacity spectrum 
(conventional or usual spaces, staff and resources, 
contingency as in functionally equivalent care 
using non-traditional patient care space, staff and 
resources, and crisis sufficiency of care in a scarce 
resource setting), so that the maximum number of 
patients can be treated during each phased response 
appropriate to the demands 
5 (9, 26, 33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Infrastructure
2. Healthcare organizations should have an overview 
of the general features of the organization on the 
ground (e.g. logistic structures including private 
rooms, toilets, wards, rooms dedicated to infectious 
disease, rooms equipped with negative pressure 
systems) and they should plan to expand their 
capacity. Healthcare organizations should at least: 
- Consider the mechanism of establishing dedicated 
pandemic centres 
- Consider the capacity for isolating patients on an 
individual basis or collectively
- Include scalable arrangements 
- Prepare for space limitations (including insufficient 
patient treatment rooms, total waiting space, space 
to be designated a separate waiting room apart 
from patients without symptoms, and space for 
urgent or fast-track care 
- Prioritise designated locations for expansion 
- Plan how to create separate waiting and evaluation 
areas and transportation routes 
- Plan for ongoing support for infrastructure 
protection, power, water, oxygen, suction, and 
compressed air provisions 
- Be able to increase the number of ICU beds by 
using monitored procedure-and-recovery areas for 
critical care 
- Plan to provide advanced ventilator support and 
most rescue therapies, and to consider transferring 
patients with severe disease to regional centres, 
- Provide for negative-pressure isolation rooms with 
adequate ventilation facilities 
12 (9, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 
36)
PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
3. Plans must include on-site or off-site alternative care 
areas (including triage areas and waiting rooms) and 
thresholds for their use 
3 (29, 36) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
4. Hospitals should have at least one isolation room 
which is well-equipped and logistically adequate. 
This room should at least have: negative pressure, 
high-efficiency particulate air filtration for exhausting 
air, sealing of windows and door, and surfaces that 
are easy to decontaminate 
3 (26, 27, 30) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
5. Healthcare organizations should have, or be able 
to create, separate waiting and evaluation areas and 
transportation routes 
5 (27, 30) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
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Table 3 Recommendations regarding surge capacity - continued
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
6. Healthcare organizations should have access to 
adequate laboratory facilities for screening and 
follow-up
1 (43) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
7. Healthcare organizations should have a list of 
procedures that will not be performed during an 
outbreak 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
8. Healthcare organizations should have a single, simple 
reporting framework to deal with the increased 
clerical burden on statistical reporting 
2 (26) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Manpower
9. Healthcare organizations should have a plan to 
access, coordinate, and increase labour resources for 
continued and expanded care. This plan should at 
least include: 
- Shift plans in order to have trained healthcare 
workers constantly available
- A procedure for excluding symptomatic staff 
members 
- Designation of physicians authorised to prescribe 
medications for patients who have or are suspected 
of having the disease 
- A list of skilled and deployable healthcare 
professionals and epidemiologists
This plan should take into account:
- Assigning staff on the basis of abilities and 
experience 
- Expanding the scope of practice for non-critical-
care personnel to provide critical care under 
adequate supervision
- Allocating staff to a single resident cohort during 
an outbreak
- How staff may be redeployed to unusual duties or 
work areas 
14 (29, 31, 33, 37, 38, 
42,43)
PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
10. Healthcare organizations should have an up-to-date 
inventory of all personnel (medical and nonmedical) 
with and without patient contacts 
1 (28) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
11. In the preparedness phase, roles and responsibilities 
of key individuals expanding the work force should 
be defined 
2 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
12. Coordinated manpower expansion should include 
adequate psychosocial support for staff members and 
their families, as well as moments of rest 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
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Table 3 Recommendations regarding surge capacity - continued
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
Equipment, pharmaceuticals and supplies
13. Healthcare organizations should have an access plan 
in place for stockpiling and distribution. This plan 
should at least include: 
- PPE for healthcare workers: for example, masks, 
gloves, gowns, N95 respirators, and alcohol-based 
hand gel
- PPE for patients and visitors: for example, 
disposable tissues, surgical masks, places for the 
disposal of used tissues, stations for hand Hygiene 
with all items needed, distributers for alcohol-
based solution should be in place at several 
locations 
- Diagnostic materials: for example, swabs and a 
viral transport medium 
- Laboratory diagnostics: diagnostic assays
- Antiviral drugs: for patients and immediate 
family members, and as prophylaxis for healthcare 
workers and their family members
- Medical equipment and medication: for example, 
ventilators, portable beds, face shields, tents, 
supplies to split waiting rooms, HEPA air filtration 
rooms, ICU equipment, ventilators, antibiotics, 
bronchodilators, sedatives, and safe respiratory 
equipment
- Vaccines
- Patient and visitor hygiene equipment: disposable 
tissues, surgical masks, places for the disposal of 
used tissues, stations for hand hygiene with all 
items needed, and distributers for alcohol-based 
solution should be present at several locations 
32 (9, 26-30, 33, 40, 42, 
43, 46)
PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
14. Senior management should prepare to provide 
adequate resources to respond to an outbreak 
1 (40) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
15. Prescription forms and rapid prescribing 
arrangements should be available (for example, with 
general practitioners)
2 (30, 42) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Triage
16. Healthcare organizations should have triage 
protocols for infectious disease outbreaks. The 
protocols should be objective, ethical, transparent, 
applied equitably, publically disclosed, developed at 
a national or regional level, and frequently revised. 
The triage criteria should be adapted to fit in with the 
individual organization. The triage protocol should 
include an ethical framework to manage competing 
priorities for relevant pathways of decision-making 
10 (9, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33, 
37)
PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
17. Critical-care triage protocols for mass casualty 
events should only be activated when critical-care 
resources across a broad geographic area are or will 
be overwhelmed despite all reasonable efforts to 
extend resources or obtain additional resources 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   52 04-05-18   16:55
Defining healthcare facilities preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks
53
2
Table 3 Recommendations regarding surge capacity - continued
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
18. When resources permit, emergency triage should 
cease in a graduated fashion by means of altering 
prioritisation criteria and then exclusion thresholds 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
19. Hospitals should prioritise support services for 
disaster needs in cooperation with laboratory, 
radiology, nutrition, and other departments 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
20. If sufficient medical equipment, pharmaceuticals 
and supplies are not available for all patients, triage 
of scarce resources should be based on those who 
benefit most or on a ‘first come, first served’ basis 
3 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
21. Healthcare organizations should plan for trained 
triage staff in place on a 24-hour basis 
1 (27) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
22. The preparedness plan should define mobile 
assessment teams intended to maintain suspected, 
probable, possible, or confirmed cases in home 
isolation
1 (26) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Monitoring
23. Healthcare organizations should have a 
communicable disease register. This register should 
at least include:
- Identification details of the suspected, probable, 
possible, or confirmed case
- Date of disease onset
- Suspected, probable, possible, or confirmed 
symptoms
- The location of the suspected, probable, possible, 
or confirmed case within the facility 
3 (27, 42, 46) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
24. Healthcare organizations should have an established 
surveillance network to monitor the burden of 
disease in relation to the capacity of healthcare 
1 (46) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
25. Healthcare organizations should plan to actively 
monitor exposed patients and visitors 
1 (41) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
26. Healthcare organizations should plan to inform 
ambulance and organization staff when a patient is 
transferred 
1 (42) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Number of key recommendations: 26; number of unique recommendations: 109; number of studies: 16
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Table 4 Recommendations regarding communication to the public, patients, and families
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
1. Healthcare organizations should have 
communication strategies for patients and their 
families. These strategies should at least contain:
- Information tailored to the different target groups 
and their level of understanding
- An unambiguous message concerning the burden 
of disease
- Information about the local healthcare provision
- Information about the situation when usual 
treatments may be impossible to deliver and triage 
may be needed, but by avoiding unnecessary 
panic. 
- Advice that focuses on efforts to take care of 
oneself and one’s family
- A plan to give families updates during an outbreak
- Emphasis on kindness, comfort, and empathy for 
patients in isolation and their families
- The ability to respond to shifts 
13 (26, 27, 33, 35, 37, 
43, 46)
PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Number of key recommendations: 1; number of unique recommendations: 13; number of studies: 7
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Table 5 Recommendations regarding coordination and collaboration 
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
Coordination plan
1. Healthcare organizations should have a tested plan 
for coordination and collaboration. The plan should 
be implemented when the crisis occurs, updated as 
the crisis evolves, and evaluated and improved in the 
post-crisis phase 
2 (33, 46) ALL FOUR 
PHASES
Coordination and collaboration within health facilities
2. Hospitals should prepare a communication, 
coordination, and collaboration system between key 
departments, such as central hospital administration, 
clinical departments, and departments of laboratory 
services, radiology, physiotherapy, housekeeping, and 
medical supplies. This means that: 
- The healthcare organization should share clinical 
information through a unified organizational 
database
- The healthcare organization should have guidelines 
for the systematic management of patient 
admission and discharge from the organization, 
but also for admission and discharge within the 
organization (i.e. between departments)
- The healthcare organization should have appropriate 
personnel to function as interdepartmental 
contacts such as a triage officer, infection control 
officer, emergency department admissions, and/or 
patient transfer officer
5 (33, 46) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
3. Organizations should have a committee for 
multidisciplinary organizational preparedness to 
ensure that the organization is well prepared. This 
committee should consist of:
- A clinical microbiologist
- An infection expert
- A representative of the management
- A medical officer of the department
- An employee who does the daily work on the ward
- Support services
- The relevant clinical leaders
- Social workers
2 (34, 35) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
4. Organizations should ensure that an outbreak 
coordinator can be appointed in an outbreak 
situation 
1 (42) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
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Table 5 Recommendations regarding coordination and collaboration - continued
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
5. Healthcare organizations should prepare for installing 
an outbreak control group to coordinate the response 
in case of a threat. This group should: 
- Assess manpower needs operations, logistics, and 
planning sections)
- Coordinate all clinical and nonclinical staffing 
requirements
- Determine the organization’s daily needs
- Provide for a sick and no-show list
- Liaise with key personnel in the various departments 
to determine the required resources, order and 
stockpile adequate numbers and amounts, and 
distribute them judiciously 
4 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Coordination and collaboration between health facilities
6. A communication and coordination system between 
each healthcare facility and the local, regional, 
and national governmental authorities should be 
established 
2 (33, 46) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
7. Healthcare organizations should collaborate, 
coordinate, and communicate with key regional 
stakeholders for outbreak preparedness 
3 (32, 43) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
8. Healthcare institutions should collaborate and 
coordinate regarding the following subjects: 
- A coordinated approach for patient transfers
- A coordinated approach for standards of care
- Resource allocation
- Collaboration between ICUs and other hospitals or 
regional resource authorities to ensure best possible 
patient care
- Resources: vital equipment, manpower, and 
pharmaceuticals
- A communication linkage established with nearby 
hospitals
- A network of referral centres 
7 (33, 34, 36, 43, 46) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
9. The public health leader should be a medical officer 1 (46) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
10. Healthcare organizations should plan to establish a 
regional outbreak control group to exercise authority 
and direction over resources in the region. This 
includes at least the domains:
- Command
- Operations
- Planning
- Logistics
- Finance and administration
- Triage 
1 (33) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
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Table 5 Recommendations regarding coordination and collaboration - continued
SUBCATEGORY NUMBER OF UNIQUE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(REFERENCES)
PLAN-DO-
STUDY-ACT 
CYCLE 
11. Good practices regarding coordination are: having 
an implementation group, national and subnational 
cooperation, and a subnational coordination group 
1 (46) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Communication strategies
12. Communication with public health planners should 
be prepared for 
1 (43) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
13. Healthcare organizations should develop an internal 
information channel to ensure that up-to-date 
information is factual, accurate, and reliable while 
preventing information overload
- Healthcare organizations should be able to 
immediately institute a forum for developing and 
sharing practice guidelines
- Triage personnel should plan to have access to an 
epidemiological update about the main outbreaks 
ongoing in the world 
5 (27, 35, 37, 44, 46) PREPAREDNESS 
TOPIC
14. One designated health care worker should 
be in charge of monitoring the major on-line 
epidemiological alert sites and bulletins, and should 
disseminate the news to the triage staff 
2 (27) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Leadership
15. Strong, visible, present, focused leadership is 
important for effective crisis management during 
outbreaks 
2 (37, 38) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
16. Healthcare organizations should have strategies to 
ensure effective and responsive leadership 
1 (37) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
17. Senior-level hospital administrators should provide 
adequate political support 
1 (40) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
18. Senior-level management should be prepared to 
provide good leadership. This includes:
- Propagating the policy to the healthcare workers
- Approving plans in a way that gives everybody, 
from the diverse sectors, the opportunity to give 
input and make final comments
- Being politically committed 
2 (36, 46) PREPAREDNESS 
ELEMENT
Number of key recommendations: 18; number of unique recommendations: 43; number of studies: 13
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Appendix 4
Tables including unique recommendations 
Table 1 Unique recommendations for construction and maintenance of the preparedness plan
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
Availability of a preparedness plan for infectious disease outbreaks 
1. Presence of a pandemic plan and activation of this plan Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
2. Implemented plan for H1N1 influenza surge Sugerman et al. (2011)
3. Hospitals must ensure they have current pandemic plans and conduct drills 
in order to ensure preparedness for natural and man-made disasters, as well as 
future influenza pandemics. 
Sugerman et al. (2011)
4. Tested pandemic plan Zoutman et al. (2010)
5. Staff responsible for pandemic influenza planning in all hospitals and 
especially small and rural hospitals would benefit from ready access to 
education and training in pandemic planning.
Zoutman et al. (2010)
6. Status of a pandemic influenza plan: part of current general facility disaster 
plan; separate plan; do not yet have a plan
Smith et al. (2009)
7. Health care providers stated that protocols established frameworks upon 
which decisions could be based. Accordingly, such protocols were thought to 
offer the potential to diminish the chaos that prevailed during much of the 
SARS outbreak.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
8. Strategies include the creation of preparedness guidelines, competency 
and capacity-building, and the development of a quorum of skilled and 
deployable health care professionals and epidemiologists.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
9. [EDs / MADs] Availability of specific protocols for the management of 
suspected HIDs (including criteria for initial diagnostic suspect, including 
initial diagnostic work-up, including basic infection control measures, 
including initial medical treatment and/or including steps for alerting and 
notifying)
Fusco et al. (2012)
10. Having a comprehensive pandemic flu plan Rebmann et al. (2011)
Development and updating of the preparedness plan
11. Fine-tuning the planning framework would provide a balance between 
central standardization of policies and procedures, and adaptability to local 
circumstances.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
12. Rapid development of clinical standards and guidelines was recognized by 
ED staff as critical to the pandemic response and appreciated. Consistent 
application of guidelines in disaster scenarios requires discipline on behalf of 
all.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
13. There is a need to review pandemic plans to capitalize on the experience from 
this pandemic, to articulate national jurisdictional and local plans, and to 
harmonize pandemic and disaster planning.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
14. ED infection control procedures must be reviewed, including standard risk-
related policies for PPE and antiviral agents.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
15. Developed a plan (year of development/ updated recently) Sugerman et al. (2011)
16. In recommending preparation for any future outbreak of SARS or similar 
infectious disease, participants advocated the rapid development of protocols 
and procedures
Nicholas et al. (2008)
17. Preparedness should be considered specifically for children Giacomet et al. (2007)
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Table 1 Unique recommendations for construction and maintenance of the preparedness plan - continued
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
18. Preparedness for influenza pandemics would be improved by the 
implementation of specific pediatric guidelines and operational procedures 
at local level 
Giacomet et al. (2007)
19. Availability of specific pediatric intensive care units dedicated to contagious 
diseases
Giacomet et al. (2007)
20. Updating the pandemic plan in the previous year Rebmann et al. (2011)
21. Good practices regarding adaptability/flexibility were: adapting treatment 
protocol; adapting response to the actual situation
Hashim et al. (2012)
22. Hospitals should consider purposefully institutionalizing lessons learned 
from responding to episodes such as the H1N1 pandemic, so that valuable 
innovations and interventions can be applied to future events.
Filice et al. (2013)
Planning collaboration and coordination
23. The hospital had multidisciplinary (internal and external) pandemic influenza 
planning committees
Zoutman et al. (2010)
24. The hospital participated in the development of the local public health unit’s 
pandemic plan
Zoutman et al. (2010)
25. The presence of a separate staff position responsible for pandemic or disaster 
preparedness
Smith et al. (2009)
26. One of the first elements addressed in the CDC planning checklist for long-
term care facilities and other residential facilities is a pandemic influenza 
planning coordinator.
Smith et al. (2009)
27. Category A countries dedicated expert groups that were available to provide 
guidance to the revision and updating of national plans and related guidelines; 
this step increased the potency of country-specific capacity building activities 
supported by the plan.
Hashim et al. (2012)
28. Good practices regarding mutual support were: guidance documents, finance 
implementations and international organizations
Hashim et al. (2012)
29. Level C (not essential): Appointment of medical officer responsible for 
hospital preparedness to avian flu and pandemic influenza
Adini et al. (2011)
Resources 
30. Additional resources for developing and testing pandemic influenza plans 
need to be made available to small and rural hospitals.
Zoutman et al. (2010)
31. To improve the pandemic influenza planning process in Ontario’s acute 
care hospitals will necessitate funding for plan development and testing and 
the fostering of planning expertise in hospital staff charged with the task of 
developing pandemic influenza plans.
Zoutman et al. (2010)
32. Challenges regarding mutual support were: Finance planning activities 
(that preparation of the plan and guidelines was not financially supported 
by international, national or sub-national government bodies), WHO data 
sharing
Hashim et al. (2012)
Distribution and implementation
33. The hospital made pandemic influenza plan available to staff on intranet Zoutman et al. (2010)
34. Routine use of specific protocols and preventive procedures for infectious 
diseases that were applied. 
Giacomet et al. (2007)
35. Policy makers seeking to improve hospital preparedness should recognize that 
many operational, clinical leaders may not be aware of existing preparedness 
guidance and so may be unprepared to implement best practices.
Filice et al. (2013)
36. Developing creative dissemination strategies, tailored to clinical providers 
and distributed through medical directors, should be considered to improve 
guidance implementation at the hospital level.
Filice et al. (2013)
Number of key recommendations: 10 ; number of unique recommendations: 36; number of studies: 11
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Table 2 Recommendations for the support of health professionals, patients, and families
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
Protection of patients, families, and healthcare workers
37. How many of the above personnel received influenza vaccination through the 
hospital?
Schneider et al. (2010)
38. In the presence of uncertainty, staff protection should start at the highest level 
and then be gradually reduced
Sprung et al. (2010)
39. All healthcare workers should be mandated to receive the flu vaccine or risk 
losing their jobs.
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
40. A plan to prioritize staff and residents for vaccine and antivirals during a 
pandemic
Smith et al. (2009)
41. Residential aged care facilities should be encouraged to use creative means for 
promoting, facilitating and subsidizing staff vaccination.
Eastwood et al. (2008)
42. Requiring employees to receive H1N1 vaccine when available Rebmann et al. (2011)
43. Level A (essential for preparedness): Designation of staff members from the 
hospital who will receive preventive medication in the event of avian flu or 
pandemic influenza
Adini et al. (2011)
44. Level C (not essential): Hospital staff was encouraged to be vaccinated against 
the flu
Adini et al. (2011)
Education and training: organization 
45. Local educational programmes should ensure staff are aware of the plans in 
place. 
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
46. Continuing education interventions appear to increase the skills and 
confidence of hospital staff and enhance communication and collaboration, 
reinforcing and enhancing the organization’s values of care and support for its 
staff.
Aiello et al. (2011)
47. Conducted operational exercises Sugerman et al. (2011)
48. Conducted table-top exercises Sugerman et al. (2011)
49. Hospitals must ensure they have current pandemic plans and conduct drills 
in order to ensure preparedness for natural and man-made disasters, as well as 
future influenza pandemics. 
Sugerman et al. (2011)
50. Knowledge and compliance with PP protocols are poor, and consequently 
knowledge should be re-evaluated frequently
Sprung et al. (2010)
51. Staffing needs (housing, food, family support and childcare) and appropriate 
protective measures (vaccinations, Protective equipment and antivirals) along 
with the appropriate training should be provided.”
Sprung et al. (2010)
52. Several web-based education approaches might be beneficial for pandemic 
learning
Zoutman et al. (2010)
53. Listed most commonly as the most important initiatives in the near future: 
healthcare worker education
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
54. Since all of the trainers used the same course material, standardized information 
was disseminated. This is particularly important when communicating 
departmental policies
Gershon et al. (2009)
55. Plan in place to provide training Smith et al. (2009)
56. Strategies include the creation of preparedness guidelines, competency and 
capacity-building, and the development of a quorum of skilled and deployable 
health care professionals and epidemiologists.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
57. [in survey for pediatric hospital units] knowledge of health care workers Giacomet et al. (2007)
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Table 2 Recommendations for the support of health professionals, patients, and families - continued
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
58. Providing ongoing infection prevention education programs for employees Rebmann et al. (2011)
59. Participating in at least 2 disaster drills/exercises per year Rebmann et al. (2011)
60. Using varying scenarios in disaster drills Rebmann et al. (2011)
61. Drills and exercises are essential to disaster preparedness because they allow 
agencies to test their written disaster plans..
Rebmann et al. (2011)
62. Home health agencies should participate in disaster drills, especially 
communitywide exercises that allow regional authorities to assess how 
various health care facility and agency plans interact and provide a better 
understanding of overall community disaster preparedness.
Rebmann et al. (2011)
63. All countries reported that staff training was a crucial pre-pandemic 
requirement. This training was specific to a generally low baseline knowledge 
concerning potential differences between pandemic and seasonal influenza.
Hashim et al. (2012)
64. Level B (important for preparedness): Availability of training materials: for 
infection control measures; for presenting principles for personal protection 
in pandemic influenza and avian flu; for contagious infectious disease (severe 
acute respiratory syndrome, pandemic influenza)
Adini et al. (2011)
65. Level B (important for preparedness): Implementation of a training program 
during the past 6 months for ED for pandemic influenza and avian flu
Adini et al. (2011)
66. Based on the national training programme that was conducted, we recommend 
central development of training tools and benchmarks and utilization of 
national standards to evaluate the level of emergency preparedness of medical 
facilities to pandemics.
Adini et al. (2011)
67. The findings of this study support the conclusions of previously conducted 
research which reported that development and implementation of training 
programmes are very important in assuring emergency preparedness. It would 
appear from the results of this study that the key domain of training is the 
implementation of the training programme. 
Adini et al. (2011)
68. Training health-care personnel to manage emergencies is regarded as an 
important component in emergency preparedness, and exercises are generally 
considered to be part of the training programmes. We suggest that exercises 
should serve a dual purpose:(i) a component of the training; and (ii) an 
evaluation tool to determine the effectiveness of the training programmes.
Adini et al. (2011)
Education and training: content
69. Theme which should be addressed in resilience training: Antiviral prophylaxis Aiello et al. (2011)
70. Theme which should be addressed in resilience training: family-work balance Aiello et al. (2011)
71. Theme which should be addressed in resilience training: Education and 
preparation of employees’ families and the community
Aiello et al. (2011)
72. Theme which should be addressed in resilience training: Ethical concerns and 
fairness
Aiello et al. (2011)
73. Need for ongoing resilience training for types of stress, as well as conflict 
management training in preparation for coping with stressful situations.
Aiello et al. (2011)
74. The hospital command structure should be trained in crisis management 
procedures.
Sprung et al. (2010)
75. The staff should be educated about the disease, its ramifications and treatment. Sprung et al. (2010)
76. Staff training in PPE use (e.g., fit-testing for N95 respirators, avoiding 
contamination when placing/removing, environmental cleaning, etc.) is 
essential
Sprung et al. (2010)
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77. Subjects to be taught include medical management, personal protection 
techniques, environmental contamination, laboratory specimens, alert lists, 
training of non-ICU staff pre-determined tasks, ethical issues, dealing with the 
deceased and families of dying patients and visitors restrictions, community 
education. 
Sprung et al. (2010)
78. With respiratory PPE use in particular, with compliance known to be 
suboptimal, a simple, short training program and skill-building drill may be 
an important component to an overall safety program. This approach might 
be helpful to other EMS departments and healthcare work groups. 
Gershon et al. (2009)
79. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Providing 
training in the use of PPE
Eastwood et al. (2008)
80. To improve general education as it seems that there is little knowledge about 
the spreading of severe infections. 
Giacomet et al. (2007)
81. Finally, all HCWs, or at least dedicated personnel depending on EDs policies, 
should be familiar with PPE use, donning and removal, isolation procedures 
and disinfection issues, as well as with the alert and command chain. 
Fusco et al. (2012)
82. HCWs dedicated to triage should be specifically trained in the rapid 
recognition of suspected patients with highly infectious diseases. 
Fusco et al. (2012)
83. [Institutional score] Was adequate training provided to you in the use of 
masks (Adequate training)
Imai et al. (2006)
84. Providing H1N1 education to staff Rebmann et al. (2011)
85. Level B (important for preparedness): The hospital training program includes 
the following topics: flu and complications; avian flu; pandemic influenza; 
personal protective equipment; infection control measures
Adini et al. (2011)
86. Level B (important for preparedness): Onset of winter training programs for 
the following: influenza and complications; treatment of a suspected avian flu 
or a pandemic influenza patient; personal protection
Adini et al. (2011)
Education and training: key personnel 
87. The administration should identify the staff to participate in training 
programs, verify that they participated and evaluate their knowledge annually
Sprung et al. (2010)
88. PP techniques and reduction of environmental contamination should 
preferably be taught by infection control staff with assistance from ICU 
directors
Sprung et al. (2010)
89. Residential aged care facilities should be encouraged to ensure that at least one 
of their staff is suitably trained.
Eastwood et al. (2008)
90. Medical and nursing personnel trained in infectious diseases, specific logistic 
facilities in the wards and more rooms dedicated to infectious diseases, 
particularly in intensive care, are strongly needed. 
Giacomet et al. (2007)
91. Level B (important for preparedness): Monitoring of attendance of staff in 
pandemic influenza and avian flu training
Adini et al. (2011)
92. Level A (essential for preparedness): Over 90% of designated personnel 
participated in the training of pandemic influenza and avian flu
Adini et al. (2011)
93. Level B (important for preparedness): The hospital identified staff who would 
undergo training for managing avian and pandemic influenza
Adini et al. (2011)
94. Allocating defined roles to the staff members ahead of time, and providing 
them with appropriate training, in addition to the tools to function in these 
roles, contributes to the effective functioning of ED personnel.     
Adini et al. (2011)
95. Efforts should be made to train the instructors from the different hospitals in 
order to ensure their competencies.
Adini et al. (2011)
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Psychosocial assistance for patients, families, and healthcare workers
96. Develop contingency plans to support, respect, and advocate for patients and 
their families
Gearing et al. (2007)
97. Addressing mistrust or fear of health care workers Aiello et al. (2011)
98. To minimize non-clinical risks and help maintain or escalate essential services, 
robust systems should be created to maintain staff confidence and safety. 
Sprung et al. (2010)
99. Staffing needs (housing, food, family support and childcare) and appropriate 
protective measures (vaccinations, protective equipment and antivirals) along 
with the appropriate training should be provided.
Sprung et al. (2010)
100. Availability of mental health and faith-based services Smith et al. (2009)
101. The intensity of perceived risk and workplace hazard left health care providers 
feeling, “vulnerable. . . physically, mentally and emotionally. ”To address these 
needs, most staff (75%) reported the importance of collegial support and 
camaraderie
Nicholas et al. (2008)
102. At times of outbreak and crisis, human resource sustainability and morale 
maintenance are crucial, particularly when heath care providers themselves are 
at considerable risk of disease infection.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
103. Use core social work practices to support patients, their families and hospital 
staff
Gearing et al. (2007)
104. Social workers needed to use their full range of experiences, knowledge, and 
skills to address situations in a crisis environment.
Gearing et al. (2007)
105. By remaining consistent to the core beliefs, values, and ethical obligations 
of their profession, social workers are well suited to take a leading role in 
providing effective interventions for patients and families in an epidemic 
environment. 
Gearing et al. (2007)
Infection control procedures and containment
106. Procedures for handling visitors, vendors, consultants etc. Sprung et al. (2010)
107. Ensure safe respiratory therapy practices to avoid aerosols / Safe practices and 
safe respiratory equipment are needed to minimize aerosol generation when 
caring for patients with influenza. These include minimizing disconnecting 
the ventilator circuit and using bag-mask ventilation, putting the ventilator on 
‘stand-by’ mode before disconnecting the patient, and avoiding Venturi masks 
and nebulized medications.
Sprung et al. (2010)
108. Develop protocols for safe performance of high-risk procedures that address 
the following issues: appropriateness of high-risk procedures, qualifications 
of clinicians performing high-risk procedures, required use of PPE during 
and following a high-risk procedure, optimal site for performing high-risk 
procedures, essential personnel and exposure time during high-risk procedures, 
room entrance and exiting during procedures and safe disposal of or adequate 
sterilization of utilized equipment.
Sprung et al. (2010)
109. The safety of areas (environment and equipment) used for elective procedures 
should be assessed to prevent exposure of uninfected patients to influenza.
Sprung et al. (2010)
110. Procedures should be performed at the bedside whenever possible. Sprung et al. (2010)
111. Appropriate safety precautions should be taken if patients are transported 
outside the ICU.
Sprung et al. (2010)
112. Staffing needs (housing, food, family support and childcare) and appropriate 
protective measures (vaccinations, protective equipment and antivirals) along 
with the appropriate training should be provided.
Sprung et al. (2010)
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113. All of the employees at my institution had been fit-tested for N-95 masks at 
the beginning of the H1N1 crisis.
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
114. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Cohorting of 
sick residents
Eastwood et al. (2008)
115. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Restricting new 
admissions
Eastwood et al. (2008)
116. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Restricting 
visitors
Eastwood et al. (2008)
117. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Ensuring 
enhanced cleaning was undertaken
Eastwood et al. (2008)
118. Standard precautions, including respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette 
measures, plus transmission-based precautions, should be implemented as 
completely as possible in all Eds and MADs at all times. 
Fusco et al. (2012)
119. If possible, an HCW should have responsibility for ensuring compliance with 
respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette measures and transmission-based 
precautions. If it is not possible to dedicate an HCWs to ensuring compliance, 
visual signs should be used. 
Fusco et al. (2012)
120. Under such circumstances [high risk of exposure due to specific procedures 
which need to be performed, and exposure to severely ill patients), the 
implementation of emergency infection control measures is imperative, 
especially for ER/ICU workers.
Imai et al. (2006)
121. [Institutional score] Do you have someone to turn to when you have a 
problem in using the PPE (Specialist available)
Imai et al. (2006)
122. Institutions should aim at higher levels of preparedness, by designating and 
implementing effective emergency infectious control measures.
Imai et al. (2006)
123. A respirator fit testing should be performed annually. Srinivasan et al. (2004)
124. [plan component] Screening of patients with respiratory symptoms in the 
emergency department
Srinivasan et al. (2004)
125. [plan component] Masking of patients with respiratory symptoms in the 
emergency department
Srinivasan et al. (2004)
126. [plan component] Use of airborne and contact precautions plus tight-fitting 
eye wear for treating patients with SARS
Srinivasan et al. (2004)
127. [plan component] Follow-up surveillance of exposed health care workers Srinivasan et al. (2004)
128. [plan component] HCWs placed on administrative leave for 10 days after 
exposure 
Srinivasan et al. (2004)
129. [plan component] Daily follow-up by employee health for 10 days after 
exposure
Srinivasan et al. (2004)
130. Fit-testing partial or all staff Rebmann et al. (2011)
Number of key recommendations: 25; number of unique recommendations: 94; number of studies: 19
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Surge capacity plan
131. The increased staff distress identified in this study ( lack of space for patients, 
increased demand, access block, filling staff deficits and staff absenteeism, and 
increased administrative burden related to statistical reporting and obtaining 
permission to prescribe antiviral medications) reinforces the need for enhanced 
surge capacity within EDs.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
132. EDs need to identify strategies to enhance their response capacity to sudden 
increases in demand deriving from major incidents and disasters.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
133. The institutional plan should account for the provision of care across this 
surge capacity spectrum (conventional (usual spaces, staff and resources), 
contingency (functionally equivalent care using non-traditional patient care 
space, staff and resources) and crisis (sufficiency of care in a scarce resource 
setting)) so that the maximum number of patients can be treated during each 
phased response appropriate to the demands.
Sprung et al. (2010)
134. Having a continuity of operations plan Rebmann et al. (2011)
135. Hospital disaster plans often include procedures aimed at discharging patients 
quickly, which likely will result in a surge of patients requiring home care 
services.Home health agencies must be prepared for this patient surge, 
including the ability to expand extra staff and secure supplies during a disaster. 
Rebmann et al. (2011)
Infrastructure
136. Management of infectious patients should be considered in ED design, 
and further consideration should be given to the ability to isolate patients 
on an individual basis, or collectively in the event of a major outbreak. 
Design considerations should include scalable arrangements, which allow for 
progressive surge in capability while preserving the capacity to continue to 
manage the remaining workload.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
137. A single, simple reporting framework needs to be developed for disasters to 
avoid this drain on already stretched senior staff.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
138. The increased staff distress identified in this study ( lack of space for patients, 
increased demand, access block, filling staff deficits and staff absenteeism, and 
increased administrative burden related to statistical reporting and obtaining 
permission to prescribe antiviral medications) reinforces the need for enhanced 
surge capacity within EDs.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
139. One important strategy in the management of pandemic influenza has been 
the creation of flu (or fever) clinics. Further consideration should be given to 
the mechanism of establishing dedicated pandemic centres or flu clinics, and 
the sourcing of appropriately skilled staff.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
140. ED should prepare for space limitations including an insufficient number of 
patient treatment rooms (65%), total waiting room space (54%), space to 
designate a separate waiting room apart from those without ILI symptoms 
(58%) (Table 2), or space in urgent care/fast track (40%).
Sugerman et al. (2011)
141. Plan designates alternative care sites (outpatient clinics, other sections of the 
hospital, schools, community centers, or a preequipped mobile trailer)
Sugerman et al. (2011)
142. Pandemic influenza plans must include on- or off-site alternative care sites and 
thresholds for their use.
Sugerman et al. (2011)
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143. Designated locations for expansion should be prioritized by expanding 
existing ICUs, using postanesthesia care units and emergency departments 
to capacity, then step-down units, large procedure suites, telemetry units and 
finally hospital wards
Sprung et al. (2010)
144. Planning should account for ongoing support for infrastructure protection, 
power, water, oxygen, suction and compressed air provisions, which are also 
necessary.
Sprung et al. (2010)
145. ICUs should be able to provide advanced ventilatory support and most 
rescue therapies including high levels of inspired oxygen and positive end-
expiratory pressure (PEEP), pressure control ventilation, inhaled nitric oxide, 
high-frequency ventilation, prone positioning ventilation and extracorporeal 
membrane oxygenation (ECMO). If hospitals cannot provide such services, 
they should consider transferring patients with severe disease to regional 
centers
Sprung et al. (2010)
146. The use of negative pressure isolation rooms with adequate ventilation 
facilities is also recommended although they may be limited in many ICUs 
and expanded areas. 
Sprung et al. (2010)
147. Hospitals should increase their ICU beds to the maximal extent by using 
monitored, procedure and recovery areas for critical care
Sprung et al. (2010)
148. Access to adequate laboratory facilities for surveillance and detection Smith et al. (2009)
149. Level A (essential for preparedness): Designated sites/hospital wards for 
ventilating patients were determined. 
Adini et al. (2009)
150. Level A (essential for preparedness): Availability of at least one isolation room 
in the ED.
Adini et al. (2009)
151. Level C (not essential): Designated sites/hospital wards for hospitalization of 
pandemic influenza patients were determined. 
Adini et al. (2009)
152. Level B (important for preparedness): A triage ED for pandemic influenza was 
allocated at a separate site from the routine ED
Adini et al. (2009)
153. Information on the general features of the hospital and the unit (i.e. logistical 
structures, including private rooms, toilets, and wards or rooms dedicated to 
infectious diseases, rooms equipped with negative pressure systems)
Giacomet et al. (2007)
154. Medical and nursing personnel trained in infectious diseases, specific logistic 
facilities in the wards and more rooms dedicated to infectious diseases, 
particularly in intensive care, are strongly needed. 
Giacomet et al. (2007)
155. The availability of technically well-equipped and logistically adequate 
isolation rooms is fundamental. These rooms should have a separate access 
directly from outside, or be logistically isolated from other common areas, 
and should be equipped with an anteroom. Ideally, these rooms should have 
negative pressure, HEPA filtration of exhausting air, sealing of windows and 
door, and surfaces inside should be easy to decontaminate.
Fusco et al. (2012)
156. [EDs / MADs] Existence of a dedicated route from ED/MAD to isolation 
ward for suspected HIDs (if yes, by-passing other common areas, if yes, the 
transport is performed by: stretcher isolator, special ambulance through an 
external pathway, different procedures depending on risk assessment, with a 
normal stretcher, without special procedures)
Fusco et al. (2012)
157. Interventions to improve the capacity for early recognition and appropriate 
management if HIDs in EDs and MADs are strongly advised.
Fusco et al. (2012)
158. Patients should be placed in separate waiting/evaluation areas, if available, or 
removed as soon as possible from common areas.
Fusco et al. (2012)
159. If the use of dedicated waiting room is not possible, ask people with fever and 
cough/sneeze to sit at least 1 meter away from other patients, and develop plan 
for surge capacity in triage/waiting areas in case of over-crowding
Fusco et al. (2012)
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   66 04-05-18   16:55
Defining healthcare facilities preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks
67
2
Table 3 Recommendations regarding surge capacity - continued
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
160. Presence of the following infection control procedures and strategies for early 
recognition of HIDs: availability of a general waiting area large enough for the 
safe distancing between attending persons (at least 1 meter/3 feet); availability 
of a reserved/separated waiting areas for suspected patients (e.g. patients with 
fever and cough); availability of plans for the implementation of waiting areas 
if necessary
Fusco et al. (2012)
161. Having at least a 20% surge capacity (calculated by dividing the reported 
surge capacity by the average patient census)
Rebmann et al. (2011)
162. Determine if certain procedures will not be performed during a pandemic Sprung et al. (2010)
Manpower
163. Need for more information about how staff may be redeployed to unusual 
duties/work areas
Aiello et al. (2011)
164. Maintained a roster of staff for patient surges as part of plan Sugerman et al. (2011)
165. What is the total number of personnel (medical and non-medical staff) with 
patient contact? 
Schneider et al. (2010)
166. Hospital critical care leadership should develop a phased staffing plan (nursing 
and physician) for the ICUs that provides for sufficient patient care supervision 
during these contingency and crisis situations
Sprung et al. (2010)
167. A central inventory of all clinical and non-clinical staff with their current roles 
along with possible emergency re-training possibilities should be maintained
Sprung et al. (2010)
168. Roles and responsibilities of key individuals expanding the work force should 
be defined before the disaster.
Sprung et al. (2010)
169. Only clinical staff should provide care to patients; non-clinical staff should not 
provide clinical care
Sprung et al. (2010)
170. The scope of practice for non-critical care personnel should be expanded to 
provide critical care.
Sprung et al. (2010)
171. Recommendations for increasing the labor pool and their functions include: 
1) Care should be provided by the most experienced clinicians available. 2) 
Assignments should be based on staff abilities and experience. 3) If patient 
surge exceeds the number of available critical care trained specialists, 
intensivists should supervise nonintensivist physicians. 4) Staffing ratios are 
altered based on needs and laws. Ideally, the ratio should remain constant and 
equal throughout ICUs in the hospital and region to provide equitable care.
Sprung et al. (2010)
172. Coordinated manpower expansion should include adequate psychosocial and 
family support and adequate rest and support.
Sprung et al. (2010)
173. A plan to access, coordinate and increase labor resources is required for 
continued and expanded ICU care including increasing critical care specialists 
and expanded practice for non-critical care personnel 
Sprung et al. (2010)
174. For clinical risks relating to adequacy of facilities, there should be advanced 
planning to maximize capacity by increasing essential equipment, drugs, 
supplies and encouraging staff availability.
Sprung et al. (2010)
175. Planning for staff shortages Smith et al. (2009)
176. Strategies include the creation of preparedness guidelines, competency and 
capacity-building, and the development of a quorum of skilled and deployable 
health care professionals and epidemiologists.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
177. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Allocating staff 
to a single resident cohort during an outbreak
Eastwood et al. (2008)
178. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Excluding 
symptomatic staff
Eastwood et al. (2008)
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179. Shift plans should be developed in order to have some trained HCWs available 
in every moment, or procedures for their rapid alerting should be in place. 
Fusco et al. (2012)
180. Level C (not essential): Designation of physicians authorized to prescribe 
medications to suspected avian flu or pandemic influenza patients
Adini et al. (2011)
Equipment, pharmaceuticals and supplies
181. In particular, the ‘embedded stockpile’ needs to be managed. Stocks of 
masks and antiviral agents, both in bulk stores and distributed throughout 
operational units, constitute the first level of a stockpile hierarchy, which also 
includes institutional stores, jurisdictional bulk stores and national dedicated 
stockpiles. Stockpiles need to be secured and distributed to all relevant 
primary-care services to complement the strategic management approach. 
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
182. Plan includes medical equipment cache (gowns, gloves, surgical masks, N95 
respirators, NP/OP swabs, viral transport medium, ventilators, portable beds, 
face shields, antivirals, tents, supplies to split waiting rooms, and HEPA air 
filtration rooms)
Sugerman et al. (2011)
183. Hospitals should maintain their own stockpiles Schneider et al. (2010)
184. Hospital stockpiles, composed primarily of oseltamivir but also small amounts 
of zanamivir, should be sufficient to provide for the prophylaxis of HCW/PC 
and for the treatment of immediate family members
Schneider et al. (2010)
185. Appropriate equipment needs should be determined Sprung et al. (2010)
186. Ventilators are expensive and difficult to stockpile but contingency plans at 
the facility and government (local, state, provincial, national) levels should 
provide for additional ventilators
Sprung et al. (2010)
187. Hospitals should ensure that adequate essential medical equipment 
(mechanical ventilators, syringe pumps, etc.), pharmaceuticals (antiviral, 
antibiotic, bronchodilators, sedatives,etc.) and other important supplies are 
available during a disaster.
Sprung et al. (2010)
188. Provide safe respiratory equipment (i.e., adequate filters, closed suctioning, 
etc.)
Sprung et al. (2010)
189. For clinical risks relating to adequacy of facilities, there should be advanced 
planning to maximize capacity by increasing essential equipment, drugs, 
supplies and encouraging staff availability.
Sprung et al. (2010)
190. There was a shortage of antiviral medication during the H1N1 crisis at my 
institution.
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
191. During the H1N1 flu crisis, senior-level hospital administrators at my 
institution provided adequate resources to respond to the crisis.
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
192. N-95 masks were readily available throughout the H1N1 crisis at my 
institution.
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
193. Surgical masks have been readily available throughout the H1N1 crisis at my 
institution.
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
194. Alcohol based hand hygiene products have been readily available throughout 
the H1N1 crisis at my institution.
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
195. Stockpiling of various critical items (eg, masks, gloves) Smith et al. (2009)
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196. Level A (essential for preparedness): Availability of at least 50 PPE kits for 
pandemic influenza.
Adini et al. (2009)
197. Level B (important for preparedness): Availability of medication stockpiles in 
accordance with potential flu patients as determined by the Ministry of Health
Adini et al. (2009)
198. Level C (not essential): PPE stockpile matches quantity supplied by the 
Ministry of Health
Adini et al. (2009)
199. Level C (not essential): Availability of prescription forms for antiviral drugs 
(Tamiflu)
Adini et al. (2009)
200. The significant relationship between maintaining stockpiles of antiviral 
medications for patients and staff and performance in an avian flu drill 
emphasises the importance of procuring effective functional stockpiles in 
accordance with the relevant threats and risk asssessments in order to assure 
emergency preparedness. (however, findings regarding the stockpiling of 
medications may be coincidental and cannot well explain the correlation 
between stockpiles and performance in a drill)
Adini et al. (2009)
201. Level B (important for preparedness): Strict adherence to required storage 
conditions for PPE
Adini et al. (2009)
202. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Ready access to 
personal protective equipment (PPE)
Eastwood et al. (2008)
203. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Ensuring 
alcohol-based hand gel was available
Eastwood et al. (2008)
204. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Ensuring an 
antiviral access plan was in place
Eastwood et al. (2008)
205. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Ensuring there 
was sufficient antiviral access to cover 50% of anticipated outbreak needs
Eastwood et al. (2008)
206. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Ensuring rapid 
prescribing arrangements existed with local general practitioners
Eastwood et al. (2008)
207. [EDs / MADs] Availability of (or easy access to) specific PPE Fusco et al. (2012)
208. Stations for hand hygiene, with all items needed, including distributors for 
alcohol-based solution, should be present in the EDs/MADs, especially in 
waiting rooms
Fusco et al. (2012)
209. Disposable tissues and/or surgical masks should be available and should be 
offered to coughing and sneezing persons (including patients and visitors)
Fusco et al. (2012)
210. Places for the disposal of used tissues should be present Fusco et al. (2012)
211. Stockpiling antiviral medications Rebmann et al. (2011)
212. Stockpiling of personal protective equipment (stockpiling gloves, gowns, 
masks, N95 respirators, goggles, or alcohol based hand rub)
Rebmann et al. (2011)
213. It is essential that home health agencies stockpile critical supplies and/or 
develop memorandums of agreement with local organizations and vendors to 
obtain equipment, supplies, and staff during a disaster.
Rebmann et al. (2011)
214. Home health agencies need to coordinate resource distribution and allocation 
with other regional planning groups to ensure that adequate supplies are 
available for patients requiring home-based services.
Rebmann et al. (2011)
215. Challenges regarding capacity building were: Hospital surveillance, More 
flexibility vaccine contracts, ICU equipment
Hashim et al. (2011)
Triage
216. Consideration should be given to mobile assessment teams intended to 
maintain patients in home isolation.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
217. Revised triage protocols in the past 3 months Sugerman et al. (2011)
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218. HCW need to be given higher priority because they will be at greater risk than 
the general population and are crucial for maintaining a high standard of care
Schneider et al. (2010)
219. If sufficient medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and supplies are not available 
for all patients, triage of scarce resources should be based on those who benefit 
most or on a ‘first come, first served’ basis
Sprung et al. (2010)
220. Triage criteria should be objective, ethical, transparent, applied equitably and 
be publically disclosed.
Sprung et al. (2010)
221. Critical care triage protocols for mass casualty events should only be triggered 
when critical care resources across a broad geographic area are or will be 
overwhelmed despite all reasonable efforts to extend resources or obtain 
additional resources. 
Sprung et al. (2010)
222. Triage of patients for ICU should be based on the likelihood for patients to 
benefit most or a ‘first come, first served’ basis.
Sprung et al. (2010)
223. When resources permit, emergency triage should cease in a graduated fashion 
by altering prioritization criteria and then exclusion thresholds. 
Sprung et al. (2010)
224. ICU triage protocols include inclusion criteria that identify patients who may 
benefit from ICU admission and exclusion criteria that identify patients who 
are not candidates for ICU admission including patients: (1) with a poor 
prognosis despite ICU care, (2) requiring resources that cannot be provided, 
(3) whose underlying illness has a poor prognosis with a high likelihood of 
death and (4) who are ‘‘too well’’ 
Sprung et al. (2010)
225. Each institution should determine its own triage criteria using senior clinicians 
in a transparent fashion. All critically ill patients will be assessed by a triage 
officer who should apply inclusion and exclusion criteria together possibly 
with a prioritization tool to determine qualification for ICU admission. 
Patients not meeting inclusion criteria remain on the ward and can be re-
evaluated. All ICU patients at the time of the MCE will also be assessed for 
eligibility based on the same criteria. Patients admitted to the ICU should 
subsequently be reassessed and re-categorized.
Sprung et al. (2010)
226. Laboratory, radiology, nutrition and other departments should help meet ICU 
disaster needs and be engaged in prioritization of support services (minimizing 
tests ordered and restrictions to essential tests).
Sprung et al. (2010)
227. Ideally triage plans should be developed at a national or regional level. Sprung et al. (2010)
228. Level A (essential for preparedness): Availability of patient questionnaires for 
patients with suspected avian and pandemic influenza. 
Adini et al. (2009)
229. Including an ethical framework seems important in managing competing 
priorities according to relevant pathways of decision making. 
Nicholas et al. (2008)
230. The triage procedures should not only include an assessment of disease 
severity/urgency, but should consider, wherever possible, also the risk of 
disease transmission posed by the patient. 
Fusco et al. (2012)
231. Simple standardized forms should be available for rapid use by triage 
personnel, and should include (i) a brief travel history, (ii) an occupational 
history (e.g. the patient is an HCW, a veterinarian, a laboratory worker, a 
farmer), (iii) a contact history of exposure to other persons with similar illness; 
and (iv) the history of being part of a cluster. 
Fusco et al. (2012)
232. Triage procedures should include a brief epidemiological investigation that 
should be performed using standardized forms
Fusco et al. (2012)
233. Early recognition strategies were defined as adequate if trained triage staff or 
other procedures are in place on a 24 hour-basis
Fusco et al. (2012)
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Table 3 Recommendations regarding surge capacity - continued
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
Monitoring
234. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: Informing 
ambulance and hospital staff when a resident was transferred
Eastwood et al. (2008)
235. The communicable disease surveillance register is expected to include: 
identification details of the sick resident, date of disease onset, resident 
symptoms, and the location of the resident within the facility.
Eastwood et al. (2008)
236. A simple system for the updating of epidemiological information should be in 
place in EDs and MADs where it is more likely to have patients with HIDs
Fusco et al. (2012)
237. [plan component] Follow-up surveillance of exposed patients and visitors Srinivasan et al. (2004)
238. All countries reported the lack of established hospital surveillance networks 
prior to the pandemic; this deficiency had a negative impact during the 
pandemic response when critical data from secondary care were unavailable or 
unreliable.
Hashim et al. (2012)
239. Our data illustrate widespread concerns that hospital surveillance for severe 
acute respiratory infection (SARI) had been inadequately addressed during the 
pandemic planning process and required urgent remedial development.
Hashim et al. (2012)
Number of key recommendations: 26; number of unique recommendations: 109; number of studies: 16
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Table 4 Recommendations regarding communication to the public, patients, and families
SUBCATEGORY (NONE) REFERENCE
240. A carefully structured and consistent message is necessary regardless of the 
means of distribution. Updates need to be kept simple, explaining what is 
different from previous information. 
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
241. Communication strategies require review, with media engagement, to 
facilitate provision of an unambiguous message. However, the outcome of any 
such review must also take into account the need for local context relating to 
operational aspects.
Fitzgerald et al. (2012)
242. The public should be informed that usual treatments may be impossible to 
deliver and treatments may have to be triaged but by avoiding unnecessary 
panic.
Sprung et al. (2010)
243. A plan to update families during a pandemic Smith et al. (2009)
244. There is a need for information translators and communication strategies that 
can swiftly respond to shifts and apply criteria to information dissemination 
and application.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
245. While participants required and appreciated the ongoing updating of 
information, the frequency of incoming and shifting information yielded 
difficulty in its assimilation and implementation.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
246. Parents repeatedly expressed in interviews the need for clear explanations to 
help children understand these realities
Nicholas et al. (2008)
247. Highlights the significance of ensuring that children, as major stakeholders, 
receive the information they need in developmentally appropriate ways. 
Nicholas et al. (2008)
248. Ensuring that information is as comprehensible as possible, yet also as simple 
and clear as possible even for the very young child.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
249. Remember to emphasize kindness, comfort, and empathy in times of crisis Gearing et al. (2007)
250. Focus on self-care, and make the effort to take care of yourself and your family Gearing et al. (2007)
251. Visual signals (e.g. posters) should be present and well visible in common 
waiting areas.
Fusco et al. (2012)
252. All countries identified that effective communication strategies were both 
important for managing infectious disease outbreaks and proved to be 
essential elements of the response to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
Hashim et al. (2012) 
Number of key recommendations: 1; number of unique recommendations: 13; number of studies: 7
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Table 5 Recommendations regarding coordination and collaboration 
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
Coordination plan
253. A detailed SOP for coordination and collaboration should be formulated and 
components tested by simulation during the pre-crisis phase, implemented 
when the crisis occurs, updated as the crisis evolves and evaluated and 
improved in the post-crisis phase. 
Sprung et al. (2010)
254. National and sub-national respondents consistently reported that coordination 
activities prior to the pandemic reduced panic during the response phase.
Hashim et al. (2012)
Coordination and collaboration within health facilities
255. Manpower needs should be assessed by the operations, logistics and planning 
sections of the Hospital Emergency Executive Control Group. They coordinate 
all clinical and non-clinical staffing requirements and determine the ICU and 
hospital’s daily needs including a sick and no-show list.
Sprung et al. (2010)
256. Key personnel within various departments should determine the required 
resources, order and stockpile adequate numbers of resources, and cautiously 
distribute them.
Sprung et al. (2010)
257. The Hospital Emergency Executive Control Group should liase with key 
personnel within various departments to determine the required resources, 
order and stockpile adequate numbers and judiciously distribute them.
Sprung et al. (2010)
258. A communication, coordination and collaboration system should be 
developed between the ICU and key departments, such as central hospital 
administration, clinical departments (e.g., internal medicine, surgery, surgery, 
operating rooms, emergency department), nursing, infectious diseases, 
laboratory services and supporting services such as radiology, physiotherapy, 
housekeeping and medical supplies)
Sprung et al. (2010)
259. Clinical information should be shared through a unified hospital database. Sprung et al. (2010)
260. Guidelines for the systematic management of patient admission and discharge 
to the hospital and between hospital departments (particularly the ICU) 
should be developed
Sprung et al. (2010)
261. Appropriate personnel to function as interdepartmental contacts, such as 
an ICU Triage officer, Infection Control Officer, Emergency Department 
Admissions and/or Patient Transfer Officer should be identified. Inter-
departmental contact methods (creating and promulgating master contact 
lists) should also be developed.
Sprung et al. (2010)
262. The Hospital Emergency Executive Control Group coordinates all clinical and 
non-clinical staffing requirements and determines the hospital’s daily needs 
including a sick and no-show list together with ICU requirements
Sprung et al. (2010)
263. A communicable disease outbreak plan is expected to include: appointment of 
an outbreak coordinator
Eastwood et al. (2008)
264. This study demonstrates the importance of giving social workers a significant 
role in interdisciplinary response teams in hospital settings.
Gearing et al. (2007)
265. Interviewees reported that optimized pandemic response outcomes could be 
envisaged when essential activities were coordinated in a seamless fashion.
Hashim et al. (2012)
266. Efforts to improve preparedness should also be emphasized at the hospital 
level. For instance, multidisciplinary institutional pandemic preparedness 
committees should consider placing more emphasis on informing and 
engaging relevant clinician leaders.
Filice et al. (2013)
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Table 5 Recommendations regarding coordination and collaboration - continued
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
Coordination and collaboration between health facilities
267. Each region should establish an Incident Management System (IMS) with 
Emergency Executive Control Groups at facility, local, regional/state or 
national levels to exercise authority and direction over resources. Each IMS 
includes five functional areas—command, operations, planning, logistics 
and finance/administration. Within the regional IMS is a Central Triage 
Committee of experts with broad situational awareness, capacity to develop 
and modify protocols, monitor outcome and coordinate responses.
Sprung et al. (2010)
268. A communication and coordination system between each health care facility 
and the local/regional/state/country governmental authorities should be 
developed for the provision of additional support
Sprung et al. (2010)
269. Decision-makers should communicate with community emergency services 
and other local hospitals to ensure a coordinated approach to patient transfers, 
standards of care and resource allocation.
Sprung et al. (2010)
270. During a MCE ICUs should effectively collaborate with their hospital 
coordinating structure, other hospitals and regional resource authorities to 
ensure the best possible patient care.
Sprung et al. (2010)
271. As ICU resources are frequently limited and vary in quantity and complexity 
from hospital to hospital, direct coordination with a regional ICU authority is 
recommended to share information regarding availability of vital equipment, 
manpower and pharmaceuticals.
Sprung et al. (2010)
272. The hospital collaborated with other local facilities in pandemic planning Zoutman et al. (2010)
273. Hospitals need to place greater emphasis on collaborating with key regional, 
external, and internal stakeholders in the pandemic influenza planning 
process.
Zoutman et al. (2010)
274. Optimal pandemic planning requires collaboration and communication with 
local public health agencies and local acute care hospitals
Smith et al. (2009)
275. Communication linkages established with nearby hospital(s) Smith et al. (2009)
276. One could envisage a national pediatric network of referral centers for 
infectious diseases, bearing in mind that the spread of avian influenza is an 
example of the need to strengthen defenses against all infectious diseases. 
Giacomet et al. (2007)
277. Planning for internal communication within the health sector requires 
development in future pandemic planning.
Hashim et al. (2012)
278. Good practices regarding coordination were: Implementation group, National 
and sub-national cooperation, Sub-national coordination group
Hashim et al. (2012)
279. A gap was reduced between public health practitioners and medical doctors 
when public health authority leaders were clinical officers; this decision 
resulted in improved coordination of pandemic preparedness planning 
activities.
Hashim et al. (2012)
280. Challenges regarding coordination were: Inter-regional coordination, Vaccine 
procurement and logistics
Hashim et al. (2012)
281. Respondents saw regional interactions as an opportunity to share pediatric 
expertise and contribute to the development of common treatment patterns 
for children
Filice et al. (2013)
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Table 5 Recommendations regarding coordination and collaboration - continued
SUBCATEGORY REFERENCE
Communication strategies
282. The findings demonstrate the value of faxed health alerts to GPs in the context 
of measles outbreaks and, potentially, in other situations of public health 
importance such as an influenza pandemic, where rapid communication 
is required to provide GPs and other health practitioners with important 
information needed to manage the situation within the community.
Rosewell et al. (2010)
283. Opportunities for preparedness enhancement could focus on establishing lines 
of communication with public health planners
Smith et al. (2009)
284. Advanced telecommunication clearly added capacity for the immediacy of 
information dissemination and, as such, technology permitted a timely forum 
for developing and sharing practice guidelines.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
285. Turn to experts in infection control to provide factual and reliable information Gearing et al. (2007)
286. Develop a conduit of communication to ensure up-to-date information is 
factual, accurate and reliable 
Gearing et al. (2007)
287. Triage personnel should have access to an epidemiological update about the 
main outbreaks ongoing in the world.
Fusco et al. (2012)
288. Challenges regarding communication were: communication primary HCW, 
poor risk communication, information overload
Hashim et al. (2012)
289. Operatively, one HCW (from ED/MAD or from Infectious Diseases 
department according to local policies) should be responsible to monitor the 
major on-line epidemiological alerts sites and bulletins, and to disseminate the 
news to the triage staff.
Fusco et al. (2012)
Leadership
290. Theme which should be addressed in resilience training: Visibility and 
presence of leadership
Aiello et al. (2011)
291. During the H1N1 flu crisis, senior-level hospital administrators at my 
institution provided adequate political support.
Lautenbach et al. 
(2010)
292. [From the pediatric care perspective need for] strategies for ensuring effective 
and responsive leadership
Nicholas et al. (2008)
293. Most health care providers (63%) outlined the importance of strong, focused 
leadership and effective crisis management during health crises such as the 
SARS outbreak.
Nicholas et al. (2008)
294. To identify a pediatric coordinating center at the local level, such as the 
regional level, capable to provide information
Giacomet et al. (2007)
295. Good practices regarding leadership were: political commitment, plan 
approval process, sub-national leading on hospital planning
Hashim et al. (2012)
Number of key recommendations: 18; number of unique recommendations: 43; number of studies: 13
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Abstract
Background
Preparedness is considered essential for healthcare organizations to respond effectively 
to outbreaks. In the current study we aim to capture the views of first responders on 
what they consider key recommendations for high quality preparedness. Furthermore, 
we identified the recommendations with the highest urgency from the perspective of 
first responders.
Methods
We chose a multistep approach using a systematic Delphi procedure. Previously 
extracted recommendations from scientific literature were presented to a national and 
two international expert panels. We asked the experts to score the recommendations 
based on relevance for high quality preparedness. In addition we asked them to 
choose the ten most urgent recommendations.
Results
Starting with 80 recommendations from scientific literature, 49 key recommendations 
were selected by both international expert panels. Differences between both panels 
were mainly on triage protocols. In addition, large differences were found in the 
selection of the ten most urgent recommendations.
Conclusions
In this study infectious disease experts selected a set of key recommendations 
representing high quality preparedness and specified which ones should be given the 
highest urgency when preparing for a future crisis. These key recommendations can 
be used to shape their preparedness activities. 
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Background
Since 1940, the frequency of outbreaks and the diversity of infectious disease 
pathogens have increased significantly [1, 2]. Most outbreaks are successfully dealt 
with at the local or regional level, but some have the propensity to become epidemics. 
Outbreaks trigger anxiety in the general population and require prompt and adequate 
actions from healthcare organizations and healthcare professionals [3]. Healthcare 
organizations have to deal with an increased number of (potentially) infected patients 
and have to accommodate new procedures and algorithms that interfere with daily 
routines. Moreover, professionals with various backgrounds of expertise need to 
work together in a coordinated way to respond to the outbreak [4]. Unfortunately, 
recent outbreak evaluations show that outbreak response is often suboptimal; there is 
considerable room for improvement [5, 6].
For healthcare organizations preparedness is considered essential to respond quickly 
and effectively to outbreaks in order to minimize the spread of pathogens and to 
reduce the number of infected persons. Preparedness requires an operational mindset 
focused on the development of formal procedures and guidelines in all preparedness 
phases, even during the period when there is no threat or outbreak. Many studies 
conclude that while at the national level preparedness guidelines and procedures are 
often in place, regional healthcare organizations are not always fully prepared [7–9]. 
It is a challenge for first responders to optimally prepare for outbreaks. The process 
of outbreak preparedness is time consuming and costly for healthcare organizations 
and asks for a shared responsibility of various actors in the field [10]. Therefore it 
is important that preparedness activities are efficient and effective, i.e. actually 
contribute to a better response. There are, however, no widely accepted standards for 
optimal outbreak preparedness for first responders as -due to the infrequency and 
the acute nature of outbreaks- there is little systematic evidence linking preparedness 
activities to response outcomes [10, 11].
This lack of clear and agreed upon standards does not guide first responders in optimal 
preparedness. The CDC [12], ECDC [13] and RAND corporation [14] developed 
tools to support preparedness planners and assess the level of preparedness. These 
tools, however, are intended primarily for public health organizations and are not 
specifically aimed at first responders, or focus solely on quality improvement without 
quality measurement, or focus on an influenza pandemic only.
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Previously, we systematically reviewed the scientific preparedness literature and 
generated a series of 80 generic recommendations representing optimal outbreak 
preparedness for first responders originating from industrialized countries (low and 
middle income country settings were excluded) (Huis, A., Belfroid E., Klein Breteler, 
J., van Steenbergen, J., Hulscher, M. Defining and improving healthcare system’s 
preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks: a systematic review identifying generic 
key recommendations and their connections to continuous quality improvement. 
Submitted). First responders were defined as organizations which are directly involved 
in providing healthcare during an infectious disease outbreak (including primary-, 
secondary-, tertiary- and home and community care providers), or indirectly 
involved in providing healthcare services during an outbreak (including local health 
departments, and clinical diagnostic laboratories). In the current study we aim to 
capture the views of first responders on the relevance of each recommendation as 
a criterion for high quality preparedness. Furthermore, we aim to identify those 
recommendations that have the highest urgency to be implemented from the 
perspective of the first responders. We compare two expert groups, the ECDC 
National Focal Points for preparedness and response, and authors of important 
papers on outbreak preparedness. 
Methods
We chose a multistep approach using a Delphi procedure [15] to select a set of key 
recommendations representing high quality infectious disease preparedness from a 
first responder’s perspective. Recommendations extracted from scientific literature 
(Huis, A., Belfroid E., Klein Breteler, J., van Steenbergen, J., Hulscher, M. Defining 
and improving healthcare system’s preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks: a 
systematic review identifying generic key recommendations and their connections 
to continuous quality improvement. Submitted) were prepared for the questionnaire 
round (step 1), see Fig. 1. The recommendations were presented to a national panel 
(step 2) in order to pilot the questionnaire, clarify the wording, and condense the 
number of recommendations resulting in an amended questionnaire. The amended 
questionnaire was presented to two international expert panels (step 3), the ECDC 
National Focal Points for preparedness and response, and authors of important papers 
on outbreak preparedness. The results from these two international expert panels 
were compared to gain insight into their perspectives. Formal ethical approval from a 
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medical ethical committee was not required for this research in the Netherlands since 
it does not entail subjecting participants to medical treatment or imposing specific 
rules of conduct on participants. All the experts consented to participate in the study 
and were aware that their responses would be used for research purposes.
Step 1: From systematic review to questionnaire
The systematic review yielded 80 recommendations (Huis, A., Belfroid E., Klein 
Breteler, J., van Steenbergen, J., Hulscher, M. Defining and improving healthcare 
system’s preparedness for infectious disease outbreaks: a systematic review 
identifying generic key recommendations and their connections to continuous 
quality improvement. Submitted). The ones with a more general formulation which 
included more than one concept were split into concept specific recommendations. 
The recommendations were processed in an online questionnaire (using Limesurvey, 
an open source web application to develop, publish and collect responses to online 
surveys) to be administered to the panels in the next steps.
Step 2: National expert panel
Expert panel
For the national panel a multidisciplinary group of experts on outbreak preparedness 
were invited. The main selection criteria for inclusion in the panel were the variety 
of specialties actually involved in outbreak preparedness and diversity of practice 
settings. The panel was invited per e-mail or telephone in November 2014. 
Assessment of key recommendations
We asked the experts to appraise the relevance of the recommendations using a 
nine point Likert scale (1 = highly irrelevant, 9 = highly relevant). Each group of 
recommendations also contained an open textbox that the experts could use for 
remarks or to add a recommendation. Data were analyzed using SPSS, median 
relevance scores were calculated for each recommendation. Recommendations with 
a median score > 7 and agreement (>70% of the scores in the highest tertile) were 
directly selected. Recommendations with a median score >7 and no agreement 
(<70% of the scores in the highest tertile) were submitted for discussion. The remarks 
of the experts on recommendations with a median score of seven were assessed by the 
researchers (EB, AH, JvS, AT, MH). If the remarks suggested a textual amendment 
of the recommendation the recommendation was also marked “discussion”. 
Recommendation with a median score < 7 were rejected. 
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Face-to-face meeting
In this meeting, recommendations previously marked for discussion could be accepted 
without change, altered textually or rejected by group discussion. The face-to-face 
meeting was held on December 15th 2014. The online questionnaire was revised on 
the basis of the results from step 2 and served as input for step 3. 
Step 3: Two international expert panels
To reach first responders in a high number of countries with substantial interregional 
differences we decided to approach the National Focal Points for Preparedness 
and Response and urged them to fill out the questionnaire from a first responder’s 
perspective in their country.
Expert panels
The first panel consisted of the ECDC National Focal Points for preparedness and 
response or their alternates designated by the EU member states to represent them in 
ECDC meetings. We aimed for one response per country from the National Focal Point 
or the alternate National Focal Point. The panel was invited per e-mail to participate. 
The panel was conducted between April 2015 and July 2015. The second panel 
consisted of international experts on outbreak preparedness who were approached 
per email or letter. We invited the first, second and last authors of the papers included 
in the previously conducted systematic review because of their scientific reputation 
in the field illustrated by peer-reviewed publications on the subject of front line 
preparedness(Huis, A., Belfroid E., Klein Breteler, J., van Steenbergen, J.,Hulscher, 
M., Defining and improving healthcare system’s preparedness for infectious disease 
outbreaks: a systematic review identifying generic key recommendations and their 
connections to continuous quality improvement. Submitted). The panel was invited 
between July 2015 and February 2016. Non-responders from both groups received 
at least one reminder per letter or e-mail. We aimed for 7–15 participants per expert 
group as this is the recommended number of participants [15].
In step 3, we submitted the revised questionnaire for assessment to both international 
panels.
Assessment of key recommendations 
The assessment procedure of recommendations was the same as previously explained 
in step 2. In addition, we asked the experts to “select the ten recommendations out of 
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the total number of 61 you consider the ones with the highest urgency to implement”. 
Recommendations were considered urgent if more than 30% of the experts chose 
them as such. 
Results
Step 1
The 80 recommendations presented in the systematic review were systematically 
translated into 91 recommendations for the questionnaire. For example: ‘Healthcare 
institutions should provide ongoing education programs about infection prevention 
for employees, and they should organize regular disaster drills and exercises’ was 
translated into two recommendations: ‘Healthcare organizations should provide 
ongoing infection prevention education programs for employees’ and ‘Healthcare 
organizations should organize regular infectious disease drills/exercises’. Six domains 
emerged from the raw data and the recommendations were categorized accordingly: 
a)  ‘construction and maintenance of the outbreak preparedness plan’ 
which describes the development and updating of the preparedness plan 
in collaboration with relevant partners, 
b)  ‘support for health professionals, patients and families’ which describes 
education and training, infection control measures and psychosocial 
assistance for healthcare professionals, 
c)  ‘surge capacity’ which describes triage, infrastructure and equipment, 
d) ‘communication to the public, patients and families’ which describes 
communication strategies, 
e)  ‘coordination and collaboration’ which describes coordination and 
collaboration with the relevant stakeholders, and 
f )  ‘facilitators for implementation of plans’ which describes facilitating 
recommendations for the implementation of plans and protocols. 
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Figure 1: Selection procedure key recommendations 
Legenda: S = Selected, D = Discussion, R = Rejected, N = New added. *This recommendation was rejected by 
the national experts but added to step 3 because in the Dutch legislation compulsory vaccination is forbidden
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Step 2
Expert panel
Nineteen Dutch experts were invited to fill out the digital questionnaire. Fourteen 
experts filled out the questionnaire (response rate 74%). The expert group consisted 
of the following experts; infectious disease specialist, infection control preventionist, 
General Practitioner, medical microbiologist, public health specialist, public health 
nurse, disaster management expert, and a virologist). Reasons for non-response 
were: a lack of expertise on the subject (n = 2), personal circumstances (n = 2) and 
unknown (n = 1).
Assessment of key recommendations
Forty-eight recommendations were directly selected. Fourteen recommendations 
were marked ‘for discussion’ (12 recommendations had a median of eight but less than 
70% of the scores in the highest tertile and two had a median of seven and the experts’ 
comments suggested a textual amendment of the recommendation). Twenty- nine 
recommendations were rejected. The rejected recommendations described, to name 
some examples, addressing psychosocial needs of healthcare workers, vaccination of 
healthcare personnel and prioritization of support services.
Face-to-face meeting
All experts that filled out the digital questionnaire (n=14) were invited for the 
meeting. Six of the 14 experts (43%) attended the meeting. The 14 recommendations 
with the label “discussion” and the two ones with textual amendments were reviewed. 
This resulted in two recommendations being accepted, nine recommendations being 
textually amended, one newly added recommendation, and three recommendations 
being rejected. 
The 60 accepted recommendations in step 2 were included in step 3. One 
recommendation that was rejected in step 2 was included in the questionnaire for 
step 3 because in the Dutch legislation compulsory vaccination is forbidden (see 
Table 2, recommendation number 12). In total 61 recommendations were included 
in the questionnaire, see Table 2.
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Step 3
Expert panels
National Focal Points 
Thirty countries were invited to fill out the digital questionnaire. We sent the 
invitation e-mail to 30 ECDC National Focal Points for Preparedness and Response 
and 27 alternates (three countries did not have an alternate). Fifteen experts filled 
out the questionnaire from 14 different countries (country response rate 47%): 
Italy, Germany, Norway, Lithuania, Denmark, Slovenia, Malta, Ireland, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Cyprus, Romania, Hungary and Croatia (Table 1). One of these 
responses was incomplete. Reasons for nonresponse were unknown (n = 16 countries). 
From one country we received two responses, one from the National Focal Point and 
one from the alternate National Focal Point. Because this was the only country with 
more than one response, we decided to exclude the latest arriving response. Including 
both responses in the analysis would give this country more weight than others in the 
results (each response is valued equal). We performed the analysis on 14 responses (of 
which one was incomplete, the respondent assessed the first ten recommendations) 
from 14 countries.
Preparedness experts 
While applying the selection criteria 60 experts were identified and invited to fill 
out the questionnaire. Three of the selected experts could not be invited due to 
unavailable contact information. Eight experts filled out the questionnaire (response 
rate 14%), see Table 1. One of the responses was incomplete. Reasons for non-
response were: contact information incorrect (n = 6), no expert on the subject (n = 1) 
and unknown (n = 42). Our experts ranged from clinical to emergency management 
and public health. Five of the preparedness experts worked at a university. The expert 
group consisted of two professors of public health, a director of general intensive care 
unit, an epidemiologist, a professor of pediatrics (head of infectious diseases unit), an 
infectious diseases consultant, a professor of environmental and occupational health 
(Institute for Biosecurity), a senior consultant on emergency management who is 
also a faculty member in the emergency medicine department at a university. The 
preparedness experts had between 10 and 26 years of experience in their current 
function. 
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Table 1: Respondent characteristics
National Focal Points Preparedness experts
Response N total = 14
N complete = 13
N incomplete = 1
N total = 8
N complete = 7 
N incomplete = 1
Countries Belgium
Croatia
Cyprus
Denmark
Germany
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Romania
Slovenia
Australia (2)
Israel (2)
Italy (2)
USA (2)
Years of experience Mean: 7.93
SD: 6.28
Mean: 15.38
SD: 5.66
Type of organization (National) Institute for 
Public Health (10)
Ministry of health (4)
 
University (4)
National Institute for Infectious 
Diseases/Public Health (2)
Ministry of Health + University
Academic hospital 
Assessment of key recommendations
Fifty-six recommendations were selected by the National Focal Points, see Table 2. 
Four recommendations were marked ‘for discussion’. One recommendation was 
rejected and one recommendation was newly added. Fifty-two recommendations were 
selected by the preparedness experts, see Table 2. Five recommendations were marked 
for ‘discussion’. Four recommendations were rejected and no new recommendations 
were added. 
There was a large amount of overlap between both groups. Forty-nine recommendations 
were accepted by both the National Focal Points and the preparedness experts and two 
recommendations were marked ‘for discussion’ by both groups. Ten recommendations 
were appraised differently by the two panels. Five recommendations were selected by 
one group but rejected by the other group and five recommendations were accepted 
by one group but ‘for discussion’ by the other group. Most of the differences were in 
the domain ‘surge capacity’ and described the triage protocols.
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Ten most urgent recommendations selected by National Focal Points and 
preparedness experts
Table 3 displays the selected recommendations by both groups. Five recommendations 
were selected by both groups. Four of these recommendations concerned the 
development of the preparedness plan and one recommendation the training of 
healthcare professionals. In addition, the National Focal Points selected nine and 
the preparedness experts four different recommendations as ‘most urgent’. Out of 
the nine additionally selected recommendations by the National Focal Points four 
described the preparedness plan, one preparedness exercises, two described sharing 
information with other organizations, one described the provision of resources and 
one the installation of an outbreak control group. Out of the four additionally 
selected recommendations by the preparedness experts one described an access plan 
for stockpiling and distribution, one the evaluation of the level of preparedness, one 
the plan to expand the healthcare organization’s capacity and one the collaboration 
with regional key stakeholders. 
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Table 2: Key recommendations
Domain No Key recommendation Nat. Focal Points Prep. experts 
C
on
str
uc
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 o
ut
br
ea
k 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
 p
la
n
1 Staff responsible for outbreak preparedness planning 
from small healthcare organizations should have access 
to education and training in outbreak planning.
S S
2 The organization’s infectious disease preparedness plan 
should be updated.
S S
3 Healthcare organizations should develop their 
organizational infectious disease preparedness plan in 
a multidisciplinary internal committee.
S
MU
S
4 Healthcare organizations should tune their 
organizational infectious disease preparedness plan 
with all (local/regional/national) organizations that 
they interact with during outbreaks.
S
MU
S
MU
5 The organization’s infectious disease preparedness plan 
should be generic (flexible and adaptable to the actual 
situation).
S
MU
S 
MU
6 The organization’s infectious disease preparedness 
outbreak plan should correspond with the national 
guidelines, but should deviate to fit the local situation.
S
MU
S
7 Resources for developing, testing, and updating a 
preparedness plan should be made available.
S
MU
S
8 Healthcare organizations should have a dedicated staff 
position responsible for infectious disease preparedness.
D D
9 The organization’s outbreak preparedness plan and 
its updates should be disseminated and implemented 
in multiple and various ways by the responsible 
management.
S
MU
S
10 Healthcare workers should be able to access the 
organizations preparedness plan (for example on the 
intranet).
S S
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 h
ea
lth
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
ls,
 p
at
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
fa
m
ili
es
11 An infectious disease preparedness plan should include 
items for staff protection; nb in case of uncertainty 
protection should start at the highest required level in 
the actual setting whereby the protection of employees 
is guaranteed, adapted for the specific situation.
S
MU
S
MU
12 A procedure should be developed to mandate the 
designated employees to receive the (for the outbreak 
designated) vaccine and/or antiviral prophylaxis*. 
S S
13 Drills and exercises to assess how various healthcare 
facility’s plans interact should be multidisciplinary.
S S
14 Healthcare organizations should evaluate their level of 
preparedness.
S S 
MU
15 Healthcare organizations should provide ongoing 
infection prevention education programs for 
employees.
S S
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Table 2: Key recommendations - continued
Domain No Key recommendation Nat. Focal Points Prep. experts 
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 h
ea
lth
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
ls,
 p
at
ie
nt
s a
nd
 fa
m
ili
es
 - 
co
nt
in
ue
d
16 Healthcare organizations should organize regular 
infectious disease drills/exercises 
S
MU
S
17 Healthcare workers should be educated and trained in 
outbreak handling.
S S
18 Training materials for infection control measures 
should be available at the healthcare organization.
S S
19 Instructors providing training should be trained 
instructors. 
S D
20 The senior management should identify staff that has 
to participate in training programs.
S S
21 The senior management should allocate staff to the 
defined roles. 
S D
22 The senior management should verify that the 
identified staff participated in the training. 
S S
23 All designated professionals should be trained. S
MU
S 
MU
24 Healthcare organizations should anticipate addressing 
mistrust, fear, moral maintenance, and sustainability of 
health care workers.
S S
25 All relevant employees should be fit-tested for PPE use. S D
26 The organization should appoint a person who is 
available for questions from the staff on PPE use.
S S
27 Compliance of healthcare workers with transmission-
based precautions should be enforced by diverse 
strategies.
S R
28 An infectious disease preparedness plan should 
include items supporting infection control (including 
measures to prevent contamination) for all phases of 
the outbreak. 
S
MU
S 
MU
29 Healthcare organizations should take into account 
that they might need to put potentially infectious 
(asymptomatic) healthcare workers on administrative 
leave. 
S S
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Table 2: Key recommendations - continued
Domain No Key recommendation Nat. Focal Points Prep. experts 
Su
pp
or
t f
or
 h
ea
lth
 
pr
of
., 
pa
tie
nt
s a
nd
 
fa
m
ili
es
 - 
co
nt
in
ue
d
30 Healthcare organizations should plan to monitor 
the health of exposed healthcare workers for the 
maximum incubation period.
S S
31 Healthcare organizations should plan to screen 
patients with infectious disease symptoms. 
S S
32 Specific protocols for high risk procedures should be 
available for high risk infectious diseases. 
S S
Su
rg
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
33 Health care organizations providing patient care 
should have an overview of the general features of the 
organization (e.g. logistic structures including private 
rooms, toilets, wards, rooms dedicated to infectious 
disease, rooms equipped with negative pressure 
systems, safe waste disposal).
S S
34 Health care organizations should plan to expand their 
capacity.
S S 
MU
35 Hospitals should have at least one isolation room 
which is technically well-equipped and logistically 
adequate.
S S
36 Healthcare organizations should have access to 
adequate laboratory facilities for screening and follow-
up.
S S
37 Healthcare organizations should have access to a 
single, simple reporting framework to minimize the 
administrative burden to reporting.
D
D
38 Healthcare organizations should have a plan to access, 
coordinate, and increase labor resources for continued 
and expanded care. 
S S
39 Healthcare organizations should have an up to date 
inventory of the total number of personnel (medical 
and non-medical staff) with patient contact and 
without patient contact.
S S
40 Healthcare organizations should have an access plan 
in place for stockpiling and distribution.
D S 
MU
41 Senior management should prepare to provide 
adequate resources to respond to an outbreak.
S
MU
S
42 Healthcare organizations should prepare for 
immediate installation of a surveillance network to 
monitor the burden of disease during an outbreak in 
relation to the capacity of healthcare.
S S
43 Healthcare organizations should prepare for 
monitoring of exposed cases. 
S S
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Table 2: Key recommendations - continued
Domain No Key recommendation Nat. Focal Points Prep. experts 
Su
rg
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 - 
co
nt
in
ue
d
44 Healthcare organizations should plan to inform 
ambulance and organization’s (hospital) staff when a 
case was transferred.
S S
45 Healthcare organizations should have triage protocols 
for infectious disease outbreaks.
S S
46 Triage protocols should be developed supra 
institutional. 
S R
47 Triage protocols should include an ethical framework 
to manage competing priorities to relevant pathways 
of decision making.
S R
48 Healthcare organizations should have a triage system 
for infectious disease outbreaks.
S S
49 A preparedness plan should include objective criteria 
to activate and stop triage protocols.
D S
50 Triage protocols should be tuned regionally. S R
51 The public health preparedness plan should define 
identify and designate staff for supporting and 
maintaining (suspected/probable/possible/confirmed) 
cases in home isolation. 
S S
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
to
 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
, p
at
ie
nt
s 
an
d 
fa
m
ili
es
52 Healthcare organizations should have communication strategies for patients and their families. S S
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
53 Organizations should have a multidisciplinary 
organizational preparedness committee to ensure the 
organization is well prepared.
S S
54 Ensure that an outbreak coordinator can be appointed 
in an outbreak situation.
S S
55 Healthcare organizations should prepare for installing 
an outbreak control group (e.g. an outbreak 
management team) in case of a threat to coordinate 
the response.
S
MU
S
56 A communication and coordination system between 
each healthcare organization and the local/regional/
state/country public health authorities should be 
established. 
S
MU 
S
57 Healthcare organizations should collaborate, 
coordinate, and communicate with key regional 
stakeholders for outbreak preparedness. 
S S 
MU
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Table 2: Key recommendations - continued
Domain No Key recommendation Nat. Focal Points Prep. experts 
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
an
d 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n 
– 
co
nt
in
ue
d
58 Healthcare organizations should plan to establish a 
regional outbreak control group to exercise authority 
and direction over resources in the region.
R S
59 Healthcare organizations should develop an internal 
information channel to ensure up-to-date information 
is factual, accurate, and reliable while preventing 
information overload.
S 
MU
S
Fa
ci
lit
at
or
s f
or
 im
pl
e-
m
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 p
la
ns
60 Healthcare organizations should have strategies to 
ensure effective and responsive leadership.
S S
61 Senior-level management should be prepared to 
provide good leadership.
S S
N
ew
 re
co
m
-
m
en
-d
at
io
ns
 
ad
de
d
Healthcare organizations should do a risk assessment 
and develop scenarios for the most probable outbreak 
situations.
Added by the 
National Focal 
Points
Legenda: S=Selected, D=Discussion, R=Rejected, MU=selected for most urgent
* This recommendation was rejected by the national experts in step 2 but the authors added the recommendation 
to step 3 because in the Dutch legislation compulsory vaccination is forbidden 
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Table 3: Selected most urgent recommendations 
Selected 10 most urgent 
recommendations National Focal 
Points (N=13)
Selected 10 most urgent 
recommendations Preparedness experts 
(N=7)
Agreements The organization’s infectious disease 
preparedness plan should be generic 
(flexible and adaptable to the actual 
situation) (N=10, 77%)
  
Healthcare organizations should tune 
their organizational infectious disease 
preparedness plan with all (local/regional/
national) organizations that they interact 
with during outbreaks (N=5, 38%)
 
An infectious disease preparedness plan 
should include items for staff protection; 
nb in case of uncertainty protection 
should start at the highest required level in 
the actual setting whereby the protection 
of employees is guaranteed, adapted for 
the specific situation (N=5, 38%)
  
An infectious disease preparedness plan 
should include items supporting infection 
control (including measures to prevent 
contamination) for all phases of the 
outbreak (N=4, 31%)
 
All designated professionals should be 
trained (N=4, 31%)
The organization’s infectious disease 
preparedness plan should be generic 
(flexible and adaptable to the actual 
situation)  (N=3, 43%)
Healthcare organizations should tune 
their organizational infectious disease 
preparedness plan with all (local/regional/
national) organizations that they interact 
with during outbreaks (N=4, 57%)
An infectious disease preparedness plan 
should include items for staff protection; 
nb in case of uncertainty protection 
should start at the highest required level in 
the actual setting whereby the protection 
of employees is guaranteed, adapted for 
the specific situation (N=3, 43%)
An infectious disease preparedness plan 
should include items supporting infection 
control (including measures to prevent 
contamination) for all phases of the 
outbreak (N=5, 71%)
All designated professionals should be 
trained (N=3, 43%) 
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Table 3: Selected most urgent recommendations - continued
Selected 10 most urgent 
recommendations National Focal Points 
(N=13)
Selected 10 most urgent 
recommendations Preparedness experts 
(N=7)
Differences Healthcare organizations should develop 
their organizational infectious disease 
preparedness plan in a multidisciplinary 
internal committee (N=7, 54%)
 
A communication and coordination system 
between each healthcare organization and 
the local/regional/state/country public 
health authorities should be established 
(N=6, 46%)
 
Resources for developing, testing, and 
updating a preparedness plan should be 
made available (N=5, 38%)
Healthcare organizations should organize 
regular infectious disease drills/exercises 
(N=5, 38%)
 
Healthcare organizations should develop 
an internal information channel to ensure 
up-to-date information is factual, accurate, 
and reliable while preventing information 
overload (N=5, 38%)
The organization’s infectious disease 
preparedness outbreak plan should 
correspond with the national guidelines, 
but should deviate to fit the local situation 
(N=4, 31%)
 
The organization’s outbreak preparedness 
plan and its updates should be disseminated 
and implemented in multiple and various 
ways by the responsible management 
(N=4, 31%)
Senior management should prepare to 
provide adequate resources to respond to 
an outbreak (N=4, 31%)
 
Healthcare organizations should prepare 
for installing an outbreak control group 
(e.g. an outbreak management team) in 
case of a threat to coordinate the response 
(N=4, 31%)
Healthcare organizations should have an 
access plan in place for stockpiling and 
distribution (N=4, 57%)
Healthcare organizations should evaluate 
their level of preparedness (N=3, 43%)
Health care organizations should plan to 
expand their capacity (N=3, 43%)
 
Healthcare organizations should 
collaborate, coordinate, and communicate 
with key regional stakeholders for outbreak 
preparedness (N=3, 43%)
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Discussion
In this study infectious disease experts selected a set of key recommendations 
representing high quality preparedness and specified which ones should be given 
the highest urgency when preparing for a future crisis. Several attempts have been 
made to develop recommendations for outbreak preparedness [11–14]. These 
recommendations differ in perspective, number of healthcare organizations the 
recommendations apply to, type of healthcare organization and, level of detail and 
specificity. Our key recommendations, in contrast to the existing recommendations, 
are specifically developed from the perspective of first responders to guide them 
in selecting relevant preparedness activities for their organization, and not from a 
regional or national perspective. When aggregating this information at regional level, 
policy makers can map the strengths and weaknesses of the region as a whole and 
decide upon specific interventions to improve overall preparedness.
Several patterns emerge when analyzing the final set. Firstly, the selected 
recommendations do not focus on psychosocial aspects of outbreak preparedness, such 
as ‘childcare for employees’ and ‘mental support for employees’. Recommendations 
regarding psychosocial aspects have been rejected in step 2. The international 
expert panels in step 3 had the option to add new recommendations but no 
recommendation regarding psychosocial aspects was added to the list. During large 
outbreaks, these aspects are highly important to ensure employees work attendance 
and commitment to sustained efforts, while possibly finding themselves at risk of 
acquiring and transmitting the disease to their family and friends [16]. We assume 
these recommendations were rejected because the expert panel mainly consisted of 
doctors and policy makers who tend to focus on the organizational and medical aspects 
of preparedness, rather than the conditions that facilitate health care professionals to 
attend work. Literature shows that psychosocial needs need to be taken into account 
[17–20]. More research is needed to determine the specific needs of healthcare 
workers during outbreaks and the corresponding preparedness activities. Secondly, 
we found a high level of consistency (49 recommendations) in the selection of 
relevant commendations from the initial set, by both panels. This shows that almost 
all preselected recommendations were considered important by our experts teams. 
Thirdly, both panels endorsed the importance of the preparedness for triage, a key 
component of outbreak response. Both groups agreed that healthcare organizations 
need to have triage protocols. The way to prepare for triage was, however, rather 
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different for both panels. While the National Focal Points considered the supra 
institutional development of triage protocols, the inclusion of an ethical framework 
in the protocol and regional tuning of the protocols relevant key recommendations, 
the preparedness experts rejected them. Contrarily, the key recommendation on 
objective criteria to activate and stop triage protocols was rejected by the National 
Focal Points but accepted by the preparedness experts. This reflects a longstanding 
debate on triage protocols. It is practically impossible to predict what situations 
might develop in an outbreak so it can be rather challenging to develop universal 
triage protocols beforehand. On the other hand, triage is a very political sensitive 
topic. It can thus be useful to consider a variety of aspects in detail beforehand and 
incorporate them in a triage protocol. There is no literature available that provides a 
sufficient evidence base to develop key recommendations regarding triage [21].
Considering the ‘most urgent recommendations’ there are five recommendations 
that are selected by both expert groups. This is a strong signal that those five 
recommendations have a high urgency. Organizations have to develop a generic plan, 
which is flexible to allow for changes to reflect new developments during a specific 
outbreak. Furthermore, they should work together and tune their respective plans. 
Also the staff protection and infection control measures are considered urgent by 
both groups. In addition training of all designated professionals is considered urgent. 
It is not surprising these five recommendations were selected. The preparedness plan, 
training and exercises and infection control measures receive a great deal of attention 
in the preparedness literature, implying there is a general consensus that these elements 
are important (Huis, A., Belfroid E., Klein Breteler, J., van Steenbergen, J.,Hulscher, 
M. Defining and improving healthcare system’s preparedness for infectious disease 
outbreaks: a systematic review identifying generic key recommendations and their 
connections to continuous quality improvement. Submitted).
In addition, we found several differences in the ‘most urgent recommendations’ 
selected meaning that not all recommendations are equally important for the 
different groups. Differences between both groups in the selected’ 10 most urgent’ can 
presumably be explained by the different perspectives of both respondent groups. The 
National Focal Points selected several recommendations about the development of 
the preparedness plan and other formal procedures. The preparedness experts selected 
the more practical recommendations. When improving outbreak preparedness it is 
impossible to focus on the total set of recommendations because of the size of the set, 
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so it makes sense to concentrate on the most urgent recommendations. The differences 
between both groups show us that the background and perspective of the professional 
is very influential in the choice for the most urgent recommendations. Therefor it is 
very important that all relevant stakeholders from the region are included in outbreak 
preparation so that no perspectives are left out.
Our study has several limitations. Firstly, we realize that our data concern only rich 
industrialized countries and the recommendations therefore are not easily applicable 
to low income countries with completely different context, infrastructure, priorities 
and resources. However, we concentrated on the wealthy counties as they have the 
possibilities, research, and experts to achieve the highest preparedness standards. A 
similar systematic approach should be used (systematic review and expert consensus 
procedure) to select recommendations for low- and middle-income countries. 
Secondly, the aim of the study was to develop a set of recommendations for the first 
local response in an outbreak situation. Although we urged the international experts 
to fill out the questionnaire from that perspective, we realize that these might be 
biased to more managerial aspects. However, we observed high similarity between 
the selected items by the “true first responders” in the Dutch panel with those of 
the international experts of “quasi first-responders”. Another limitation is the focus 
on outbreaks and not all hazard preparedness. We did so because outbreaks require 
unique recommendations because of the transferable potential of pathogens and an 
all hazard approach would miss, for outbreaks specific, relevant recommendations. 
One of the strengths of our study is the inclusion of a wide variety of experts in the 
field of outbreak preparedness. All our respondent groups (n = 14, n = 14 and n = 
8) contained a sufficient number of participants as compared to the recommended 
7–15 number of participants [15]. The national panel consisted of a wide variety 
of disciplines involved in outbreak preparedness. The panel of the National Focal 
Points on preparedness and response covered the entire European Union and the 
respondent panel of the preparedness experts had a worldwide coverage including 
different specialties and experienced respondents.
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Conclusions
We present a set of generic recommendations, including a prioritization of the most 
urgent ones. When preparing for the next crises, these can provide the basis for 
frontline organizations to guide decisions on how and where to start, as well as to 
identify weaknesses. Outbreak preparedness requires a solid scientific base. While this 
field of research is rather new, more efforts are needed to provide systematic evidence 
on high quality preparedness, ideally linking it to outbreak response outcomes. 
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Abstract
Background
The performance of recommended control measures is necessary for quick and 
uniform infectious disease outbreak control. To assess whether these procedures are 
performed, a valid set of quality indicators (QIs) is required. The goal of this study was 
to select a set of key recommendations that can be systematically translated into QIs 
to measure the quality of infectious disease outbreak response from the perspective of 
disaster emergency responders and infectious disease control professionals.
Methods
Applying the Rand modified Delphi procedure, the following steps were taken to 
systematically select a set of key recommendations: extraction of recommendations 
from relevant literature; appraisal of the recommendations in terms of relevance 
through questionnaires to experts; expert meeting to discuss recommendations; 
prioritization of recommendations through a second questionnaire; and final 
expert meeting to approve the selected set. Infectious disease physicians and nurses, 
policymakers and communication experts participated in the expert group (n = 48).
Results
In total, 54 national and international publications were systematically searched for 
recommendations, yielding over 200 recommendations. The Rand modified Delphi 
procedure resulted in a set of 65 key recommendations. The key recommendations 
were categorized into 10 domains describing the whole response pathway from 
outbreak recognition to aftercare.
Conclusion
This study provides a set of key recommendations that represents ‘good quality 
of response to an infectious disease outbreak’. These key recommendations can 
be systematically translated into QIs. Organizations and professionals involved in 
outbreak control can use these QIs to monitor the quality of response to infectious 
disease outbreaks and to assess in which domains improvement is needed.
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Background
Infectious disease outbreaks are a global threat to public health that can have a high 
economical and societal impact [1,2]. During an outbreak, recommended control 
measures need to be timely and uniformly performed to curb the spread of pathogens 
and, ultimately, to reduce the number of persons becoming infected [3]. 
Numerous documents -from various countries or regions addressing various types 
of outbreaks- describe such recommended or ‘good quality’ response to infectious 
disease outbreaks. Unfortunately, publication and dissemination of scripts, guidelines 
and scientific advice does not guarantee good quality outbreak response [4-6]. 
Evaluations of recent crises show large variation in the implementation of crisis advice 
and thus in the quality of outbreak response. A Dutch study examining the response 
to the Q-fever outbreak showed large regional variance in the implementation of 
the nationally advised measures [7]. Similarly, evaluation of the control measures 
during the early stages of the lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) outbreak in the 
various EU countries showed great differences between countries with respect to 
case definitions, laboratory testing and antimicrobial drug treatment [8]. A study 
examining the causes of differences in the implementation of crisis advice showed 
that among others, the various categories of professionals involved in outbreak 
control lacked clearly defined measures to monitor the execution of ‘key actions’ [9].
Quality indicators (QIs) can be used to gain insight into the quality of response and, 
even more importantly, they can be used to measure the effects of interventions aimed 
at improving response [10]. In this manner, QIs provide a tool to systematically 
monitor response quality. Two studies developed QIs for infectious disease outbreak 
response describing the major domains of outbreak response [11,12]. Both studies 
lack transparency and reproducibility because they do not provide insight into among 
others; the selected literature, selected experts and the definition of consensus. It is 
important that QIs are developed in a systematic and transparent way [10,13,14], 
which to our knowledge has not been done for infectious disease outbreaks. 
The goal of this study was therefore to select a set of key recommendations that can be 
systematically translated into QIs to measure the quality of infectious disease outbreak 
response from the perspective of disaster emergency responders and infectious disease 
control professionals (ID-control professionals) using a valid development procedure. 
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We aimed to develop a generic set of key recommendations that can be used to 
measure the quality of outbreak response, irrespective of the causative pathogen.
Methods
We used the systematic RAND modified Delphi method to develop and select -in 
a multistep approach (see Step 1 through 5 below)- a set of key recommendations 
representing good quality infectious disease outbreak response [15]. In this iterative 
method the individual opinion of experts is aggregated into group consensus. 
Recommendations for infectious disease outbreak response were extracted from the 
literature, and presented to a multidisciplinary expert panel. The panel achieved 
consensus on a set of key recommendations during two questionnaire rounds and 
two face-to face consensus meetings. Formal ethical approval from a medical ethical 
committee was not required for this research in the Netherlands since it does not 
entail subjecting participants to medical treatment or imposing specific rules of 
conduct on participants. All the experts consented to participate in the study and 
were aware that their responses would be used for research purposes.
Table 1: Medline search strategy
The gold standard search strategy 
of the Cochrane Effective Practice 
and Organisation of Care group 
(http://epoc.cochrane.org/) 
Communicable diseases OR 
communicable disease, Emerging 
OR 
disease outbreaks OR
Crisis 
AND
Risk Assessment OR 
Contact Tracing OR 
Disease notification OR
Infection Control OR 
Mandatory Testing OR 
Universal Precautions OR 
Population Surveillance OR 
Immunization OR 
Quality Management
OR
Bioterrorism OR 
Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome
Indicator* OR 
Measurab* OR 
Performance Measure* OR 
Performance Assessment* OR 
Quality Assessment* OR Quality 
Measure* OR 
Manage* OR 
Recommend* OR
Disease Management OR 
Organization OR Administration 
OR 
Scientific AND Advice
OR 
Quality indicators, Healthcare
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Step 1 – Literature search and extraction of recommendations
We performed a literature search using the Medline database to review the international 
literature for information about quality indicators and recommendations for good 
quality response to an infectious disease outbreak from the year 2007 (search executed 
4th week of February 2012). Table 1 shows the search strategy in which we combined 
the gold standard search strategy of the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation 
of Care Group to identify quality improvement studies and combined these (http://
epoc.cochrane.org/) with terms on outbreaks and performance measurement. 
Two researchers (EB and AT) independently examined title and abstract of the 
publications to include any publication (for example outbreak reports, evaluations, 
health services research studies, guidelines) potentially describing recommendations 
for ID-control professionals and disaster emergency responders. Exclusion criteria 
were: publications that were not about infectious disease outbreaks (non outbreak 
setting or no acute outbreak like HIV), publications describing recommendations 
for a hospital setting, publications that were setting/region or patient specific, and 
publications that described simulations or mathematical models of outbreaks.
Next, we collected grey literature, i.e. Dutch documents on good quality response 
including national guidance, national outbreak advice, contracts between health 
care organizations and disaster care plans. We also included national evaluations 
of recent infectious disease crises such as Q-fever and the 2009 flu pandemic. The 
inclusion of grey literature was made on the basis of recommendations from national 
specialists on infectious disease preparedness- and control who were asked to judge 
appropriateness. 
Two researchers (EB and MHi) performed the extraction of recommendations 
independently on a sample consisting of 25% of all selected sources (literature review 
and grey literature). The researchers extracted good quality response recommendations 
from the selected literature. Discrepancies between the two researchers were discussed 
until consensus was reached. After reaching consensus on this 25% sample, one 
researcher continued to extract recommendations from the remaining selected 
literature (EB). The two researchers examined the total set of recommendations to 
remove identical recommendations.
All recommendations were discussed with the main researchers involved in this study 
(MHu, JH, AT, EB) in two meetings. In these meetings we selected in consensus and 
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while applying the inclusion criteria, existing generic recommendations or aggregated 
pathogen and disease specific recommendations, which were subsequently presented 
to the participants in the expert panels during the next stages.
Step 2 – First questionnaire round
The consensus procedure took place between September 2012 and May 2013. We 
approached all 25 public health regions from the Netherlands by e-mail and invited 
public health infectious disease experts from their region to participate in the expert 
group. Our expert panels consisted of 48 Dutch experts in public health (28 ID-
control professionals and 20 disaster emergency responders) who all had experience 
in the preparedness and/or control of an infectious disease outbreak. All regions were 
represented. 
Two digital Limesurvey (a digital open source survey application) questionnaires were 
composed, one for the ID-control professionals and one for the disaster emergency 
responders. In this process, recommendations were assigned to the responsible 
organization in the Netherlands: logistical support recommendations were presented 
to disaster emergency responders and infectious disease control recommendations 
were presented to ID-control professionals. In the Netherlands, the disaster emergency 
responder tasks lay with charge of logistical support of outbreak control while the 
coordination of outbreak measures is a responsibility of the ID-control experts. This, 
of course, can be different in other countries. 
Both expert groups followed a parallel, methodologically identical path: each 
expert group assessed the recommendations regarding their expertise on relevance. 
Relevance was graded by the experts in response to the following question; “To what 
extent do you consider this recommendation as a relevant element for measuring 
the quality of infectious disease outbreak response?” on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = 
totally disagree, 9 = totally agree). Experts could comment on recommendations and 
could add recommendations. Recommendations were accepted or further processed 
based on the RAND/University of California at Los Angeles agreement criteria [15]. 
Relevance scores were calculated for each item. If the recommendation had a median 
of 8 or 9 and >70% of the experts scored in the top tertile, then the recommendation 
was marked as “accepted”. If the recommendation had a median <8 and <70% scored 
in the top tertile, then the recommendation was marked as “not accepted” and was 
excluded. If the recommendation had a median <8 and >70% of the experts scored 
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in the top tertile or the median was 8 or 9 and <70% of the experts scored in the top 
tertile, then the recommendation was marked as “to be discussed”. 
In the second part of the questionnaire we checked whether we assigned 
recommendations to the correct responsible organization (disaster emergency 
responders or ID-control experts). If more than 33% of the responders questioned the 
attribution of responsibility for the action to a certain party, then the recommendation 
was presented to the responsible organization in the second questionnaire round.
Step 3 – Consensus meeting
Both expert groups were invited for a separate face-to-face consensus meeting in 
October 2012. The results of the analysis of the questionnaires were sent to the 
experts in advance of the consensus meeting. During the meeting, the expert panels 
could comment on recommendations with the label “to be discussed”. As a result, 
the discussed recommendations were found to be not relevant or were modified and 
found relevant. 
Step 4 – Second questionnaire round
In step 4, two responsible organization specific questionnaires were composed of 
all recommendations. To categorize the recommendations, we combined two 
frameworks which incorporate the main domains of emergency response [16,17]. 
The recommendations were categorized into 35 categories (25 for ID-control experts 
and 10 for disaster emergency responders) which described each step in the process of 
infectious disease outbreak response. These 35 categories or subdomains represented 
10 main domains: “Scale of the outbreak and epidemiology”, “Control measures”, 
“Diagnostics”, “Logistic support”, “Aftercare and conclusion”, “Communication”, 
“Logistics”, “Upscaling”, “Coordination of the chain of outbreak control” and 
“Continuity of care”.
Corrections on the assigned responsible organization based on the first questionnaire 
were processed in this second questionnaire. Doubles were removed if there was 
too much resemblance of the recommendations within one category. If a number 
of recommendations represented the same recommendation, but for different 
patient groups (for example, confirmed case, contact of cases) the recommendations 
were merged. We asked both expert groups to prioritize the most important 
recommendation per category, and we calculated the percentage of experts that 
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selected a recommendation. If more than 15 percent of the experts selected a 
recommendation, the recommendation was considered prioritized. Each group only 
prioritized recommendations regarding their own expertise. 
Step 5 – Second consensus meeting
In a final, combined face-to-face expert meeting the experts were presented the 
combined selected sets of quality indicators from step 4. Experts were asked to judge 
the completeness of the selected recommendations. As a result, recommendations 
were textually modified, merged or deleted.
Results
Step 1 – Literature search and selection of recommendations
The Medline search for international literature regarding quality indicators and 
recommendations for good quality response to an infectious disease outbreak 
resulted in 151 unique publications (two identical publications were removed), see 
Figure 1. Based on title and abstract, 106 of these international publications were 
excluded while applying exclusion criteria. The remaining 47 publications [18-64] 
were read full text. From 11 [24,26,27,33,37,38,48,51,58,60,64] out of these 47 
articles, we extracted 35 recommendations. The national specialists on infectious 
disease preparedness- and control plans provided 43 grey literature documents (see 
Additional file 1), from which we extracted 1057 recommendations. In total, we 
extracted 1092 recommendations from both the international and the grey literature. 
After removal of doubles and of recommendations that were not executed by ID-
control professionals and disaster emergency responders, 656 recommendations 
remained of which 35 were extracted from the international literature. These 
recommendations were discussed with all researchers involved in this study to make 
the recommendations generic so that they apply to all outbreaks irrespective of the 
nature of the causative pathogen and removed doubles while applying the inclusion 
criteria. This resulted in 226 recommendations (155 for ID-control professionals 
and 71 for disaster emergency responders). Figure 2 displays the results from the 
consensus procedure.
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Figure 1: Flowchart of included and excluded publications
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Step 2 – First questionnaire round
Forty-four experts returned the first questionnaire (response rate 92%) containing the 
226 recommendations resulting from step 1. After applying the RAND/University 
of California at Los Angeles agreement criteria, the first consensus round resulted in 
138 “accepted” recommendations. Thirty-eight recommendations were found “not 
accepted”, and therefore excluded. Thirty-one recommendations were marked as “to 
be further processed in the second questionnaire”.
Both the “accepted” recommendations and the “to be further processed in the second 
questionnaire” recommendations (N = 169) were subsequently included in the 
second questionnaire (discussed further in step 4). Nineteen recommendations were 
marked “ to be discussed”, meaning that the experts did not reach consensus on 
the relevance or non-relevance of the items. These recommendations were further 
assessed in step 3.
Step 3 – Consensus meeting
In the third step, the expert panels could comment on recommendations with the 
label “to be discussed” in a consensus meeting. Fourteen ID-control professionals (14 
out of 28) and 16 disaster emergency responders (16 out of 20) attended the consensus 
meeting. The ID-control professionals discussed nine recommendations, of which 
one was found not relevant, seven were found relevant after textual modification and 
one was found relevant without modification.
The disaster emergency responders discussed ten recommendations of which two 
were found not relevant. Two recommendations were combined into one and as a 
result, seven recommendations were found relevant after textual modification. In 
total fifteen recommendations were accepted for
further assessment.
Step 4 - Second questionnaire round
Recommendations were combined into one if the recommendations represented the 
same action but a different target group (for instance management of suspected case, 
case, confirmed case). This resulted in a reduction from 184 to 160 recommendations. 
The prioritization questionnaire consisted of 160 recommendations, of which 31 had to 
be appraised by both the disaster emergency responders and the ID-control professionals 
as in practice both could be made responsible for performing the recommended activity. 
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Forty experts returned the second questionnaire (response rate 88.9%). As a 
result, the ID-control professionals selected 55 recommendations, the disaster 
emergency responders 21. In some cases both types of experts prioritized the same 
recommendation. Deleting those resulted in 69 unique recommendations from both 
expert groups.
Step 5 – Second consensus meeting
In the final consensus meeting, both expert panels were merged. Seventeen experts 
(17 out of 48) attended the consensus meeting. The group discussed the 69 
recommendations resulting from step 4. Three recommendations were deleted, 1 
newly added and 4 combined into 2. This resulted in 65 recommendations divided 
among 10 main domains (Table 2): Scale of the outbreak and epidemiology (n = 2), 
Control measures (n = 22), Diagnostics (n = 9), Logistical support (n = 4), Aftercare 
and conclusion (n = 2), Communication (n = 5), Logistics (n = 6), Upscaling (n = 
5), Coordination of the chain of outbreak control (n = 6) Continuity of care (n = 4).
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Table 2: Selected key recommendations* 
Domain Quality indicator
Scale of the outbreak and 
epidemiology
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] collects data about all cases and 
contacts of cases for inclusion in the case register of the [RESPONSIBLE 
ORGANIZATION] if the nature and phase of the outbreak are such that the data 
are relevant to outbreak control
Scale of the outbreak and 
epidemiology
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] reports the data about the index case, 
the epidemiological situation (number and nature of the contacts, possible source, 
etc.) to the National Authority in charge of infectious disease control for national 
surveillance and coordination
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] is in charge of supplying prophylaxis 
for the designated groups
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] informs the supervisory pharmacy 
about delivery of the prophylactic medication by the [RESPONSIBLE 
ORGANIZATION]. The pharmacist helps set up the medication management 
system
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] must register the indications and 
contraindications of the prophylactic medication by name and national insurance 
number of the person receiving treatment whenever the [RESPONSIBLE 
ORGANIZATION] provides prophylaxis
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] informs the supervising pharmacy 
about any delivery of medicaments by the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION]. 
The pharmacist helps set up the medication management system
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] must register the indications and 
contraindications for the medication for treatment by name and national 
insurance number of the person receiving treatment when the [RESPONSIBLE 
ORGANIZATION] is in charge of the treatment
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] vaccinates only the groups with an 
indication for vaccination in as far as the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] 
gives the vaccination 
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] obtains a list of the residents in the 
outbreak area (the target population) and approaches them whenever this is 
necessary**
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] informs the supervisory pharmacy 
about any vaccine delivery by the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION]. The 
pharmacist helps set up the medication management system
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] looks after registering the indications 
and contraindications for the vaccine by name and national insurance number of the 
person receiving vaccination whenever the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] 
gives the vaccinations
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] organises quarantine for contacts of 
cases, people belonging to the risk group, and other healthcare professionals, with 
adherence to the national guidelines
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] verifies whether quarantine for contacts 
of cases, people belonging to the risk group, and other healthcare professionals was 
carried out with adherence to the national guidelines
Control measures Within the agreed time span, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] 
must make available a fully equipped quarantine facility that meets the current 
requirements starting from the moment that the need of such a facility was made 
known
Control measures With adherence to the national guidelines, the [RESPONSIBLE 
ORGANIZATION] places cases and people with symptoms in isolation
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] verifies whether the national guidelines 
were adhered to when cases and people with symptoms were placed in isolation at 
home 
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Table 2: Selected key recommendations* - continued
Domain Quality indicator
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] is in charge of monitoring the medical 
condition of any suspected case and contacts of cases by telephone and asks the person 
about his/her symptoms with a view to the causative pathogen. Thus quick action can be 
taken, should there be any indication that this person has been infected 
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] instructs people exposed to infection to 
register themselves with the appropriate caretaker if they develop any symptoms (e.g. 
flu-like symptoms such as fever and conjunctivitis)
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] ensures that people with symptoms, people 
belonging to the risk group, contacts of cases, and other healthcare professionals receive 
instruction about the appropriate measures to prevent infection in consultation with the 
treating medical practitioner
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] instructs the general population about the 
appropriate measures for controlling infection
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] instructs the carrier how to transport cases 
in conformance with the national guidelines
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] instructs its employees to take the prescribed 
protection measures the way the national guidelines recommend
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] informs other health care professionals 
about personal protection measures conforming to the national guidelines
Control measures The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] checks whether its employees use the 
prescribed protection measures the way the national guidelines recommend
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] provides for the correct diagnostics for 
cases, contacts of cases, people belonging to the risk groups, and people who meet the 
case definition criteria as determined in the national guidelines
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] makes arrangements with general 
practitioners (GPs) and the local medical microbiology laboratory for routing the 
diagnostics
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] takes charge of diagnostics and any 
additional control measures (conferring with the consultant microbiologist and the GP)
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] confers with the consultant microbiologist 
of the region in the event of an infectious disease outbreak
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] provides storage of medical materials (e.g. 
medicines, medical equipment, necessary research materials, and sterile materials) if 
national instructions to do so are given
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] distributes medical materials if national 
instructions to do so are given
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] provides triage based on the national criteria 
whenever there is a medical indication for such triage
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] provides instruction to the medical 
interagency partners about the triage criteria
Diagnostics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] organises specific areas (high-risk zones) 
for the transport, assessment, and management of suspected or confirmed cases with 
adherence to current protocols (this monitoring measure concerns the separation of 
patient flows)
Logistic support The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] has direct access to diagnostic material
Logistic support The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] documents where diagnostic materials can 
be ordered
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Table 2: Selected key recommendations* - continued
Domain Quality indicator
Logistic support The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] continuously has a supply of the necessary 
materials in stock, in conformance to the criteria, and determines where these materials 
can be ordered
Logistic support The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION], the fire department, and the police organise 
fire safety, security, and traffic flow around mass-meeting sites, in conformance with the 
mass vaccination plan
Aftercare and 
conclusion
When the crisis is over, each [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] evaluates the actions 
that the organization itself initiated
Aftercare and 
conclusion
During the outbreak or soon afterwards, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] take 
the initiative to involve all parties concerned in setting up a plan for aftercare 
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] provides health education for people with 
symptoms, people belonging to the risk group, cases, and contacts of cases
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] limits the number of people visiting infected 
or suspect locations, such as businesses and student homes, as much as possible
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] adheres to the national communication 
guidelines
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] has a single leader and centrally directed 
communication during an outbreak
Communication The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] posts up-to-date advice, FAQs, and 
associated hygiene advice on its website (for residents unfamiliar with the local language 
as well, if relevant) or states where this advice can be found
Logistics Among themselves, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATIONS] clearly mark out who 
is responsible for coordinating and carrying out tasks in the context of infectious disease 
control
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] records the decision-making process
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] adheres to the division of tasks between 
the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] and the National Authority in charge of 
infectious disease control
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] makes and updates a prognosis of 
bottlenecks on the basis of gaps in care, the attack rate, and the specific pandemic groups
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] works with adherence to the current 
procedure strategy 
Logistics The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATIONS] inform each other in a timely way about 
signals and events that may lead to an infectious disease crisis
Upscaling The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] appropriately upscales if and when an 
infectious disease crisis occurs
Upscaling The Director of Public Health directs and coordinates the elements of the clinical 
pathway
Upscaling The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] makes an appraisal based on complexity 
(safety partners) and capacities (of the supply chain partners) to scale with adherence to 
the Coordinated Regional Incident Procedure
Upscaling The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] composes a regional multidisciplinary team 
during a potential outbreak situation.
Upscaling The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] presents an analysis of expected bottlenecks 
in regional care to the interagency medical and administrative partners of the 
multidisciplinary consultation team
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Table 2: Selected key recommendations* - continued 
Domain Quality indicator
Coordination 
of the chain of 
outbreak control
The physician in charge of infectious disease control handles communications to 
external colleagues about field-specific aspects, in as far as the [RESPONSIBLE 
ORGANIZATION] is in charge of communication
Coordination 
of the chain of 
outbreak control
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] agrees with all parties involved on a contact 
person for people with symptoms, people belonging to the risk group, cases, contacts of 
cases, and other healthcare providers
Coordination 
of the chain of 
outbreak control
If and when the National Outbreak Management Team has convened, the 
[RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] organises a meeting with the regional crisis 
centre to discuss the results of the Administrative Coordination Consultation that are 
made known by the National Authority in charge of infectious disease control 
Coordination 
of the chain of 
outbreak control
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATIONS] maintain permanent contact with each 
other
Coordination 
of the chain of 
outbreak control
The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] ensures from the beginning that 
communication with all parties involved is clear, complete, and timely
Coordination 
of the chain of 
outbreak control
In the early stages of an outbreak, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] organises 
a face-to-face consultation with all the care partners. During this consultation, the 
expectations of each organization are expressed and the assignment of roles and tasks 
is determined
Continuity of care During an infectious disease crisis, the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] maintains 
an overview of the current need for care and care capacity
Continuity of care The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] consults with local GPs about the 
coordination of general practice care (24/7)
Continuity of care In coordination with the local care provider networks (for example GP networks and 
ambulance networks), the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] consults with GPs 
about how long the upscaled organization of primary care will still suffice and from what 
time supplemental packages will be necessary to guarantee continuity
Continuity of care In coordination with the local care provider networks (for example GP networks and 
ambulance networks), the [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] alerts all healthcare 
providers regarding continuation of care and advises them to act in conformance with 
the agreements (e.g. for home care and nursing-and-care settings)
*This table represents the selected set of key recommendations that can be systematically translated into Quality 
Indicators (QIs). For each key recommendation, the responsible organization(s) should be determined prior to 
measuring the set.
**In the Netherlands, the municipality can provide public service organizations with the list of residents and the 
necessary contact details from the Municipal Personal Records Database
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Discussion
In this study, we selected a set of 65 key recommendations describing good quality 
of infectious disease outbreak response, based on scientific and grey literature, 
while applying the systematic Rand modified Delphi procedure. We selected key 
recommendations for the broad range of tasks in infectious disease outbreak response, 
from “control measures” and “diagnostics” to processes such as “coordination of the 
chain of outbreak control”. These recommendations can be systematically translated 
into a set of quality indicators. This QI set is a valuable tool to monitor the quality 
of response to infectious disease outbreak irrespective of the pathogen, and to assess 
in which domains improvement is needed. To our knowledge, no generic QIs have 
been systematically developed to measure the quality of infectious disease outbreak 
response from the perspective of disaster emergency responders and ID-control 
professionals describing the whole process of infectious disease outbreak response.
Two studies previously developed QIs applicable to some specific components 
of outbreak response [11,12]. One study focused on organizational aspects like 
vaccine availability, communication and reporting [11], while the other study 
focused on the correct and timely detection of the first cases and the initiation of 
prophylaxis, education and advice to healthcare workers [12]. Although there is some 
resemblance between the domains selected in these two studies and our study, our 
key recommendations are more detailed and specific, which is crucial for a valid and 
reliable assessment of quality but also for selecting targets for improvement.
Our study has some strengths and limitations. The strength is that our panels 
consisted of 26 and 18 experts with ample experience in outbreak control, ensuring 
optimal face validity of the key recommendations. Literature describes that 7–15 
experts per panel are needed in order to develop a reliable set of indicators, [15]. 
The experts brought expertise from various fields such as: infectious disease control, 
policy making, public health administration, contingency planning, public health 
nursing, and had been involved in regional and national meetings regarding infectious 
disease control. Diversity of expert panel members leads to consideration of different 
perspectives and a wider range of alternatives [65]. 
Preferably, key recommendations are selected combining evidence- and consensus 
based recommendations, with a strong preference for evidence based [14]. A 
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   119 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 4
120
limitation of our study is that, from the 656 recommendations which served as a 
basis for the first questionnaire round, only 35 were extracted from the international 
literature. In addition, the recommendations are merely practice and expert opinion 
based. Expert opinion is considered to be the lowest degree of evidence [66]. This is in 
line with Yeager et al., who studied the literature and concluded that “the public health 
emergency preparedness literature is dominated by nonempirical studies”. They also 
describe how only 15 percent of scientific literature on infectious disease outbreaks 
concerns the response to outbreaks [67]. Although this explains the lack of evidence 
based recommendations in our study, at the same time it stresses the importance of 
building a knowledge base for ‘good quality’ response to infectious disease outbreaks. 
Our set of key could be the starting point for such methodologically sound empirical 
studies. Another limitation of our study is that our results are, for pragmatic reasons, 
based on judgments by Dutch experts and partly on Dutch grey literature which may 
reduce transferability to other countries. To reduce this risk as much as possible, we 
used a large group of experienced experts with various backgrounds. In addition, 
a considerable part of the Dutch grey literature is based on documents issued by 
supranational institutions (e.g. the WHO checklist, ECDC or CDC guidelines). 
We therefore assume that our key recommendations describe essential elements of 
outbreak response and will have an added value in improving efforts to deliver high 
quality response to outbreaks. These key recommendations are formulated in such a 
way that they allow for adaptation to fit the specific organizational structure of different 
countries. Most countries have their own national guidelines. European countries 
lacking national guidelines are very likely to use ECDC guidance instead (such as 
the RAGIDA guidelines or guidance disseminated through Rapid Risk Assessments).
Conclusion
In conclusion, this study provides systematically selected key recommendations 
for good quality of infectious disease outbreak response. These recommendations 
can be systematically translated into QI to measure the quality of infectious disease 
outbreak response and to assess in which domains improvement is needed. Their 
consequent application will provide public health organizations with knowledge on 
where improvement of outbreak response is needed and how to prioritise the efforts 
to achieve optimal and uniform outbreak control, in order to be prepared for the 
next crisis.
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The most successful indicators for quality improvement are indicators that are 
measurable, have potential for feasible improvement, are capable of detecting 
differences in scores and therefore of discriminating between organizations and are 
applicable to a large part of the population [14]. At this moment, we are performing 
a study to test the measurability of our set of key recommendations in practice.
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Abstract
Background
Healthcare workers (HCWs) face specific challenges in infectious disease outbreaks, 
which provide unusual, new events with exposure risk. The fear of infection 
or new, unknown tasks in an unfamiliar setting, for example, may complicate 
outbreak management.
Aim
To gain insight into how healthcare organizations can prepare to meet the needs of 
their HCWs by capturing the experiences of HCWs with patients with suspected 
Ebola virus disease. 
Methods
We conducted 23 in-depth interviews with HCWs, of whom 20 worked in a 
Dutch university hospital and three worked in a regional ambulance service. We 
invited HCWs who cared for patients with suspected Ebola or who were on the 
team preparing for admission of such patients in the period 2014-2015.
Findings
The HCWs were stressed and anxious, but most rated their overall experience as 
positive. We categorized the reported experiences in three main themes, namely, 
experiences related to: (i) the novelty of the threat, (ii) the risk of infection and 
fear of transmission, and (iii) the excessive attention. Our results underline the 
importance of a supportive working environment suitable for crises.
Conclusion
The experiences of HCWs dealing with patients with suspected Ebola can direct 
improvements in generic preparedness for highly transmissible diseases.
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Introduction
Healthcare workers (HCWs) may experience stress when managing infectious disease 
outbreaks [1]. They may have to work extra shifts and perform tasks that do not 
belong to their daily routine in a different department, and they may have to work 
in a multidisciplinary team they are not accustomed to [2]. They must also deal with 
the unpredictability of their working schedule, which requires them to adjust their 
private and social life [3]. Most importantly, HCWs are at risk of exposure to highly 
infectious pathogens while they care for the patients. This may cause fear of being 
infected or being a source of infection for close contacts such as family members [2-
4]. Such stressful events may have negative effects. For example, HCWs exposed to 
severe acute respiratory syndrome or Marburg haemorrhagic fever experienced high 
levels of psychological distress as a result of temperature monitoring and reporting, 
and of quarantine [4,5]. The consequences of distress may persist long after the 
outbreak and may result in depression or post-traumatic stress disorder [2,6-10].
Fortunately, not all outbreaks trigger distress in HCWs, but, in order to have the 
team of HCWs ready to perform optimally while the outbreak unfolds, organizations 
should prepare to address potential stressors. Little is known about how healthcare 
organizations can prepare for stress-related experiences that may affect HCWs [11]. 
The aim of this study was to gain insight into how healthcare organizations can 
prepare for meeting the needs of their healthcare personnel. We did this by studying 
the experiences of HCWs who dealt with patients with suspected Ebola virus disease.
Methods
Design
We conducted in-depth interviews with HCWs in the Netherlands dealing with 
patients with suspected Ebola during the 2014-2015 Ebola outbreak. These interviews 
took place from May to October in 2016.
Setting
The outbreak of Ebola virus disease in 2014 enforced hospitals to prepare for the 
admission of patients with suspected Ebola virus. In the Netherlands, such patients 
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were referred to one of the five appointed university hospitals, following initial 
assessment by a general practitioner or a local hospital department. The regional 
ambulance services were responsible for transporting the patients. Of the 99 patients 
assessed for risk of Ebola, 14 were admitted in strict isolation. All Ebola laboratory 
tests proved negative [12]. Upon request of the United Nations, one patient with 
a confirmed case was admitted to the Major Incident Hospital in the University 
Medical Centre Utrecht in a Medevac procedure [13].
Study participants
We invited HCWs who had cared for a patient with suspected Ebola or were part 
of the team that had prepared for admission of such patients in several university 
hospitals in the Netherlands. We also invited HCWs from regional ambulance 
services who had transported a patient with suspected Ebola.
Data collection
A researcher (E.B.) trained in qualitative research interviewed the participants. Before 
enrolment, each participant received an information letter regarding the purpose of 
the interview, the voluntariness of participation, and how the data would be used. 
The participants were asked to sign an informed consent form. The interviews lasted 
25 min to 1 h. Each interview started with a short explanation about the goal of the 
study. The interviews were semi-structured. We used an interview guide that included 
a topic list about HCWs’ potential needs from a systematic literature review of 
outbreak preparedness (A. Huis et al., unpublished data). We asked the participants to 
tell us about their experiences during the Ebola outbreak, starting with their first Ebola 
training session or allocation to the Ebola team and ending with the final evaluation. 
We asked them to reflect on their experiences during each step, from preparation to 
caring for the patient. We asked them to share their feelings and worries, and those 
of their friends and family. New themes that emerged during the interviews were 
intuitively added to the interview guide, to be verified in the next interviews. Inclusions 
took place until saturation was reached and no new concepts or themes emerged.
Analysis
The interviews were recorded with a digital voice recorder and transcribed verbatim 
by an independent transcriber. The main researcher (E.B.) and a member of the 
research team (A.T. or J.S.) coded 10 interviews, and they discussed the codes until 
consensus was reached. The main researcher (E.B.) coded the remaining interviews.
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Synthesis
A thematic analysis was applied and the main themes extracted from the data. Patterns 
in the data were identified with an iterative process in research group meetings (E.B., 
J.S., A.T., A.H., and M.H.). The qualitative software program Atlas.ti was used for 
the coding.
Ethical review
The Medical Ethics Committee of the University Medical Center Utrecht assessed 
the study and concluded that it was exempt from their approval; reference number 
16/192.
Results
Twenty-three in-depth interviews were conducted. Twenty HCWs were employed 
by five separate university hospitals (13 nurses, six physicians, and one person in 
charge of logistics). Three interviewees worked as ambulance nurses in three different 
regional ambulance services. Two of these interviewees had additional tasks: one was 
a team leader, and the other was a regional manager of acute medical incidents. All 
except five HCWs had children and each of them had a partner when they were 
involved in caring for a patient with suspected Ebola. They had four to 38 years of 
experience in their current profession.
The experiences of HCWs dealing with a patient with suspected Ebola were 
categorized into three themes, which were experiences related to: (i) the novelty of 
the threat, (ii) the risk of infection and the fear of transmission, and (iii) the excessive 
attention (Figure 1). Experiences related to the ‘working environment’ were relevant 
for all three themes. The responses of the various types of healthcare professionals 
were similar with very few differences.
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Figure 1: Categorization of the experiences of healthcare workers dealing with a patient with suspected Ebola 
virus disease.
Overall experience
Despite their fears and anxiety, almost all the HCWs felt positive about the experience 
of caring for a patient with suspected Ebola. It gave them a chance to test their 
protocols, it was motivating, and they felt special and proud that they had been 
selected for this work. Afterwards, they were more motivated for further training and 
simulation exercises for similar outbreaks. Table I shows the corresponding quotes.
Table I: Quotes related to the overall experience
Factor Quote Interview
 ’Everyone had the feeling they were doing something good for this 
world.’
‘But then the tension diminishes, and it’s very nice to do something 
this exciting, which is actually not that exciting, but everything 
around it makes it very interesting.’
Male nurse in university hospital
Female physician in university 
hospital
Novelty of the threat
The experiences in this domain are related to Ebola being a new situation in this part 
of the world. Organizations and HCWs were faced with a situation that deviated 
from the norm and required immediate preparations and action. Table II shows the 
corresponding quotes. 
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Table II: Quotes related to the novelty of the threat
Factor Quote Interview
Formation of the Ebola 
team: voluntary or 
mandatory
‘I think that refusing to transport a patient with suspected 
Ebola would have resulted in a service request. Refusing a 
service request has consequences or has consequences in the 
future. And I definitely considered: am I willing to accept 
the consequences?’
Male ambulance nurse
Availability of 
protocols and clear task 
descriptions
‘Everything was in protocols. We had task cards and 
protocols of everything so there was no discussion how 
something should be done. That was simply pre-defined.’
‘First they say, “This is sufficient”. And 2 weeks later it 
is completely different. Then you think: are the current 
equipment and the current procedures for donning PPE 
good enough?’
Male nurse in 
university hospital
Male ambulance nurse
Briefing and debriefing ‘Well, we had the team ready and the team came here, and 
the team was briefed. Whatever you do – Well, this is how 
we are going to do it. This is the plan, this can be expected, 
you should do this and you shouldn’t do that; this is what 
we have practised.’
Male ambulance nurse
Training and information ‘Well, we are well-trained. Bring it on!’ Female nurse in 
university hospital
Working environment ‘If you are in the Ebola group, then food and drink are 
taken care of. You can rest; there are beds. And people walk 
in all the time and ask, “How are you?”, “Is everything 
okay?” and “How are you feeling?” In that respect it is a 
reassuring experience.’
Female nurse in 
university hospital
Formation of the Ebola team: voluntary or mandatory 
Some healthcare organizations allowed for voluntary participation in the Ebola 
treatment team. Other organizations appointed employees for the team. The HCWs 
who voluntarily applied for the Ebola team more often reported positive experiences e 
less stress and anxiety e than HCWs who were mandatorily appointed. The latter said 
that being a team member should not be taken for granted. These HCWs wondered 
whether they could be fired if they refused to provide care for a patient with Ebola. 
One interviewee reported that she refused to be part of the Ebola team and had the 
feeling that her colleagues disapproved. The HCWs who volunteered were also fearful 
and anxious, but were nonetheless excited about doing something that really matters.
Availability of protocols and clear task descriptions 
Healthcare organizations had to develop new protocols and train their HCWs to 
handle patients with Ebola. The HCWs described how clear and simple protocols 
helped them remain calm by using the instructions provided. Interviewees who 
worked in a healthcare organization that did not have clear and unambiguous 
protocols said that this caused stress and uncertainty. These HCWs felt confused 
because of undefined roles and tasks.
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   133 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 5
134
The HCWs felt safe seeing their organization continuously reviewing and improving 
procedures, securing the availability of all necessary materials, and taking steps to 
obtain the safest personal protective equipment (PPE) possible. However, a small 
minority saw the continuous adjustments as a weakness, mainly when PPE was 
involved.
Briefing and debriefing
The HCWs perceived anticipating the arrival of a patient with suspected Ebola 
positively. Some organizations only admitted the patient after they had completed 
all the preparatory work and after the isolation room had been fully prepared. By 
contrast, when HCWs had to rush because the patient had already arrived, they 
found the preparation very stressful. Most organizations had an Ebola team meeting 
before the patient arrived to talk through all steps in the patient admission and 
treatment. This pre-arrival briefing helped the HCWs to prepare mentally.
Most healthcare organizations had a debriefing after the dismissal of each patient, 
which the HCWs appreciated because it served as an outlet, and protocols could be 
adjusted if necessary.
Training and simulation
In all the interviews, the HCWs referred to the influence of the training and 
preparation they had received. Most reported that training had helped them feel 
prepared for their tasks. However, some HCWs were unsure whether and how their 
healthcare organization was fully prepared. They reported that information about the 
disease helped them stay calm. Some HCWs said they needed more information on 
treatment options or disease progression.
Working environment
Most healthcare organizations put much effort into the comfort of their HCWs, 
and the HCWs valued these efforts. Almost all the HCWs felt that preparing for 
and taking care of a patient with suspected Ebola greatly increased the team spirit. 
After leaving the isolation room, the HCWs turned to team members as an outlet for 
emotions and feelings, which helped reduce their stress levels. It was very reassuring 
to share this experience and to talk about it with colleagues. Team members were 
very receptive to social talks and meetings. Nonetheless, HCWs also pointed out 
the importance of keeping in touch with the HCWs who were not on the Ebola 
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team and who performed all the regular tasks. The HCWs mentioned that protocols 
were often developed with the entire team, which made them feel that their opinion 
was important. They also felt that their supervisors valued their opinions. Most 
organizations did an evaluation. The HCWs stated that this evaluation should be 
done with the entire team and not only the designated Ebola team. However, this did 
not happen in every organization.
Risk of infection and fear of transmission
The experiences in this domain are related to Ebola being a highly infectious pathogen, 
which causes fear and anxiety among HCWs and their families. Most HCWs were 
fearful and anxious when they had to care for a patient with suspected Ebola, although 
some felt safe and protected. Table III shows the corresponding quotes.
Familiarity and unfamiliarity
The HCWs said that they were nervous about entering the patient’s room because 
they did not know what to expect. They were anxious about how seriously ill the 
patient would be; they were relieved when they found that the patient was mildly ill. 
They reported that, when entering the patient’s room, they were extremely alert about 
their own actions and were afraid of making mistakes. Once they had entered the 
room and had seen a patient who needed their help, they felt comfortable in the role 
of care provider. In addition, HCWs who had to enter the patient’s room repeatedly 
reported that their fear and anxiety diminished at each entrance. Some HCWs were 
afraid that, without wearing any PPE, they had been in contact with a supposedly 
non-infectious patient who would later be diagnosed with Ebola.
Moral norm
Most healthcare organizations propagated the ‘one’s own safety first’ principle. This 
means, for example, that lifesaving invasive procedures might have to be delayed or 
cancelled if a staff member with inadequate PPE is in the room. It was difficult for 
some HCWs to accept the fact that their own safety was given preference over the 
patient’s health.
Prevention of transmission
Wearing PPE was reported to be a significant physical burden. Working in full PPE 
makes the body temperature rise and moving around is difficult. Physicians could 
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sometimes provide care at a physical distance from the patients (for example, by using 
the intercom), whereas direct nursing care can never take place at a distance.
Social environment
The HCWs feared for the safety of their family and vice versa. Most interviewees 
reported that their family members were anxious. Some HCWs kept in touch with 
their family members, mostly by telephone, and updated them regularly on their tasks 
and well-being. Family members also feared transmission; some asked the HCW to 
keep a distance at home or to take an extra shower before joining the family, sit in a 
separate chair, or sleep on the couch. Most healthcare organizations had information 
available for family members (sometimes written, and some organizations had a 
meeting), but this information was generally not used. If the organization did not 
have information available for family members, HCWs reported that they had 
missed it. Most HCWs reassured their family members themselves and provided 
information about disease and control measures.
Training and simulation
Almost all the interviewees were very positive about the training and simulation 
exercises. Because of the training and simulation exercises, the HCWs had information 
about the pathogen and knew how to prevent transmission. Some HCWs regretted 
that they were unprepared for the fear and anxiety that they experienced. They said 
that training and simulation exercises focused mainly on technical guidance related 
to the pathogen and the transmission routes only. They focused on preventing 
transmission, whereas no attention was paid to mental well-being in the preparation 
phase or during training sessions. The HCWs felt the need to talk about their worries 
with their colleagues and team managers in this phase.
Working environment
Almost all the interviewees said that having a buddy who helped them put on and 
take off the PPE was useful and comforting. The buddy instructed the HCW, who 
then felt more at ease during high-risk procedures without having to think about 
what they should do and only had to carry out the task. By contrast, some HCWs 
found it difficult to carry out the buddy’s instructions without being allowed any 
personal initiative.
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Table III: Quotes related to the risk of infection and fear of transmission
Factor Quote Interview
‘Will I get infected? That is your biggest fear.’ Female nurse in 
university hospital
Familiarity and 
unfamiliarity
‘After some time it becomes more normal. After a few nights, 
when I was changing my clothes, my new buddy said, “Huh, 
aren’t you nervous?” But it just becomes sort of a routine.”
Female nurse in 
university hospital
Moral norm ‘You get instructions like: “If the patient is dying and it is not 
safe for you, then we let the patient die.” But that is new to us, 
that is the opposite of normal. We are used to doing everything 
we can to keep someone alive. So I think you need to discuss the 
psychological effect of this. “Yes we make this choice, but we do it 
for your own good.” That is difficult to accept. Witnessing such an 
event can be very dramatic.’
Female nurse in 
university hospital
Prevention of 
transmission
About PPE:
‘It demands a lot from your body and you perspire underneath it 
[the PPE]. Because it is really layer on layer on layer. You do have 
a cotton T-shirt underneath it, but that is not enough. Your body 
temperature will really rise, so to speak. Yes, and then you are very 
happy when you can take the PPE off.’
Female nurse in 
university hospital
Social environment ‘I think that especially my husband, and my son the most… were 
more concerned. Like, be careful, if anything happens, let me 
know.’
‘My partner asked me, “Shouldn’t you be sleeping on the couch?” 
It was sort of a joke. But the undertone suggested there was more 
to it.’ 
Female nurse in 
university hospital
Female physician 
in university 
hospital
Training and simulation ‘More like, I missed the entire psychosocial aspect around it. I 
thought that was a shortcoming. … At least to sit around the 
table and listen to what the needs are.’
Female nurse in 
university hospital
Working environment About the buddy: ‘It was very clear what was expected from you 
and what you should do. There was no question about that. And 
also, how you should do it. You didn’t have to figure that out 
yourself.’
‘Yes…some supervisors stayed at night … so we could discuss 
things with them if we wanted.’
Female nurse in 
university hospital
Male nurse in 
university hospital
Some HCWs positively valued the fact that their supervisors and medical specialists 
were more easily accessible than in normal situations. Most HCWs said that, in 
this exceptional situation, there was always someone available to answer all their 
questions. They also appreciated the fact that, when they were caring for a patient 
with suspected Ebola, they had much more time for the patient than in their regular 
work because they could care only for this one patient. However, since there was not 
much work to do, they were sometimes bored. Further, the efforts of their employers 
to do everything possible to protect their safety made the HCWs feel safe.
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Excessive attention
The suspected Ebola led to media frenzy and attracted a lot of curiosity from other 
healthcare staff and from the media. Table IV shows the corresponding quotes.
Table IV: Quotes related to excessive attention 
Factor Quote Interview
Adapted decision-
making
‘Well ... I think it’s a bit tricky … I was focused on the entire 
patient process, but what I ran into is that, while working, my 
activities were somewhat determined by the board of directors. 
They decided when the patient was to be dismissed from the 
isolation room, while this is a medical decision.
Female physician in 
university hospital
Working 
environment
‘Yes, you are just doing your job and the first time with the first 
patient and the first moments in the isolation room …. If there 
are a lot of people nearby, you think: just let us do our jobs. 
Because when you get out of the isolation room you are sweating 
like crazy and just want to recover.’
Female physician in 
university hospital
Adapted decision-making
Some doctors reported that the board of directors took over the medical decision-
making because the board wanted to ensure that the right decisions were made. 
Physicians from one hospital reported that, in their opinion, the visibility of the team 
taking care of the patients with suspected Ebola was underexposed. Some nurses said 
they were not allowed to follow up on the patient’s condition at home. They reported 
that sometimes they were concerned about the patient’s condition when they were 
at home. They sometimes kept thinking about the patient while they were off duty 
because they had no access to the patient’s record and colleagues were not allowed to 
give them any information. However, physicians could often follow up on the patient 
while they were at home. They found this very comforting and reassuring.
Working environment
Most HCWs were bothered by the unnecessary presence of colleagues in the patient’s 
room. Because of media attention and the interest of colleagues, the HCWs felt that 
they were being watched. In some cases, colleagues from other departments in the 
hospital were anxious and insecure about a patient with suspected Ebola being in 
their hospital. Nonetheless, there was a lot of positive and supportive interest from 
colleagues and supervisors. The HCWs felt that their supervisors, doctors, and team 
members supported them. The supervisors were generally more easily accessible than 
in normal situations. However, if the supervisor was stressed or unsupportive, this 
reflected on the HCWs. The HCWs considered the presence of security guards in the 
department to be good because they kept intruders out of the department.
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Discussion
We studied the experiences of HCWs dealing with patients with suspected Ebola in 
the industrialized western world to gain insight into how healthcare organizations 
can prepare for meeting the specific needs of their healthcare personnel in future 
crises. Such insight may improve generic preparedness regarding highly transmissible 
diseases. Our results show that, overall, most HCWs felt positive about the total 
experience despite their fears and anxiety. On the basis of the reported experiences, 
we constructed a framework for preparedness that included crisis-specific themes. 
The interviews clearly showed the importance of a supportive working environment. 
Training and simulation were also seen as helpful for dealing with this new situation 
with a high risk of infection. When preparing for outbreaks, healthcare organizations 
focus mainly on the medical, hygienic, and organizational aspects, whereas the 
human factors are ignored [14]. Our study shows that, while preparing for outbreaks, 
a general working environment that meets the needs of the individual and ensures the 
support of the team and the managers is crucial.
One must bear in mind that in this study we interviewed professionals who worked 
in a well-organized and well-prepared healthcare system while caring for patients 
potentially infected by a highly contagious disease. Even in this well-controlled and 
relatively safe situation, we found many aspects that affect HCWs. The impact on 
HCWs working in less well-organized or less prepared organizations will likely be 
different. Healthcare organizations should plan and put mechanisms in place to 
capture the experiences of HCWs and channel them in order to improve the resilience 
of the HCWs, and, if need be, their families. There are many studies and guidelines 
that describe mental care in other contexts of major emergency situations, mass 
trauma events, or disasters [11,15,16]. In line with our findings, these documents 
acknowledge the importance of creating feelings of safety and connectedness, 
providing reliable information, and showing organizational involvement and 
facilitation of the exchange of experiences between those involved. However, they lack 
recommendations about the risk of infection and excessive attention that may arise 
during outbreaks. The results of these studies and guidelines are, however, difficult 
to translate to HCWs dealing with highly infectious patients for three reasons. First, 
most of the literature describes care for victims or patients but not for HCWs who 
are exposed to the pathogen because of their obligation to attend work [11,16e18]. 
Second, infectious disease outbreaks have a unique feature among mass trauma 
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events: transferability of pathogens from person to person that may result in fear of 
containment. Third, an outbreak is not a sudden disaster; the severity may gradually 
increase, and infectious disease outbreaks may eventually last for months. This means 
that HCWs must work in a stressful environment for a long period. One other study 
took a step to gain insight into the experiences of HCWs regarding their mental state 
when they were working during the Ebola outbreak in a western country [19]. The 
reported experiences are similar to our findings. Our study, in addition, provides a 
systematic framework that may be helpful to healthcare organizations when they are 
preparing for outbreaks. The experiences related to the factor ‘working environment’ 
apply to all outbreaks, irrespective of whether they are new or highly infectious, or 
whether they create excessive attention. Healthcare organizations should first focus 
on these experiences when they begin preparing for outbreaks.
There are several limitations to this study. First, there was only one confirmed Ebola 
case in the Netherlands. The 14 suspected cases were negative. The experiences of 
the HCWs in our study should therefore be considered a best-case scenario. Second, 
there was a delay between the HCW caring for a patient with suspected Ebola and 
the interview that may have caused recall bias. This study can nevertheless be used as 
a basis for further research into this topic and gives enough items and opportunities 
for improving preparedness in the industrialized western world. Because we identified 
experiences, and not necessarily needs or shortcomings of healthcare organizations, 
it is difficult to provide extensive advice for healthcare organizations. One of the 
strengths of this study is the data synthesis. We used an iterative group process that 
led to the identification of patterns and themes across our data. Another strength is 
the diversity of the HCWs who participated in the interviews. All the relevant types 
of HCW were included from different hospitals and different ambulance services 
in the Netherlands. We interviewed more than 20 HCWs, ensuring that different 
perspectives were taken into account.
In conclusion, it is important that the experiences of HCWs in settings such as the 
Ebola outbreak are not forgotten, but are translated into a set of recommendations 
for healthcare organizations preparing for, or responding to, outbreaks of serious 
infections. 
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Abstract
The largest outbreak of Ebola virus disease ever started in West Africa in December 
2013; it created a pressing need to expand the workforce dealing with it. The aim of 
this study was to gain insight into the experiences of volunteers from the European 
Union who worked in deployable laboratories in West Africa during the outbreak. This 
study is part of the EMERGE project. We assessed the experiences of 251 volunteers 
with a 19-item online questionnaire. The questions asked about positive aspects of 
volunteering such as learning new skills, establishing a new path in life, and changing 
life values. Other questionnaire subjects were the compliance to follow-up measures, 
the extent to which volunteers felt these measures restricted their daily activities, 
the fear of stigmatization, and worries about becoming infected or infecting their 
families. The volunteers reported positive effects reached far beyond their daily work, 
such as changes in life priorities and a greater appreciation of the value of their own 
lives. Although the volunteers did not feel that temperature monitoring restricted 
their daily activities, full compliance to temperature monitoring and reporting it to 
the authorities was low. The volunteers did not fear Ebola infection for themselves 
or their families and were not afraid of stigmatization. With respect to the burden 
on the families, 50% reported that their family members were worried that the 
volunteer would be infected with Ebola virus. Altogether, the positive experiences of 
the volunteers in this study far outweigh the negative implications and constitute an 
important argument for inspiring people who intend to join such missions and for 
motivating the hesitant ones. 
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Introduction
The largest outbreak of Ebola virus disease to date originated in West Africa in 
December 2013. It caused 28,616 Ebola cases in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 
which resulted in 11,310 deaths [1]. It takes more than 25 healthcare workers 
to care for 10 Ebola patients, meaning that thousands of healthcare workers and 
volunteers were needed to contain the outbreak [2]. As the Ebola outbreak unfolded 
to an unprecedented magnitude, a large demand on human resources that included 
physicians, nurses, and laboratory staff emerged [2]. 
The severity of the disease, the lack of curative treatment, and the high risk of 
contamination were major challenges. Healthcare workers from western countries 
were hesitant to volunteer or did not find suitable channels through which to do so 
[3, 4]. Of all the local healthcare workers in West Africa, 1.4 – 8.7% died of Ebola, 
compared to 0.02 – 0.11% of the general population [5]. Due to the uncontrolled 
spread of the disease locally and the media’s alarming reports about cases imported 
into Europe and the USA, many governmental and non-governmental organizations 
worldwide, along with military personnel, finally provided support to the most 
affected countries. Trained staff, equipment, and facilities for treatment and testing 
were deployed or set up in West Africa. At present, there is still very little insight 
into the experiences of the volunteers who worked in this high-risk setting. The few 
studies on healthcare workers volunteering during the Ebola outbreak describe the 
barriers and facilitators that healthcare workers encountered when they consider to 
volunteer [3, 4].
Although diagnostic laboratory work can be considered less dangerous than patient 
care because there is no direct patient contact, anxiety still caused difficulty in the 
enrolment of personnel. This is likely due to the fact that laboratory personnel 
processed patients’ specimens that were positive for Ebola virus and were aware that 
any breach in observing strict laboratory precautions might lead to exposure and 
infection. Insight into the experiences of volunteers who actually did go to West 
Africa is needed to learn the lessons that will prepare volunteers more adequately to 
participate in future emergency workforce teams. 
This study reports on the personal experiences of European Union (EU) volunteers 
deployed in laboratories in West Africa during the Ebola outbreak that began in 
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2013. Mobile laboratories were often located at Ebola treatment units; laboratory 
staff had close contacts with the clinical staff.
Methods
This study is part of the EMERGE Joint Action project. The general objective of 
EMERGE Joint Action is to enable an efficient response to serious emergent and 
re-emergent cross-border events by reinforcing the existing EU network of Biosafety 
level 3 and Biosafety level 4 laboratories that are already actively identifying dangerous 
human pathogens of the bacterial and viral types. An online questionnaire was sent to 
the laboratory personnel who were voluntarily deployed by European organizations 
to work in West Africa during the Ebola outbreak. This questionnaire evaluates 
technical aspects of laboratory preparedness and deployment. We augmented it 
with a subset of questions that ask about well-being and the personal experiences 
of volunteers during and after the mission. We report on the results of the subset 
questions and highlight the implications for future missions. 
Study population 
Eight organizations, who provided 17 associated mobile laboratories, were involved 
in sending out volunteers. We emailed the questionnaire to 646 volunteers who were 
deployed by six of the eight organizations (the six had 14 of the 17 European mobile 
laboratories). After emailing them in January 2016, we repeated our message with 
reminders for those who had not responded. The online questionnaire was opened 
by 302 recipients and was completed by 251 respondents (response rate: 38.9%, 
completion rate: 83%). The median time between deployment (the first day of the 
initial month of deployment) and the time of completing the questionnaire was 373 
days, range 82 – 772). Any volunteer who had been on multiple missions was asked 
to report on only one mission. The last questionnaire was completed by July 1, 2016. 
The Clinical Expertise Centre of the National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment reviewed the study protocol (LCI-350). On the basis of this review, 
they determined that the research plan did not fall under the Dutch law on medical 
research involving humans (WMO). All the respondents consented to participate in 
the study and were aware that their responses would be used for research purposes. 
Data were collected anonymously.
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Questionnaire design
There were 19 statements (Table 1) about aspects of volunteering such as learning new 
skills, establishing a new path in life, changing life values, compliance with follow-
up measures, the extent to which volunteers felt these measures restricted their daily 
activities, and worries about being infected or infecting their families. We asked the 
respondents to assess their fear of stigmatization after they returned from the mission.
The questionnaire was based on questionnaires that had been used previously to 
collect the experiences of healthcare workers caring for two patients with Middle East 
respiratory syndrome and a case of Marburg hemorrhagic fever in the Netherlands 
[6, 7]. Items from the Post-traumatic Growth Inventory were used as well [8]. We 
asked the respondents to what extent they agreed with the statements included in the 
questionnaires on a 7-point Likert scale (0 thru 6; 0 = strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 
6 = strongly agree).
Analysis
We used our descriptive analysis of the data and a linear regression to study the 
relation between the sum score of each domain versus the age group and country 
where the volunteer worked. We calculated the sum scores by adding up the scores 
within each domain.
Results
Study population
Of the 251 volunteers, 162 (65%) volunteered to go to Sierra Leone, 76 (30%) went 
to Guinea, and 13 (5%) went to Liberia. The first 70 participants (28%) volunteered 
in 2014, and the remaining 180 (72%) volunteered in 2015. Most volunteers (45%) 
were 26 to 35 years old and 27% were 36 to 45 years old.
Questionnaire: volunteers’ experiences
The results in this paragraph are the perceived results of the volunteers’ experiences 
in the Ebola virus disease outbreak. Overall, the respondents were very positive about 
volunteering in a high-risk setting. Most volunteers (234 of 249, 94%) stated that 
the experience provided them with a sense of meaning and purpose, and almost 97% 
stated that they would go on a mission again. The volunteers felt a greater sense of 
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closeness with others (51%), knew that they could handle difficulties better (68%), 
and discovered they were stronger than they thought they were (58%). In addition, 
the volunteers thought that they had a greater appreciation of the value of their own 
lives (64%) and that they had changed their priorities about what is important in 
life (67.9%). There were differences among the age groups (<25 years, 26–35 years, 
36–45 years, 46–55 years, and 56–65 years) for the items “I have learned new skills 
that I can use in my current and/or future job” and “I established a new path for my 
life”  (Fig 1). The two youngest age groups were better at learning new skills than the 
oldest age group. Volunteers aged 26–35 years were better at establishing a new path 
for their lives than volunteers aged 36–55 years. We found no differences between the 
age groups for the other items in this domain.
Relation between the domains and the age groups 
Because only 13 volunteers went to Liberia, we had to exclude this group from our 
analysis. We aggregated the age groups into three groups (≤35 years, 36–45 years, 
and 46–65 years) to get closer to equal numbers. We calculated the sum scores of 
each domain by adding up the scores of the variables corresponding to each domain. 
For the domain “follow-up measures”, we recoded the variable “monitoring my 
temperature made me feel restricted in my daily activities” so that all variables in the 
domain represent a positive trend. We found no significant results by linear regression 
in the relation between the sum scores of the domains versus age and country except 
for the domain “experience”. We found a difference of -3.89 between the youngest 
and oldest age groups (p = 0.044) and a difference of -6.40 between the youngest 
group and the middle-aged group (p = 0.001). This means that younger volunteers 
were the most positive about the experience and volunteers aged 36–45 years were 
the least positive. We found no significant difference for the country the volunteer 
was sent to. 
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Figure 1: Mean and 95% Confidence interval per age group
Follow-up measures
All volunteers had to monitor and report their temperature for the 21 days following 
the last exposure, regardless of whether they had a fever. Forty-four percent (score = 
6) of the respondents said that they had fully complied with temperature monitoring, 
and 75% of the respondents did not feel that monitoring their temperature 
restricted their daily activities. Almost 13% did not fully comply with temperature 
monitoring for the 21 days and 3% of the respondents felt that monitoring their 
temperature restricted their daily activities. Over 26% of the respondents reported 
their temperature to the authorities in charge. We found no differences between the 
five age groups. 
Worries and stigma 
Ten percent of the respondents said they were worried about being infected with the 
Ebola virus, and 11% were worried about infecting their family members with the 
Ebola virus. Half of the respondents (50%) agreed that “My family members were 
worried that I would be infected with the Ebola virus”, and 20.1% agreed that “My 
family members were worried about being infected with the Ebola virus.” Almost 
15% were afraid of being stigmatized after their return, and 6.4% of the respondents’ 
families were afraid they would be stigmatized. We found no differences between the 
five age groups.
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Discussion
This study captures the experiences of volunteers who worked in a high-risk setting 
during the Ebola virus disease outbreak. Volunteering for such a mission can have 
major implications for the volunteers themselves and for their families [9-11]. The 
volunteers report positive experiences that reached far beyond their daily work, such 
as a change in their priorities in life and a greater appreciation of the value of their own 
lives. Although the volunteers reported that temperature monitoring did not make 
them feel that their daily activities were restricted, fully complying with temperature 
monitoring and reporting it to the authorities was low. The volunteers did not fear 
infection with Ebola or infecting their families, and they were not afraid of being 
stigmatized. With respect to the burden on family members, 50% reported that their 
family members were worried that the volunteer would be infected with Ebola virus.
Our paper shows that those who did volunteer derived a lot of satisfaction from 
their experiences. Most of our respondents were not worried about being infected 
with Ebola or infecting family members. Nevertheless, their families were concerned. 
This effect has also found in other studies, such as the one reporting on a patient 
with Marburg hemorrhagic fever. In that study, 40% of the 130 contacts reported 
that their family members expressed anxiety about becoming infected, and over 30% 
reported that their partners were disturbed by the restrictive control measures [7]. In 
another study of the experiences of Dutch healthcare workers caring for a suspected 
Ebola patient, we found that family members of healthcare workers were afraid and 
anxious [12]. One explanation may be that healthcare workers are better informed 
about the risks and protective measures than their family members are, which reduces 
worry and anxiety. However, family members’ fears and anxieties can influence the 
volunteer’s decision to participate in such a mission. For those volunteering in the 
event of future outbreaks, it is important that the families’ worries are addressed at an 
early stage of the recruitment.
In our study, almost half of the respondents complied with daily measuring, but 
we notice a low reported compliance with daily reporting of temperature to the 
authorities. Over 26% of the volunteers reported their temperature to the authorities 
in charge. Compared to other studies (adherence rates ranging from 80 percent in the 
first weeks after exposure to 66% after 6 weeks of exposure) this is low [7]. The reasons 
for that have not been asked, but there might have been difference with respect to 
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how authorities required reporting between the countries sending volunteers. This is 
an aspect that deserves attention when developing instruction for volunteers in future 
missions. The reported perceptions of risk in this study are low. However, the actual 
risks are also likely to be low for a well-trained and experienced volunteer. Thus, we 
believe that the perceived risks represent the actual risks.
Almost half of our respondents were between 26 and 35 years old. This is similar to 
the findings in Turtle’s study in which 43% of those considering volunteering were 
in the 26–35 year age group [4]. In recruitments for future outbreaks, most of the 
volunteers will be less than 35 years old. Volunteers of this age reported the most 
positive experiences in our study. This might be explained by the assumption that 
younger people are more adventurous or do not have children and are therefore more 
inclined to work in a high-risk environment. A previous study showed that potential 
volunteers without children were less afraid of contracting Ebola virus disease [4]. 
This age group might be considered a primary target for volunteer missions, while 
it must be taken into account that senior experts are also needed because they have 
the necessary hindsight and expertise; they provide guidance and support to younger 
volunteers and help constitute a well-balanced group of volunteers. 
This study has some limitations. First, there may be recall bias, given the retrospective 
nature of the study. Second, only a minority of all the volunteers who were contacted 
completed the questionnaire. Volunteers who experienced the mission as positive 
might have been more prone to complete the questionnaire, causing selection bias. 
However, in our previous study in which we interviewed healthcare workers who cared 
for a patient suspected of Ebola virus disease healthcare workers also reported positive 
experiences [12]. Third, the volunteers reported their family members’ experiences. 
Firsthand information from relatives and family members themselves would help us 
to gain more insight into their actual needs. The questionnaire did not provide data 
from people who wanted to volunteer but did not because their families did not want 
them to. Bearing in mind the expected need for volunteers for future outbreaks, their 
insights and needs would also be very valuable. Fourth, respondents could decide for 
themselves which mission they wanted to report. Respondents who went on multiple 
missions may have reported more positive experiences than volunteers who went 
on one mission only because they were more experienced and accustomed to the 
situation. However, the setting was identical.
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The response rate for this study was 38%. Several factors may explain our response 
rate. First, the time span between the actual mission and receiving the questionnaire 
might have had a negative impact on the response rate. Second, volunteers might 
have already talked through their experiences with their organization or their family 
and friends and did not feel the need talk about their experiences again. Given the 
knowledge gap in the literature about the experiences of volunteers working in high-
risk environments, we believe that our study is very valuable. 
Our study reports on personal experiences systematically collected from 251 volunteers 
who engaged in circumstances that were distinct from their daily routines. They were 
required to carry out new tasks in an unusual situation associated with significant 
risks, and they had to work in a new team. The Ebola crisis made it clear that there 
was a need for a European Medical Corps and a global health emergency workforce 
for strengthening the emergency capacity and the international capability to respond 
to crises. Both of these are now installed [13-15]. The results of our study could be 
used as a starting point to aid the workforce in preparing healthcare workers for their 
tasks. It must be kept in mind that healthcare workers, while working in potentially 
even more dangerous environments than laboratory workers, might have experiences 
similar or less positive than our volunteers. Special attention should be paid to the 
fear and anxiety of the healthcare worker’s family, both of which need to be addressed 
beforehand. Altogether, the positive experiences of the volunteers in this study far 
outweigh the negative implications. These experiences may constitute an important 
argument for inspiring people who intend to join such missions and to motivate the 
hesitant ones. For most respondents, participating in this volunteer mission resulted 
in an immaterial long-term yield of new experiences and a purposeful meaning of 
life.
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The main aim of the studies described in this thesis was to define high quality generic 
preparedness and response from a first responder’s perspective. In this thesis we 
defined first responders as professionals working in organizations which are directly 
involved in providing healthcare during an infectious disease outbreak (including 
primary-, secondary-, tertiary- and home and community care providers), or indirectly 
involved in providing healthcare services during an outbreak (including local health 
departments, and clinical diagnostic laboratories). We identified recommendations for 
high quality preparedness and response from literature reviews followed by consensus 
procedures and prioritization. To our surprise, recommendations describing needs 
of healthcare workers were ranked as not relevant and were thus not selected. This 
very finding triggered our interest for an in-depth study to gain more insight into 
the presence and content of such needs of healthcare workers while responding 
to an outbreak exemplified by the Ebola outbreak. In this chapter we summarize 
and discuss the main outcomes from our studies, and outline the implications and 
recommendations for further research and practice. 
In this thesis, we started with studying the evidence in the field of outbreak 
preparedness and response. We found that there is very little scientific evidence 
defining what constitutes ‘high quality generic preparedness’ and ‘high quality 
response’. The scientific papers we were able to find, describe outbreak evaluations or 
report on expert opinion (i.e. observational studies), both methods yielding low levels 
of evidence. Furthermore, the scientific papers and grey literature we found were 
often disease specific, describing a specific pathogen in a specific context or a specific 
outbreak, rather than being generic. This meant that we needed additional steps to 
deduct generic features from the disease specific recommendations, in order to meet 
the original objectives of our project: to describe key recommendations for generic 
preparedness and response. By systematically combining the available evidence with 
expert opinion, we selected recommendations for generic preparedness and response 
for which evidence alone was insufficient, absent, or methodologically weak. The 
generic key recommendations we propose, allow for application in a wide variety of 
outbreaks or threats, irrespective of the causative agent or setting. 
Generic preparedness is the basis on which both specific preparedness and response 
should be built. Healthcare organizations that are well prepared for outbreaks in 
general, can transfer quickly to more disease specific preparedness in case of a specific 
threat or outbreak. This approach provides a solid fundament and allows for generic 
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learning from specific threats. In emergency management there is a new movement 
towards an all-hazard approach for emergency preparedness [1]. The all-hazard 
approach is based on the principle that hazards vary in source but challenge health 
systems in similar ways [2]. Emergency preparedness, response and recovery activities 
are usually implemented along the same structure, regardless of the cause. The extent 
to which our generic preparedness and response to communicable diseases approach 
overlap with an all-hazard approach is subject to careful consideration. We subscribe 
the need for generic learning from other types of crises in order to improve processes 
that are common for all crises. Generic infectious disease preparedness and the all-
hazard approach have similarities. However at the same time, we emphasize that 
infectious diseases have specific characteristics that make them distinctly different 
from other disaster such as earthquakes, flooding’s and volcano eruptions. Infectious 
diseases have the intrinsic characteristics of being transmittable from person to person 
and thus put many people at risk of contracting the disease, including healthcare 
workers, which causes fear and anxiety for themselves and their social networks [3-
6]. Outbreaks grow exponentially in number of cases and can persist undiscovered 
for a long time among the population, reaching numbers that finally cause a threat 
worldwide, such as it was the example with SARS and Ebola[7, 8]. Moreover, the 
causative agents (bacteria, viruses, parasites, fungi, prions) are invisible for the naked 
eye and thus for society, they do not make an appearance that can be easily detected 
and most people are not familiar with them; in terms of risk perception, they belong 
to the most dreaded category of unknown and unexpected threats [9]. The social 
unrest associated with outbreaks can persist for months and even go beyond the time 
frame of outbreaks [10].
Main findings
Linking preparedness and response
Our review and Delphi procedure on quality of preparedness and response revealed 
a wealth of recommendations that could be assigned to specific domains. Intuitively, 
the key recommendations selected for generic preparedness should correspond to the 
key recommendations selected for response: common sense dictates that preparedness 
recommendations should describe all preparatory actions needed to respond optimally 
during an outbreak. When comparing the identified key recommendations for 
preparedness with the identified key recommendations for response, it becomes clear 
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that there is incomplete overlap. Although some domains are merely preparedness 
actions –for example ‘the construction and maintenance of the preparedness plan’ 
and ‘training and exercising’– the domains ‘surge capacity’, ‘communication’ 
and ‘collaboration and coordination’ are important both for preparedness and 
response. For these domains overlap between preparedness and response would be 
expected. Table 1 demonstrates, as an example, the ‘communication’ domain with 
suboptimal overlap between preparedness and response recommendations. In the 
domain communication there is only one preparedness recommendation. This 
recommendation dictates that healthcare organizations should have communication 
strategies for patients and their families. The response recommendations prescribe, 
in addition to a general recommendation that ‘organizations should adhere to the 
national communication guidelines’ highly specific actions regarding communication 
that should be performed. These recommendations state for example that the 
responsible health organization should have a single leader and centrally directed 
communication during an outbreak, and should post up-to-date advices, FAQ’s, and 
associated hygiene advices on its website.
Preparedness and response are not yet linked properly. One explanation for this 
can be found in the fact that preparedness and response are performed by different 
healthcare professionals and sometimes even different organizations. More study is 
needed to identify the gaps in the preparedness and response recommendations and 
to bridge these gaps in order to provide an optimal link between high quality generic 
preparedness and response. 
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   161 04-05-18   16:55
Chapter 7
162
Table 1: Example of preparedness and response recommendations compared
Domain Preparedness Response
Communication • Healthcare organizations 
should have communication 
strategies for patients and 
their families.
• The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] 
provides health education for people with 
symptoms, people belonging to
• the risk group, cases, and contacts of cases
• The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] 
limits the number of people visiting infected 
or suspect locations, such as businesses and 
student homes, as much as possible
• The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] 
adheres to the national communication 
guidelines
• The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] 
has a single leader and centrally directed 
communication during an outbreak
• The [RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION] 
posts up-to-date advice, FAQs, and associated 
hygiene advice on its website for residents 
unfamiliar with the local language as well, if 
relevant) or states where this advice can be 
found
Experiences of healthcare workers and volunteers 
When systematically reviewing the literature on preparedness we encountered several 
recommendations regarding support for healthcare workers. To our surprise, when 
presenting those to the panels for appraisal of relevance, most of these recommendations 
were ranked as not relevant and were thus not selected. This very finding triggered 
our need for an in-depth study to gain more insight into the presence and content 
of such needs of healthcare workers while responding to an outbreak. Our study is 
one of the first to define a framework for needs of healthcare workers that needs to 
be included when preparing for outbreaks. Support for healthcare workers is mostly 
described in psychological journals or guidelines in the context of disasters [11-14]. 
The needs of healthcare workers during outbreaks differ from the needs during other 
disasters due to the fact that infectious diseases can be transmitted from person to 
person and therefore a patient can infect a healthcare worker, and healthcare workers 
can infect their family and friends. In literature on preparedness for outbreaks, 
however, there is little guidance describing support for frontline healthcare workers, 
while these healthcare workers are at risk of contracting the disease themselves and 
even transmitting it to their close contacts. In addition, there is no framework in 
preparedness literature that describes how needs of healthcare workers should be 
structured. Our study shows that a working environment that meets the needs 
of the individual and ensures the support of the team and the managers is crucial 
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for outbreak management. While preparing for outbreaks, the identified needs of 
healthcare workers should be taken into account. During large-scale outbreaks in low 
resource countries, there often is a call for volunteers from abroad (nurses, doctors, 
laboratory staff, epidemiologists) to help contain the outbreak. Just like the healthcare 
workers, volunteers may need support. Our studies on healthcare workers and 
volunteers showed that the family members of the healthcare worker and volunteers 
experienced fears and anxiety. When recruiting healthcare workers or volunteers to 
work with infectious patients, healthcare organizations should invest in providing 
information for the family members and reducing their worries and anxieties. 
Integrating preparedness and response into the PDSA cycle
A Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA, see figure 1) approach can be used as an instrument for 
continuous quality improvement and is often used for improving quality of care [15]. 
The PDSA cycle was first described by W. Edwards Deming in 1950 [16]. The PDSA 
cycle can be applied to improve processes, products, and services in any organization. 
The completion of one PDSA cycle is usually insufficient as threats evolve or new 
threats emerge while settings can be changing and new knowledge becomes available. 
The cycle represents a repetitive process in learning for organizations and health 
systems (bold black arrow).
In the first step, the planning step, a goal or purpose or success metric is defined. In 
the Do step, the actions are implemented. In the Study step, outcomes are monitored 
and in the Act step, the lessons learned from the process are used to adjust the goal or 
reformulate the success metrics. These four steps are repeated over and over as part of 
a never-ending iterative cycle of continuous quality improvement. 
In the context of emergencies, preparedness and response cycles are often used to 
describe the process of emergency, risk- or incident management [17-19]. A major 
shortcoming of these cycles is that preparing for and responding to emergencies is 
described with one single step. In our view, preparedness and response should be 
seen as part of a repetitive approach, with the ultimate goal to optimize control and 
minimize outbreaks from spreading. 
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Figure 1: PDSA cycle
Figure 2 describes generic preparedness in relation to the PDSA cycle. Th e systematic 
review on preparedness showed that most recommendations in literature describe 
the ‘Plan’ and ‘Do’ step of the PDSA cycle. Th e literature mostly describes activities 
that should be included in a preparedness plan, how the preparedness plan should 
be developed and maintained, and how to perform training and simulation exercises. 
Th e ‘Study’ and ‘Act’ steps are underrepresented, meaning that there were few 
recommendations on how to identify lessons learned and how to incorporate them 
in preparedness plans. Th is implies that there is a missed opportunity to increase 
output of preparedness and response by sustainable inclusion of experiences and 
lessons learned. Lessons learned from recent outbreaks are often disease specifi c and 
not generic [20, 21]. Th is was also shown in our review on outbreak preparedness. If 
these disease specifi c lessons are implemented for example in updated preparedness 
plans, they are used to improve disease specifi c preparedness. Th is will likely result 
in an improved level of preparedness for the specifi c disease. However, this does not 
automatically imply that the level of generic preparedness also improves. Lessons 
learned from outbreaks should be used, in the fi rst place, to improve generic 
preparedness. In this way, preparedness for all outbreaks will reach a higher quality 
level, and not just preparedness for that specifi c outbreak. 
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Figure 2: Integrated Model for Preparedness and RESponSe, IMPRESS
Plan
-Preparedness plan
Do 
- Education and
training
Act
- Update plans
based on lessons
learned
Study
- Evaluate level of 
preparedness
Preparedness elements
- Support for health professionals, 
patients, and families including needs 
of healthcare workers
- Surge capacity 
- Communication with the public, 
patients, and families
- Coordination and collaboration
Figure 3: PDSA cycle for generic preparedness
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Integrated Model for Preparedness and RESponSe, IMPRESS
We developed a layered PDSA cycle, to integrate preparedness and response, based 
on what we have learned from the studies described in this thesis, see figure 2. 
Our layered PDSA cycle distinguishes itself from other preparedness and response 
frameworks because it conceptually links preparedness and response, shows the 
distinction between generic preparedness, disease specific preparedness and response. 
Our cycle allows for a quick recognition of the very phase of the cycle actions are 
being undertaken or needed to be undertaken.
A layered PDSA cycle that includes generic preparedness, threat specific preparedness 
and response provides insight into the full process of preparing for and responding to 
outbreaks. There are three different layers of the ‘Do’ step corresponding to generic 
preparedness, specific preparedness (for a specific threat) and response (to an outbreak 
or threat). Figure 3 describes the activities for generic preparedness, as identified in 
our studies. The cycle for generic preparedness can be completed multiple times if 
there is no outbreak or threat. While preparing for outbreaks, the specific needs of 
healthcare workers should be taken into account. For example healthcare workers in 
our study expressed the need to discuss feelings of fear and anxiety during training 
and exercises. If there is an outbreak in another country or region and healthcare 
organizations should anticipate (suspected) cases, the preparedness will be focused 
on suspected patients with that specific disease, meaning that for example protocols 
will be developed and updated, relevant partners consulted, trainings and simulation 
exercises will be organized taking into account the specific materials and disease 
characteristics. In this thesis we did not define threat specific preparedness. However, 
the recommendations for generic preparedness are to be used as a basis and should be 
systematically translated into threat specific preparedness recommendations.
During an outbreak, healthcare organizations have to implement their preparedness 
plans and respond to the outbreak. In our studies we selected recommendations 
defining high quality response. These recommendations apply for response in general 
and can be made specific for each outbreak. During outbreak response the needs of 
healthcare workers should be taken into account. 
Arrow number 4 of figure 2 on the left side of the framework describes the process 
of continuous quality improvement. Each cycle should be completed fully before 
starting a new cycle. The PDSA cycle should be completed repeatedly. Learning from 
outbreaks, threats or generic preparedness can improve generic preparedness or threat 
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specific preparedness. Preferably, after every threat or outbreak, lessons learned can be 
used to improve generic preparedness. 
In the following paragraphs we discuss the layered PDSA cycle and use Ebola as 
example discuss the cycles in detail. 
Completion of the cycle during the Generic step
The generic phase of the PDSA cycle is described with the arrows with the number 
‘1’. Generic preparedness describes the moment in which there is no threat or 
outbreak. In the ‘Plan’ step, healthcare organizations prepare themselves for outbreaks 
in general. In the ‘Do (generic)’ step the organizations perform regular training, 
education and exercises to improve their preparedness in general. In the ‘Study’ step 
the organizations evaluate their training and education activities and in the ‘Act’ step 
they implement their lessons learned from the training and exercises into the ‘Plan’ 
step. In this thesis, we selected recommendations that define generic preparedness for 
first responders. These recommendations describe all steps of the generic preparedness 
cycle, although, as discussed earlier, most of the recommendations describe the ‘Plan’ 
and ‘Do’ step. The needs of healthcare workers should be added to the generic cycle.
Completion of the cycle during the Threat step
In between outbreaks preparedness is generic. However, if a threat emerges, healthcare 
organizations should focus their preparedness activities on that specific threat to 
anticipate (suspected) cases. Because of this, the ‘Do’ step of the PDSA cycle shifts 
(arrow 2a). In our framework, we present a threat as one component, which actually 
is a simplification. Not all threats have similar severity. The likelihood of geographical 
spread defines the further detailing of the threat. Healthcare organizations should 
study the activities performed during a threat and identify lessons learned (arrow c). 
The lessons learned can be both implemented in generic preparedness and in disease 
specific preparedness. 
For instance, when we apply this to the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa, healthcare 
organizations outside of West Africa started to prepare for admission of an imported 
case[22]. Preparedness for the import of a case was based on generic preparedness 
for import of cases with a highly pathogenic contagious disease[23]. This implied 
triage activities, cross border measures to early identify cases, training for healthcare 
workers how to recognize, admit and treat those patients. When preparing, countries 
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needed to adapt those principles to Ebola specific features such as long incubation, 
high severity of clinical presentation and risk of infection for HCW. Healthcare 
personnel were trained in the use of Ebola specific personal protective equipment, 
protocols were developed and simulation exercises with a simulated Ebola patient 
conducted. Lessons learned can be both implemented in generic preparedness and 
Ebola specific preparedness. 
Outbreak
In some cases, the threat becomes an outbreak or an outbreak emerges so fast or 
unexpected there is no threat phase (arrow 3a). Similar to threats, the lessons learned 
can be both implemented in generic preparedness and in disease specific preparedness. 
Following the increase in patients with Ebola virus disease in 2014 and the spread of 
the disease outside West Africa, countries all over the world moved from the specific 
preparedness phase to response. Confirmed and suspected cases were admitted in 
strict isolation in designated hospitals all over the Netherlands[24]. Hospitals that 
admitted a (suspected) case had to prepare the isolation room, change the work 
schedule of the selected healthcare workers so they could provide patient care for this 
particular patient, and provide medical care for the patient, ensure healthcare workers 
felt safe and comfortable to work[22]. Healthcare organizations had to communicate 
and coordinate with relevant stakeholders in their region and communicate to the 
public about the disease, transmission routes, and give regular updates on admitted 
cases. The lessons learned from this outbreak can be used to improve Ebola specific 
preparedness and generic preparedness. 
Our cycle incorporates the three different layers (generic preparedness, threat specific 
preparedness and outbreak response) and provides different routes to learn from 
outbreaks and exercises. When identifying lessons learned and improving preparedness 
and response quality, it is crucial to be aware of the exact phase of the layered PDSA 
cycle they concern. The response to a specific outbreak yields valuable lessons for 
improving quality of both generic preparedness and disease specific preparedness, 
making thus the newly acquired knowledge and experience sustainable for the next 
crisis.
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Methodological considerations
When defining quality in healthcare, the topic of interest usually concerns care for a 
specific disease or disorder (for example diabetes), delivered by a specific healthcare 
worker (for example the GP) for a specific patient group (for example young adults) 
[15]. In our thesis we defined quality of care for a range of diseases (any infectious 
disease), delivered by a range of healthcare organizations (among others hospitals, 
GPs, regional public health organizations, emergency responders) for different 
groups (cases, suspected cases, the general public). Although this reflects the real 
life complexity of preparing for and responding to outbreaks, it complicates the 
development of Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Timely (SMART) QIs. 
In this respect, our recommendations provide a uniform and rigorously developed 
basis for further attempts to develop organization specific Quality Indicators (QIs).
Our Delphi study on high quality generic preparedness showed that the composition 
of the expert panel reflects on the selected recommendations. First, we noticed that 
in the first rounds of the RAND modified Delphi procedure, most recommendations 
regarding the needs of frontline healthcare workers were rejected. We assumed that 
this was caused by the fact that the experts we consulted were merely managerial 
officers not directly involved in patient care themselves and therefore not at risk for 
being infected by direct patient contact. This argumentation was confirmed in our 
interview study with healthcare professionals caring for cases suspected for Ebola 
virus disease who expressed a large number of needs during outbreaks. Second, in 
the final step of the Delphi study on high quality generic preparedness, we asked 
the experts to prioritize recommendations with the highest urgency. The two expert 
groups selected a different set of recommendations, with only a limited overlap. 
Both examples show that when selecting recommendations for high quality care, the 
composition of the expert panel needs careful consideration. Research shows that the 
composition of the expert panel can be challenging and it is often not well described 
in scientific papers[25, 26]. A multidisciplinary panel better reflects the variety of 
specialties involved in the type of care under discussion than monodisciplinary panels 
[27]. Panel members who perform a medical procedure themselves tend to rate a 
recommendation higher on the appropriateness scale than those who do not. This 
results in more recommendations being rated appropriate by a monodisciplinary 
panel than when multiple specialties were represented [28]. When composing an 
expert panel to select or prioritize recommendations in the multidisciplinary field of 
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outbreak preparedness and response, a multidisciplinary panel in which all relevant 
organizations and experts are included is necessary to select recommendations that 
are important for all that are involved. In this thesis we aimed to defining generic 
preparedness and response using the expertise of national and international experts 
with a large variety in background and expertise. We aimed to include all relevant 
expertise. However, due to the complexity of this field and the international character 
of our study we missed expertise of healthcare workers in our first study.
Implications for research
Several research steps are needed to further determine which elements of preparedness 
lead to high quality response. 
• More research is needed to capture the experiences of healthcare 
workers during outbreak management. The needs of healthcare 
workers should be studied more extensively and the studies should 
aim at including the whole range of (para) medic personnel involved 
in the care of highly infectious patients. Next, the needs should be 
translated into QIs and should become an integral part of preparedness 
and response plans. 
• To link generic preparedness and response, both sets of QIs should 
be compared and integrated. Preparedness and response are often 
performed by separate healthcare workers or even organizations. An 
integrated set of QIs might be crucial in this respect. Furthermore, 
generic preparedness activities should be measured and link to response 
outcomes. 
• Our sets of key recommendations including the needs of healthcare 
should be systematically translated into QIs. Once the QIs are 
developed, a practice test is needed to test the attributes of the QIs. 
The QIs should be valid and reliable, sensitive to change and should be 
accepted by their target audience [15]. These attributes can be tested by 
evaluating the clinimetric properties of the indicators and by assessing 
their value in daily practice (performance measurements) [6]. For these 
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tests, the QIs should be scored with real data in a pilot round and the 
clinimetrical properties assessed. 
• The One Health concept recognizes that the health of people is 
connected to the health of animals and the environment. The goal 
of One Health is to encourage the collaborative efforts of multiple 
disciplines-working locally, nationally, and globally-to achieve the best 
health for people, animals, and our environment [16]. We limited 
our studies to healthcare professionals and organizations and did not 
include at this stage professionals and organization involved in the 
veterinary and environmental fields. Obviously, their involved and 
synergic actions are key to better preparedness and response. Further 
research should aim to identify recommendations for a synergic, one 
health approach.
Implications for healthcare professionals, organizations 
and policy makers
This thesis demonstrates several learning points for healthcare professionals, healthcare 
organizations and policy makers. 
• In this thesis we differentiate between generic preparedness, threat specific 
preparedness and response by a layered PDSA cycle. This cycle should 
be used by healthcare professionals, organizations and policy makers. 
Until now, the terms preparedness and response are used in guidelines, 
literature and policy documents to describe both generic preparedness, 
threat specific preparedness and response. This is very confusing. 
• We approach outbreak preparedness and response from a generic 
perspective. Healthcare organizations with a high level of generic 
preparedness can switch with ease to more disease specific preparedness 
in case of a threat or outbreak. When evaluating an outbreak, lessons 
learned should be used not only to improve preparedness specific for the 
outbreak of concern, but should also be translated to generic lessons to 
improve generic preparedness. This ensures that resources are used more 
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effectively, efficiently, timely and safer because one specific outbreak may 
only occur every 10 years, while outbreaks in general occur frequently. 
• Healthcare professionals, organizations and policy makers should 
become aware of the fact that quality improvement in outbreak 
preparedness and response is a continuous cycle. Each cycle should 
be fully completed before starting a new one, and cycles should be 
completed repeatedly.
• Outbreak preparedness is often the responsibility of dedicated 
preparedness experts and organizations, who are not necessarily 
involved in outbreak response. Their goal is to ensure the pre-requisites 
for response. There should be more collaboration and coordination 
between the preparedness and the response side. For example by 
integrating organizations or involving preparedness planners in 
outbreak evaluations. 
• Healthcare professionals, organizations and policy makers should put 
more focus on the needs of healthcare workers and volunteers during 
preparedness and response. Our studies showed that healthcare workers 
have considerable needs during the care for highly infectious patients 
while until now there was very little attention for this.
Final conclusion
In this thesis we defined high quality generic preparedness and response from a first 
responder’s perspective. We developed a framework linking generic preparedness, 
threat specific preparedness and response in a cyclical quality improvement process. 
The research presented in this thesis contributes to the body of knowledge on 
outbreak preparedness and response, because it provides a definition of high quality 
integrated care in this field, including the needs of healthcare workers during outbreak 
management. Since this study is the first to integrate high quality preparedness and 
response from a first responder’s perspective, more research is needed to integrate and 
translate the selected key recommendations into quality indicators and to actually 
measure the quality of preparedness and response. 
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Summary
Outbreaks in the past underpin the need for a quick and uniform response to 
outbreaks. Outbreaks can spread rapidly and cross boarders easily. Stopping a 
local outbreak can prevent an epidemic or pandemic to emerge. Therefore, local 
preparedness is necessary to prevent and keep outbreaks as limited as possible. All 
over the world first responders (i.e. hospitals, General Practitioners, municipal health 
services) have to prepare themselves for outbreaks. 
In many countries work is being done to prepare for outbreaks. Often by professionals 
or organizations specially appointed for this purpose. The actual work during an 
outbreak, the response, is performed by a wide range of institutions and individuals. 
Until now, there is little evidence to support guidance in what constitutes high 
quality preparedness and response for first responders. In this thesis, we combined a 
literature review, the opinion of experts and the experiences of healthcare workers in 
the field with the aim to define high quality preparedness and response from a first 
responder perspective. 
Chapter 1 describes infectious disease outbreaks in the past and the national and 
regional organizations related to outbreak preparedness and response. In addition, 
chapter 1 explains the need to define high quality preparedness and response. 
Due to globalization, urbanization, the rapid growth and mobility of the world 
population and the speed of travel, emerging and reemerging diseases pose an 
increasing risk to the world. An infectious disease can spread to any part of the world 
within 24 hours, and thus emerge in new geographical locations or populations. 
As outbreaks challenge the entire healthcare system, preparedness and response are 
essential at all levels, from the local healthcare provider level to the global health policy 
level. Until now, there is little evidence to inform guidance in what constitutes high 
quality preparedness and response for first responders. However, in recent decades, 
a significant body of evidence emerged on how to define quality in healthcare in 
general. These principles can be used to define high quality preparedness for and 
response to outbreaks. 
At the end of the chapter an outline of the thesis is presented. 
Chapter 2 describes a review of literature to generate a series of key recommendations 
for optimal preparedness focused on first responders. Systematic searches of 
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experimental, observational, qualitative, mathematical-modelling, and consensus 
procedure studies on preparedness were conducted from January 2002 to December 
2013. Studies had to address preparedness of healthcare facilities and healthcare 
providers for infectious disease outbreaks. We reviewed 63 studies of outbreak 
preparedness resulting in 295 unique recommendations for optimal preparedness 
among which we identified 80 key recommendations. We linked the recommendations 
to cyclical quality improvement practices such as the PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT cycle 
(PDSA cycle). The recommendations emphasize five main categories of preparedness: 
construction and maintenance of the preparedness plan; support for health 
professionals, patients, and families; surge capacity; communication with the public, 
patients, and families; and coordination and collaboration. The review showed that 
there is very little scientific evidence available on preparedness for outbreaks. Most 
recommendations described the Plan and Do steps of the PDSA cycle. 
Chapter 3 describes the modified Delphi procedure in which we captured the view 
of first responders on what they consider key recommendations for high quality 
preparedness. The 80 recommendations for generic preparedness from our literature 
review (chapter 2) were presented to a national and two international expert panels. 
For the national panel a multidisciplinary group of experts on outbreak preparedness 
were invited. To reach first responders in a high number of countries with substantial 
interregional differences we approached the National Focal Points for Preparedness and 
Response and international experts on outbreak preparedness for both international 
panels. We asked the experts to score the recommendations based on relevance for high 
quality preparedness. Starting with 80 recommendations from scientific literature, 49 
key recommendations were selected by both international expert panels. Considering 
the ‘most urgent recommendations’ there are five recommendations that are selected 
by both expert groups. This is a strong signal that those five recommendations have a 
high urgency. Organizations have to develop a generic plan, which is flexible to allow 
for changes to reflect new developments during a specific outbreak. Furthermore, 
they should collaborate in preparedness and mutually tune their plans. Also the staff 
protection and infection control measures are considered urgent by both groups. In 
addition training of all designated professionals is considered urgent. 
We found several differences in the ‘most urgent recommendations’ selected 
suggesting that not all recommendations are equally important for both international 
expert panels. Differences between both groups in the selected ‘10 most urgent’ can 
presumably be explained by the different perspectives of both respondent groups. The 
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National Focal Points selected several recommendations about the development of 
the preparedness plan and other formal procedures. The preparedness experts selected 
the more practical recommendations. When improving outbreak preparedness it is 
impossible to focus on the total set of recommendations due to the size of the set. A 
meaningful approach is to concentrate on the most urgent recommendations. The 
differences between both panels showed that that the background and the perspective 
of the person who has to make this choice influences the selection. Therefore, it is 
very important that all relevant stakeholders from the region are included in outbreak 
preparation to ensure that all perspectives are included.
Chapter 4 describes the modified Delphi procedure in which disaster emergency 
responders and infectious disease control professionals selected a set of key 
recommendations describing high quality outbreak response. As a first step we assessed 
54 national and international publications and extracted over 200 recommendations. 
We presented these recommendations to an expert panel, consisting of infectious 
disease physicians and nurses, policy makers, disaster emergency responders and 
communication experts participated in the expert group (n = 48) using online 
questionnaires and consensus meetings. The expert panels selected a set of 65 key 
recommendations. The key recommendations were categorized into 10 domains 
describing the whole response pathway from outbreak recognition to aftercare. This 
study provides a set of key recommendations that represents ‘good quality of response 
to an infectious disease outbreak’. 
When systematically reviewing the literature on preparedness we encountered some 
recommendations regarding support for healthcare workers. Nevertheless, when 
presenting those to the panels for appraisal of relevance, all these recommendations 
were ranked as not relevant and were thus not selected. This finding triggered the 
need for this in-depth study to gain more insight into the needs of healthcare workers 
while responding to an outbreak. 
Chapter 5 describes the experiences of healthcare workers in the Netherlands dealing 
with patients with suspected Ebola to gain insight into how healthcare organizations 
can prepare for meeting the specific needs of their healthcare personnel in future crises. 
Our results show that most healthcare workers felt positive about the total experience 
despite their fears and anxiety. The interviews clearly showed the importance of a 
supportive working environment. Training and simulation were also seen as helpful 
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for dealing with this new situation and high risk of infection. When preparing for 
outbreaks, healthcare organizations focus mainly on the medical, hygienic, and 
organizational aspects, whereas the human factors are ignored. Our study shows that, 
while preparing for outbreaks, a general working environment that meets the needs 
of the individual and ensures the support of the team and the managers is crucial. 
The experiences in the Netherlands with Ebola are limited, and the facilities in 
the Netherlands provide high quality care compared to other parts of the world. 
Therefore, the experiences described in the previous chapter can be too positive. In 
countries where the Ebola virus disease really affected large numbers of people and 
the facilities are considerably more limited than in the Netherlands, other experiences 
may be described by healthcare workers. 
Chapter 6 described a study on the experiences of volunteers who went to West 
Africa to work in mobile laboratories during the Ebola outbreak. The volunteers 
report positive consequences that reach far beyond their daily work such as a change 
in their priorities in life and a greater appreciation for the value of their own life. At 
the same time, volunteering in such a mission can have major implications for the 
volunteers themselves and for their families. For example, half of the respondents 
indicated that their family was afraid that the respondent would become infected 
with the Ebola virus.
In Chapter 7 the results of our studies are discussed and integrated and we describe 
our main findings. First, the key recommendations selected for generic preparedness 
should correspond to the key recommendations selected for response. Commons 
sense dictates that preparedness recommendations should describe all preparatory 
actions needed to respond optimally during an outbreak. When comparing the key 
recommendations for preparedness with the key recommendations for response, it 
becomes clear that preparedness and response are not yet linked properly. The second 
main finding is the support for healthcare workers. In the literature on preparedness for 
outbreaks there is little guidance regarding support for frontline healthcare workers, 
while these healthcare workers are at risk of contracting the disease themselves and 
even transmitting it to their close contacts. A working environment that meets the 
needs of the individual and ensures the support of the team and the managers is 
crucial for outbreak management. While preparing for outbreaks, the identified 
needs of healthcare workers should be taken into account. 
50264 Evelien Belfroid.indd   182 04-05-18   16:56
183
Summary
We developed a layered PDSA cycle, to integrate preparedness and response, based on 
what we have learned from the studies described in this thesis. Our cycle incorporates 
and conceptually links three different layers (generic preparedness, threat specific 
preparedness and outbreak response) and provides different routes to learn from 
outbreaks and exercises. The cycle provides insight into the full process of preparing 
for and responding to outbreaks. We believe we have taken a step towards a uniform 
language that can improve mutual coordination between preparedness and response. 
When identifying lessons learned and when improving preparedness and response 
quality, it is crucial to be aware of the exact phase of the layered PDSA cycle they 
concern. The response to a specific outbreak yields valuable lessons for improving 
quality of both generic preparedness and disease specific preparedness, making thus 
the newly acquired knowledge and experience sustainable for the next crisis.
Finally, we provide implications for research and practice. More research is needed 
on the experiences of healthcare workers during outbreak management. The needs 
of healthcare workers should be studied more extensively. Next, the needs should be 
translated into quality indicators and should become an integral part of preparedness 
and response plans. The layered PDSA cycle can be used to link generic preparedness 
and response. A first step in this respect is to compare and integrate the two sets of 
recommendations, including the needs of healthcare workers. The layered PDSA cycle 
we present in this thesis should be used by healthcare professionals, organizations and 
policy makers. Healthcare professionals, organizations and policy makers should put 
more focus on the needs of healthcare workers and volunteers during preparedness 
and response.
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Samenvatting
Infectieziekte-uitbraken in het verleden laten lieten zien dat een snelle en juiste 
bestrijding belangrijk is. Uitbraken kunnen zich snel verspreiden en eenvoudig 
landsgrenzen passeren. Als met de juiste maatregelen een lokale uitbraak tot staan 
kan worden gebracht, is daarmee een epidemie of zelfs pandemie voorkomen. 
Daarom is lokale voorbereiding op uitbraken essentieel om uitbreiding van 
uitbraken te voorkomen en de impact ervan te beperken. Daarom moeten regionale 
zorginstellingen overal ter wereld zich voorbereiden op uitbraken. 
In veel landen wordt er gewerkt aan voorbereiding op uitbraken. Vaak door speciaal 
daartoe in het leven geroepen functionarissen of organisaties. Het feitelijke werk bij 
een uitbraak, de bestrijding, wordt door een breed scala aan instellingen en personen 
uitgevoerd. Tot nu toe is er weinig wetenschappelijk onderbouwde bewijsvoering voor 
regionale zorginstellingen hoe goede voorbereiding en bestrijding bij uitbraken er uit 
moet zien. In dit proefschrift hebben we daarom een aantal eerste stappen gezet om 
een wetenschappelijke verantwoorde definitie te krijgen van “goede” voorbereiding 
en bestrijding. We hebben een literatuuronderzoek gecombineerd met de opinie van 
experts uit het veld en met de ervaringen van zorgmedewerkers uit de praktijk. 
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een korte schets van infectieziekte-uitbraken in het verleden 
en beschrijft nationale en regionale organisaties die zich bezighouden met de 
voorbereiding en bestrijding van uitbraken. Daarnaast onderbouwt hoofdstuk 1 de 
behoefte aan definitie van goede voorbereiding en bestrijding. 
Door globalisatie, urbanisatie en de snelle groei en mobiliteit van de wereldbevolking 
en de snelheid waarmee personen over de wereld kunnen reizen, vormen uitwisseling 
en verspreiding van infectieziekten een steeds groter risico. Een infectieziekte kan 
zich binnen 24 uur verspreiden naar ieder deel van de wereld, en daarmee onverwacht 
opduiken in volstrekt nieuwe gebieden of bevolkingsgroepen. Uitbraken belasten het 
gehele zorgsysteem en daardoor is voorbereiding en bestrijding nodig op alle niveaus, 
van regionaal tot mondiaal. Tot nu toe is er weinig wetenschappelijk bewijs dat helpt 
bij het definiëren van goede voorbereiding en bestrijding bij uitbraken. Echter, in de 
afgelopen tientallen jaren is er een grote hoeveelheid bewijs verzameld over hoe je 
kwaliteit van zorg in het algemeen kan definiëren. Dit zal dan ook als basis worden 
gebruikt. 
Aan het einde van het hoofdstuk wordt de opbouw van dit proefschrift weergegeven. 
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In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt het literatuuroverzicht beschreven waarmee we een set 
kernaanbevelingen voor goede voorbereiding voor regionale zorginstellingen hebben 
kunnen ontwikkelen. 
Voor dit systematisch literatuuronderzoek zochten we naar experimenteel, 
observationeel en kwalitatief onderzoek, mathematische modellen en consensus-
procedures over de voorbereiding op infectieziekte-uitbraken gepubliceerd 
tussen januari 2002 en December 2013. De studies moesten de voorbereiding op 
uitbraken door zorginstellingen en zorgverleners beschrijven. We bestudeerden 
63 studies en extraheerden daaruit 295 unieke aanbevelingen voor goede 
voorbereiding. Hieruit identificeerden we 80 generieke aanbevelingen. We plaatsten 
de 80 generieke aanbevelingen in de cyclische PLAN-DO-STUDY-ACT cyclus 
voor kwaliteitsverbetering. De aanbevelingen beschrijven vijf hoofdcategorieën van 
voorbereiding: ‘ontwikkeling en onderhoud van het voorbereidingsplan’, ‘ondersteuning 
voor zorgprofessionals, patiënten en familie’, ‘piekcapaciteit’, ‘communicatie met het 
publiek, patiënten en familie’, ‘coördinatie en samenwerking’. 
De analyse van de studies liet zien dat er weinig wetenschappelijk bewijs beschikbaar 
is met betrekking tot de voorbereiding op uitbraken. De meeste aanbevelingen 
behoorden tot de Plan en Do fase van de PDSA cyclus. 
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een gemodificeerde Delphi procedure waarin we door 
middel van de mening en ervaringen van experts uit regionale zorginstellingen een 
nadere selectie konden maken van de meest relevante kernaanbevelingen voor goede 
voorbereiding. De 80 generieke aanbevelingen die geïdentificeerd werden in het 
literatuuronderzoek in hoofdstuk 2 hebben we aan een nationaal en twee internationale 
panels voorgelegd. Het nationale panel bestond uit een multidisciplinaire groep 
experts met een variëteit aan expertise op het gebied van de voorbereiding op 
infectieziekte-uitbraken bij diverse zorginstellingen. Het ene internationale panel werd 
gevormd door de National Focal Points for preparedness and response. Het andere 
internationale panel werd gevormd door vertegenwoordigers van onderzoeksgroepen 
op het gebied van de voorbereiding en bestrijding van uitbraken. We vroegen de 
experts om de aanbevelingen te scoren op basis van relevantie voor goede kwaliteit 
voorbereiding. Van de 80 generieke aanbevelingen die het resultaat waren van het 
literatuuronderzoek werden er 61 generieke aanbevelingen door het nationale panel 
geselecteerd en hieruit werden 49 kernaanbevelingen door de twee internationale 
panels geselecteerd. Vijf aanbevelingen werden door beide panels aangewezen als 
‘meest urgent’. 
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Organisaties moeten een generiek plan hebben dat flexibiel is en aangepast kan 
worden als er nieuwe ontwikkelingen tijdens een uitbraak zijn. Daarnaast moeten 
organisaties samenwerken in de voorbereiding op uitbraken en hun plannen onderling 
afstemmen. De veiligheid van het personeel en infectiepreventiemaatregelen werden 
ook urgent bevonden door beide panels. 
We vonden ook diverse verschillen in de ‘meest urgente’ aanbevelingen tussen de 
beide internationale panels wat suggereert dat niet alle aanbevelingen even belangrijk 
zijn voor de verschillende expertgroepen. De verschillen tussen de beide panels in 
de 10 aanbevelingen die ze selecteerden als “meest urgent” kunnen waarschijnlijk 
verklaard worden door de verschillende perspectieven van de beide panels. De 
National Focal Points selecteerden verschillende aanbevelingen over de ontwikkeling 
van het voorbereidingsplan en andere formele procedures. De experts op het gebied 
van voorbereiding selecteerden meer praktische aanbevelingen. Wanneer een regio 
de voorbereiding op uitbraken wil verbeteren is het praktisch onmogelijk om te 
focussen op de gehele set omdat deze te omvangrijk is. Een zinvolle aanpak is daarom 
om te concentreren om de meest urgente aanbevelingen. De verschillen tussen de 
twee panels laten zien dat de achtergrond en het perspectief van de persoon die deze 
keuze moet maken de selectie beïnvloedt. Het is daarom belangrijk alle relevante 
stakeholders uit de regio te betrekken bij de selectie van items voor voorbereiding op 
uitbraken om te zorgen dat alle perspectieven geïncludeerd zijn. 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft een gemodificeerde Delphi procedure waarin 
rampenbestrijders en professionals op het gebied van infectieziektebestrijding 
een set kernaanbevelingen selecteerden die goede kwaliteit bestrijding weergeven. 
Als eerste stap bestudeerden we 54 nationale en internationale publicaties en 
extraheerden daaruit meer dan 200 aanbevelingen. Vervolgens legden we deze 
aanbevelingen voor aan een panel van onder andere infectieziekte-artsen en 
-verpleegkundigen, beleidsmakers en communicatie experts (n=48) door middel 
van een vragenlijst en expertbijeenkomst. Na een tweede vragenlijst waarin we het 
panel vroeg de aanbevelingen te prioriteren en een expert bijeenkomst waarin de 
experts akkoord gaven voor de geselecteerde set bleven er 65 aanbevelingen over. 
De kernaanbevelingen werden ingedeeld in 10 domeinen die de gehele bestrijding 
beschreven van uitbraak herkenning tot nazorg. Deze studie beschrijft de selectie 
van een set van kernaanbevelingen die goede kwaliteit bestrijding beschrijft. 
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Bij het systematisch beoordelen van literatuur over de voorbereiding op uitbraken 
kwamen we enkele specifieke aanbevelingen tegen met betrekking tot ondersteuning 
voor zorgmedewerkers. Toen we deze echter aan de panels presenteerden voor 
beoordeling op relevantie werden al deze aanbevelingen als minder relevant 
beschouwd en dus niet geselecteerd. Deze bevinding vormde de aanzet voor deze 
meer diepgaande studie om inzicht te krijgen in de behoeften van zorgmedewerkers 
ten tijde van een uitbraak. 
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft de ervaringen van zorgmedewerkers in Nederland die 
voor een van Ebola verdachte patiënt hebben gezorgd om inzicht te verkrijgen in 
hoe ervaringen kunnen bijdragen om zorginstellingen te helpen zich goed voor te 
bereiden, en dan in het bijzonder op de (specifieke) behoeften van hun medewerkers. 
Onze resultaten laten zien dat de meeste zorgmedewerkers de totale ervaring als 
positief beschreven, ondanks hun ook aangegeven bestaande angsten. De interviews 
onderstreepten het belang van een ondersteunende werkomgeving. Trainen en 
oefenen werden door de geïnterviewden ook genoemd als behulpzaam in het omgaan 
met deze nieuwe situatie met een hoog risico op infectie. In de voorbereiding op 
uitbraken richten zorginstellingen zich vooral op medische, hygiënische en organisatie 
aspecten terwijl de menselijke factoren genegeerd lijken te worden. Ons onderzoek 
laat zien dat een ondersteunende werkomgeving met ondersteuning van het team en 
managers cruciaal is om te voldoen aan de behoeften van zorgmedewerkers. 
Omdat de ervaringen in Nederland met Ebola beperkt zijn, en de voorzieningen in 
Nederland weinig tekortkomingen hebben, kunnen de ervaringen zoals omschreven 
in het vorige hoofdstuk een rooskleurige vertekening geven voor noodzakelijke 
aandachtspunten in de voorbereiding. Daar waar Ebola werkelijk grote hoeveelheden 
mensen trof en de voorzieningen aanzienlijk beperkter zijn dan in Nederland kunnen 
wellicht andere aandachtpunten naar voren komen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft daarom een onderzoek naar de ervaringen van vrijwilligers 
die in West Afrika werkten in mobiele laboratoria ten tijde van de Ebola uitbraak. 
Ook hier vonden we voornamelijk positieve ervaringen. De vrijwilligers noemden 
positieve gevolgen van hun missie die veel verder reikten dan hun dagelijks werk, 
zoals een verandering in hun prioriteiten in het leven en een grote waardering voor 
de waarde van hun eigen leven. Tegelijkertijd heeft een dergelijke missie soms grote 
gevolgen voor de vrijwilliger zelf en voor hun familie. Zo gaf bijvoorbeeld de helft van 
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de respondenten aan dat hun familie bang was dat de respondent besmet zou raken 
met het Ebola virus.
In hoofdstuk 7 proberen we de resultaten van de verschillende studies te integreren 
en presenteren we de hoofdbevindingen van dit proefschrift. De eerste hoofbevinding 
betreft de verbinding tussen voorbereiding en bestrijding. De kernaanbevelingen 
die geselecteerd zijn voor generieke voorbereiding zouden logischerwijs moeten 
corresponderen met de kernaanbevelingen die geselecteerd zijn voor bestrijding, 
omdat in de voorbereiding alle voorbereidende werkzaamheden voor de bestrijding 
gedaan moeten zijn. Wanneer we beide sets vergelijken blijkt dit niet het geval te zijn. 
De tweede hoofdbevinding betreft de ondersteuning voor zorgmedewerkers. Er is in 
de literatuur over de uitbraken weinig informatie over de gewenste ondersteuning 
van zorgmedewerkers te vinden, terwijl zij het risico lopen zelf ziek te worden en dit 
door te geven aan hun contacten. Een werkomgeving die voldoet aan de behoeften 
van het individu en zorgt voor de ondersteuning van het team is cruciaal. Bij het 
voorbereiden op uitbraken moet rekening worden gehouden met de behoeften van 
zorgverleners.
  
Gebaseerd op de geïntegreerde kennis uit dit proefschrift hebben we een model 
opgesteld waarin voorbereiding en bestrijding samengaan. We hebben een gelaagde 
PDSA-cirkel ontwikkeld. We willen daarmee de bestaande spraakverwarring over 
voorbereiding en bestrijding en de discussie over domeingrenzen doorbreken. Deze 
cirkel omvat en verbindt drie verschillende lagen (generieke voorbereiding, bij 
dreiging specifieke voorbereiding en de bestrijding) en geeft verschillende routes weer 
om te leren van uitbraken en oefeningen. De cirkel geeft inzicht in het complete 
proces van voorbereiding en bestrijding van uitbraken. Wij denken hiermee een stap 
te hebben gezet naar een uniforme taal waarmee onderlinge afstemming sterk kan 
verbeteren. Het is volgens ons belangrijk om te weten waar in de cirkel (generieke 
voorbereiding, specifieke voorbereiding of bestrijding) men zich precies bevindt en 
voor welk onderdeel er lessen worden geleerd uit eerdere uitbraken. De bestrijding 
van een specifieke uitbraak bevat waardevolle lessen om generieke en specifieke 
voorbereiding op uitbraken te verbeteren waardoor deze lessen duurzaam worden 
gebruikt voor toekomstige uitbraken. 
Als laatste presenteren we de implicaties van dit proefschrift voor onderzoek 
en praktijk. We zijn van mening dat er waardevolle bijdragen zullen komen uit 
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onderzoek naar de ervaringen en behoeften van zorgmedewerkers. De behoeften 
van zorgmedewerkers bij voorbereiding en bestrijding moeten worden vertaald in 
kwaliteitsindicatoren en een integraal onderdeel worden van voorbereidings- en 
bestrijdingsplannen. Met de door ons gepresenteerde meerlaagse PDSA-cirkel als 
uitgangspunt kan vervolgonderzoek de generieke voorbereiding en de bestrijding aan 
elkaar verbinden. Een eerste stap daartoe zou moeten zijn de beide sets aanbevelingen 
te vergelijken en te integreren, inclusief de behoeften van zorgmedewerkers. In de 
uitvoering kan de gelaagde PDSA cirkel die we presenteren in dit proefschrift gebruikt 
worden door zorgprofessionals, organisaties en beleidsmakers. Zorgprofessionals, 
organisaties en beleidsmakers zouden meer focus moeten leggen op de behoeften 
van zorgmedewerkers en vrijwilligers tijdens de voorbereiding en bestrijding van 
uitbraken. 
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Het doen van een promotieonderzoek is niet altijd makkelijk. Gelukkig waren er 
altijd lieve collega’s, vrienden en familie om me er doorheen te slepen. Hier is hij dan 
eindelijk, mijn eigen proefschrift! In dit dankwoord wil ik jullie graag voor al jullie 
steun bedanken. 
Allereerst wil ik graag mijn promotor en drie copromotoren (jazeker 3!, het zorgde 
nog even voor wat stress voor dat dat officieel was) bedanken voor hun begeleiding 
en ondersteuning. 
Beste Prof. dr. M. Hulscher, beste Marlies, we leerden elkaar bij AMPHI al kennen. 
Meteen vielen jouw methodologische insteek en detailniveau van feedback op. Soms 
duurt het even, maar na jouw akkoord wist ik altijd zeker dat een stuk ook echt goed was. 
Beste dr. A. Timen, beste Aura, met jouw scherpe blik wist je altijd feilloos een 
brug te slaan tussen verschillende onderwerpen en onderzoeken. Daarnaast wist je 
ook al mijn Engelse zinnen te verfraaien of corrigeren (ik zal mijn best doen om 
nooit meer een who-/that- fout te maken). Ik denk met veel plezier terug aan de 
congressen waar we samen zijn geweest in Brussel, Glasgow, Wenen en Stockholm. 
Beste dr. J. van Steenbergen, beste Jim, mijn bureaula ligt vol met schema’s en 
tekeningen van al onze brainstormsessies. Zodra ik ergens even geen oplossing voor 
wist, maakte jij tijd vrij om er samen voor te gaan zitten. Erg fijn! Ook als ik even niet 
meer wist hoe ik een probleem in de sociale context moest oplossen, was je er voor me. 
Beste dr. A. Huis, beste Anita, met jouw methodologische input en expertise vanuit 
de ziekenhuiswereld wist je het onderzoek altijd aan te scherpen en te verbeteren.
Ik wil graag de leden van de manuscriptcommissie, prof. dr. M.A.W. Merkx, prof. dr. 
A.J.A.M. van der Ven en prof. dr. S.E. Geerlings bedanken voor het beoordelen van 
mijn proefschrift. 
I would like to thank all experts who have filled out a questionnaire or were present 
at one of the consensus meetings. Daarnaast wil ik ook iedereen bedanken die mee 
heeft gedaan aan een van de interviews. Ook wil ik alle mensen bedanken bij wie ik 
terecht kon met vragen over methodologie of voor uitleg over de praktische kant van 
de infectieziektebestrijding. Jullie kennis en ervaring was onmisbaar voor een goede 
uitvoering van dit onderzoek. Ook alle stagiaires die een bijdrage hebben geleverd 
aan dit promotie onderzoek (Michelle, Cherelle, Sarah en Priya), fijn dat jullie vol 
enthousiasme aan mijn onderzoek wilden meewerken. 
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Mijn eerste onderzoek voerde ik uit bij de Academische Werkplaats AMPHI onder 
dagelijkse begeleiding van Jeannine Hautvast. Jeannine, jouw begeleiding en je 
praktische tips zorgden ervoor dat ik me meteen thuis voelde bij AMPHI. Beste 
AMPHI collega’s (Olga, Joris, Laura, Alma, Emilie, Helma, Helen en Hanneke) ik 
heb een erg fijne tijd met jullie gehad! 
Hierna maakte ik een klein uitstapje naar het LCI/Universiteit Twente om samen 
met Desirée (Dr. Desirée inmiddels), de tekenapp te ontwikkelen. Beste Desirée, 
tijdens de paar maanden die we hebben samengewerkt heb ik veel van je geleerd. 
Jouw enthousiasme, creativiteit en de vrijheid die je geeft, zijn enorm inspirerend. 
Uiteindelijk werd ik een echte promovendus en ging bij de LCI (4 dagen) en IQ 
healthcare (1 dag) aan de slag. Als je ergens maar 1 dag per week bent zoals ik bij 
IQ zou je denken dat je de meeste dingen van de afdeling niet meekrijgt. Bij IQ was 
daar echter totaal geen sprake van. Halverwege de ochtend samen met een kopje 
koffie kreeg ik altijd een update over alle gebeurtenissen en roddels uit de kelder van 
de afgelopen week (Annelie dank daarvoor) en was ik weer helemaal op de hoogte. 
De IQ-lunches, borrels, diners (vooral het afscheidsdiner van Jan staat me nog erg 
goed bij), stapavondjes (vooral die magische avond in de Hofman), logeerpartijtjes, 
4-daagse feesten, het Wardloopweekend en een weekendje Kopenhagen waren enorm 
gezellig. Gelukkig zijn de meeste daarvan vereeuwigd in het leuke plakboek dat ik 
van jullie kreeg bij mijn afscheid! Beste IQ-collega’s (Annelie, Lisanne, Karin, Guus, 
Jan, Dominique, Julia, Sofie, Thomas, Ellen … en iedereen die ik ben vergeten in 
dit lijstje), bedankt voor alle gezelligheid! Lieve Annelie, al heel snel (zelfs jaren voor 
mijn uiteindelijke verdediging) was duidelijk dat jij mijn paranimf zou worden. Als 
je iets goed geregeld wil hebben of mentale support nodig hebt, dan kan je niemand 
beter om hulp kan vragen dan jou. Bedankt voor alle afleiding en alle momenten dat 
ik je mocht bellen om je hulp in te schakelen of stoom af te blazen.
Beste LCI-kamergenootjes (Germa, Babette, Nora, Renske, Marion, Kim) en oud-
kamergenootjes (Laura, Lianne en Lydia). Met zijn allen zitten we op de gezelligste, en 
waarschijnlijk ook luidruchtigste, kamer van de LCI. Van serieuze onderzoeksvragen, 
sportplannen tot het bespreken van elkaars weekend en persoonlijke verhalen, alles 
komt bij ons voorbij. Dank jullie wel voor jullie luisterend oor en de gezelligheid. Beste 
Laura, we leerden elkaar bij AMPHI kennen als kamergenoten en niet veel later werd 
je ook bij de LCI mijn kamergenoot. Dankjewel voor alle koffiemomentjes samen! 
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Beste preparedness-LCI-ers (Corien, Dorothee, André, Suzanne en Doret), iedere 
maand bespreken we gezamenlijk de stand van zaken van alle preparedness projecten. 
Ik vind het altijd erg leuk om op deze manier met jullie samen te werken en op de 
hoogte te zijn van alles wat er speelt in preparedness land, ook buiten het onderzoek. 
Ook als ik een extra mening of inzicht nodig heb voor mijn onderzoek staan jullie 
klaar, erg fijn! 
Beste LCI-collega’s, bedankt voor jullie interesse in mijn onderzoek en de gezelligheid. 
Lieve familie en schoonfamilie, zo’n promotieonderzoek was voor jullie ook een 
beetje nieuw en soms was er dus wel een beetje tekst en uitleg nodig om duidelijk te 
maken waar ik bezig was en vooral, waarom dat toch zo verschrikkelijk lang moest 
duren. Gelukkig waren jullie altijd bereid om me mijn verhaal te laten doen. 
Lieve doctor Marlieke, doctor Ellen, dokter Yvon en dokter Anne, eindelijk mag 
ik me ook in het doctor/dokter rijtje aansluiten. Bedankt voor alle leuke etentjes 
en momenten samen. Marlieke, wat fijn dat jij mijn paranimf kan zijn. Al hoewel 
je inmiddels al een aantal jaar ver weg in Duitsland woont (ja, daar blijven we nog 
jaren over zeuren) doen we regelmatig leuke dingen samen en maak je altijd tijd om 
gezellig bij te praten.
Lieve Youri, van jou krijg ik altijd alle vrijheid, ruimte en tijd om te doen waar ik 
gelukkig van word. Jij hebt altijd geloofd dat ik dit tot een goed einde zou weten te 
brengen, zelfs op de momenten dat ik dat niet deed. Dankjewel daarvoor!
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TRAINING ACTIVITIES
a) Courses & Workshops
- Introduction day Radboudumc
- RIHS Introduction Course for PhD students 
- EpidM Klinimetrie: het ontwikkelen en evalueren van 
meetinstrumenten 
- Cochrane Netherlands Het ontwikkelen van een Cochrane 
systematische review over interventies 
- Scientific Integrity 
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- Presenteren eigen onderzoek
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2014
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1.5
1.0
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b) Seminars & lectures
-  Landelijke conferentie AWP Crisisbeheersing 
- Radboud Research Round
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0.1
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